Ukraine's OpSec in planning the Kursk operation has been spectacular. WSJ obtained new details of the operation:
CinC Syrskyi gathered senior officers for a secret meeting in late July where he disclosed an audacious plan to revive the country’s flagging war effort. 1/10⬇️
Syrskiy had evidently drawn conclusions from Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive during the summer of 2023, when Ukraine consulted with the U.S. and other Western partners, deployed newly formed brigades and telegraphed its plans with videos and public comments. 2/10
Only a small number of senior officers took part in the meetings, led by Syrskiy, to thrash out detailed plans for the incursion. Syrskiy tapped battle-hardened units, such as the 80th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades, to lead the incursion and didn’t inform the U.S. of plans. 3/10
“The strong point of Syrskiy is that he is a general who can act unusually, suddenly, unexpectedly for the enemy" Serhiy Cherevatiy, Syrskiy’s former communications adviser. “He knows we don’t have parity and can’t go head-to-head, so he uses cunning and any advantage we have.”
Before Syrskiy’s July meeting with senior officers from units selected for the operation, troops from the 61st Brigade had spent months training in the east for what officers assumed would be another defensive engagement. 5/10
Even after the general’s disclosure that they would be going into Russia, Kholodkevych, the brigade’s chief of staff, thought it might simply be a bluff, meant to deceive the Russians. 6/10
The transfer of the 61st Brigade from the east was accompanied by a disinformation campaign indicating they were headed for Vovchansk, a northern city under assault since May, when Russia launched its own cross-border incursion. 7/10
Ukraine is using new tactics and equipment to gain an upper hand where Russian defenses are weaker, including using small explosive drones to strike down helicopters and Russian surveillance drones. 8/10
The commander of a drone unit, call sign Aristarkh, said that was allowing Ukrainian artillery to move more freely and hit more targets as the threat of discovery is lower. 9/10
Aristarkh’s teams operate strike drones with a range of 30 miles that can drop aerial bombs on high-value targets such as artillery guns. 10/10
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Very insightful observations by Kyrylo Veres, Hero of Ukraine and Commander of the K-2 Brigade, on drone warfare:
It is expected that within a few months there will be “traffic jams” of ground robotic systems in the better-equipped brigades. 1/15
However, many other brigades will likely not receive such systems for another three years, which is regrettable. 2/15
The effectiveness of kamikaze-type UGVs depends on the specific operational task. There are many units that employ them exceptionally well when used appropriately. In most cases, manufacturers are able to adjust their designs to meet these evolving requirements. 3/15
Andriy Biletskyi, Commander of the Third Army Corps, on Ukraine’s Military Outlook for 2026:
Regardless of whether the war continues or the country enters a period of ceasefire, the Ukrainian army must change, and it must do so immediately. 1/16
In Ukraine, there is an illusion that increasing the size of the armed forces automatically equals “coffee in Crimea.” This is not the case. 2/16
First Problem - People
Without high-quality basic training and without a strong non-commissioned officer corps, increasing troop numbers only means higher losses. 3/16
Very interesting remarks from Deputy commander of Ukraine's HATRED reconnaissance battalion:
The war evolves roughly every six months. At the moment, it is entering a new era — the widespread introduction of artificial intelligence. 1/11
Half a year ago, the dominant trend involved FPV drones, heavy bombers, “vampires,” and the broad use of uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs), combat modules, and kamikaze systems. In parallel, electronic warfare and signals intelligence capabilities have been expanding rapidly. 2/11
It now appears that the next stage will be AI systems capable of carrying out combat tasks autonomously: you upload the program, and then — much like in Terminator — the system performs the mission. Perimeter defense, 360-degree surveillance, robots fighting robots. 3/11
A must-read assessment of the current state of the war by General Hennadiy Shapovalov, Commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine:
Modern warfare is defined by constant adaptation. 1/15
The most difficult challenge has been the need for continuous adjustment to changes in both enemy and friendly tactics, as success now depends on the ability to evolve faster than the opponent. 2/15
While experience gained since 2014 remained relevant in the early stages of the full-scale invasion in 2022, today combat operations, command-and-control methods, and the employment of forces and assets have undergone a profound transformation. 3/15
General Syrskyi on the transformation of modern warfare:
We are witnessing a rapid and fundamental shift in the very paradigm of warfare. 1/15
At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, combat was conducted in a largely traditional manner: battalion tactical groups, armored columns, and large concentrations of infantry. Today, the battlefield has been transformed by the mass introduction of drones of every type. 2/15
It is now impossible to imagine warfare without drones, or to imagine commanders and headquarters making decisions without accounting for them. Countering drones, destroying enemy drones and their launch sites, has become the number-one task for any commander. 3/15
Macron's very important statements regarding Ukraine
If Ukraine decides and asks for allied forces to be on its territory, it is not up to Russia to accept or not. 1/4 ⬇️
A thirty-day ceasefire has made it possible to reconcile views and agree on a process that allows for the establishment of trust. 2/4
Moscow's refusal and the implicit threats that have been made (...) demonstrate the insincerity of Russia's commitment and, ultimately, its unwillingness to undertake genuine peacemaking. 3/4