Trent Telenko Profile picture
Sep 2 20 tweets 8 min read Read on X
What is the thing that stands out the most in this Moscow video of an AFU drone striking a Russian refinery _IN_DAYLIGHT_?

IT'S WHAT'S MISSING.

Consider: Where are the VKS fighter jets?

Where Russian Drone Defense vs AFU strategic drone bombing🧵
1/
Ukrainian PSU Mig-29's are downing Shaheed's in daylight.

Where are the Russian fighter jets over Moscow?

2/
Ukrainian PSU Hind helicopters are in the air shooting down Shaheed's in daylight.

Where are the Russian VKS Hind attack choppers over Moscow?

3/
Ukrainian PSU Hip transport helicopters are in the air shooting down Shaheed's in daylight.

Where are the Russian VKS Hip transport helicopters over Moscow?

4/
Ukrainian PSU Yak-52 trainers are in the air shooting down observation drones in daylight.

Where are the Russian propeller trainers over Moscow?

5/
Ukrainian Territorial Defense flak units are all over Ukraine for more than 18 months shooting down Shaheeds.

Where are the Russian mobile flak units in Moscow?

6/
Pointing to a map showing the density of S-300, S-400, and Pantsir surface to air missile launchers misses the reality of Russia's inability to adapt to drones.

7/
People looking at this video of a Ukrainian drone being downed by a Pantsir missile (TOR-M SAM have smoke trails) think of it as a successful Russian Defense.

The AFU drone you saw cost between $20K & $99K.

The Russian missile cost $1 million(+).

8/
Even if you believe the Russian claims of 158 AFU drones killed.

Russia used at least one missile per drone for a minimum of $158 million in defense.

The maximum Ukraine spent on the OWA drones is $15 million. That is a 10 to 1 cost effectiveness

9/
...advantage for Ukraine.

Four of the five ways Ukraine was defending against Shaheed class drones was with machine gun and cannon fire.

Moscow's obsolete in the face of drone swarm, missile based, defenses were hit with a drone saturation attack at low level on one axis.

10/
As @secretsqrl123 noted during the 9/1/2024 AFU drone swarm over Moscow.

Specific S-300 & Pantsir batteries selected by AFU intelligence had their missile stores exhausted.

Low, slow & cheap drones kept on coming on that route.

11/

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Ths map of AFU drone strikes shows 12 different target areas with Sept 1, 2024 drone impacts/engagements inside Russia.

Many more desired mean points of impact (DMPI) were were represented with those flame tags and each DMPI had multiple drones

12/
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...aimed at them.

The oil distillation cracking towers of the Kaputnya refinery near Moscow ate several AFU drones.

13/
Far more impressive was Ukrainian drones took out two major Moscow area power plants.

~86% of Russian railway freight is pulled by electric locomotive engines.

No power in Moscow decapitates both the central rail hub

14/

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...for which there are no redundant rail line route arounds as well as natural gas pipeline hub for the Russian federation.

Russian electric engines on depowered rail lines block diesel engine trains.

16/
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Small, cheap, low & slow drones are a b*tch of a target for modern integrated air defenses (IADS) in the age of satellite radar interference tracking of all active Russian air defense radars

Turn on a radar under the wrong radar satellites

17/

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...and it is literally "X" marks the spot.

Two satellite radar interference passes overlayed will draw an "X marks the spot" of the location of a surface to air missile radar in the "C" & "X" bands, which covers most RuAF SAMs.

18/

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Ukraine's satellite radar interference tracking and electronic tools like Cambridge Pixel app below together can predict where Russian radar coverage can see low flying drones for drone swarm strikes like the one at Moscow.

19/
Russia has a much larger exposed economic & logistical "cross section" compared to Ukraine.

This means Ukraine has a much more massive target set to demolish via strategic drone bombing.

20/


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It also means there are too many vital targets for Russian missile defenses to protect that were built with the Soviet Union's "One Big Plant" gigantism.

Precision drone strikes on key power & gas infrastructure feeding those key plants will have disproportionate effects.

21/21 Image

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More from @TrentTelenko

Sep 1
It appears the Ukrainian Kusk incursion has been accompanied by a new Security Service of Ukraine fixed wing FPV drone called the Gray Widow-1 that has a range of 50 km to stop Russian road & rail traffic.

AFU's Cut Rate Lancet in Kursk🧵
1/


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The twin engine Gray Widow-2 was shown in the same article.

It is unclear what the range/payload of the FPV/loitering munition will be, but something significantly over 52 km is a good guess.

2/
mil.in.ua/en/news/a-batc…
Image
The video of the Gray Widow-1 operations make clear it is now in service.

It's an easy to use munition that is logistically simpler to move and set up than a 60mm mortar and outranges a M109A6 155mm/L39 Cal gun firing an Excalibur GPS guided shell.

3/
Read 8 tweets
Aug 31
Bwa-Ha-Ha-ha-ha...

I've seen pro-Russian trolls waving this IMF freak flag after one of my posts pointing out the history of how Russian agricultural sector collapse precedes a bigger economic collapse.

Let's look at the official Russian numbers, courtesy of Joe Bloggs.
1/
This is a spreadsheet comparing the hard numbers of US versus Russian economic growth of Jan 2018 - Dec 2023.

BLUF:

The US economy grew more.

2/
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This spreadsheet is a comparison of economic purchasing power of the Russian economy over time given the ruble's decline in value in the world economy in terms of the US dollar.

BLUF:

Russian world purchasing power fell 16% from Dec. 2017 to Dec 2023.
3/ Image
Read 10 tweets
Aug 31
This is an English translation 🧵of a Russian language article describing the RuAF "final 10 km to the front line" motor transport logistics made up of donated and stolen civilian motor transport.

RuAF Mafia logistics🧵
1/
The Front-Line troops and Russian Army MP's are now drawing guns on one another as the Russian MP's latest leader in occupied Ukraine is trying to enforce a year-old order to confiscate "Non-standard" motor transport from the front-line troops.

2/
Culturally, this 2024 Russian wartime behavior mirrors that of the Soviet state in late 1941-early 1942 period as described in "The Soviet Home Front, 1941-1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II" by John Barber & Mark Harrison.

3/
amazon.com/Soviet-Home-Fr…
Read 10 tweets
Aug 29
We see videos like this and there are still Western ground forces officers' denying that FPV's drones are a major battlefield threat to tanks.

The ability to steer an overmatching shaped charge to the weakest armor points on a tank requires a new approach to tank design.
1/
FYI, the highest US production rate for the M-1 Abrams at the height of the Cold War was 70 a month, 840 a year.

Pre-1979 tank designs were not built for top attack protection against major caliber shaped charge attacks FPV's deliver.

And it shows⬇️

2/
Pimping out pre-1979 tank designs are a semi-useful adaptation that are better than WW2 sandbags.

However, catastrophic top attack loss rates of over 100 tanks a month are not sustainable by anyone.

Russia lost 122 tanks in April 2024.

3/3
Read 4 tweets
Aug 28
This is going to be my third 🧵on the AFU's Palyanitsa one way attack (OWA) Drone and the latest information on its cluster munitions payload per the briefing from the "Reporting from Ukraine" YouTube channel.

Palyanitsa Payload/Success Analysis🧵

1/
In the first Palyanitsa thread I did a cost effectiveness analysis at a $300K price point for "American procurement realistic" numbers.

The actual Ukrainian price point of a Palyanitsa is $40K.

That's 75 for the price of one JASSM.

2/
The jet powered Palyanitsa has a speed of ~300 knots indicated.

This makes it a very difficult target for machine guns or 23mm autocannon's but still too cheap for most missiles to down.

3/
Read 18 tweets
Aug 25
What the Palyanytsia drone-missile brings that other Ukrainian OWA drones lack is _SPEED_.

They are moving at better than 300 knots indicated, compared to about 100 knots for a propeller OWA drone.

AFU Jet OWA Drone impact🧵
1/
In 30 minutes, a propeller OWA drone reaches 92 km versus 277.8 km for a Palyanytsia drone-missile.

This makes a huge difference for the VKS scrambling jets to avoid Ukrainian drone attacks.

2/
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While Russian VKS jets have moved back out of the 300 km ATACMS range.

VKS Attack helicopter forward area refueling points cannot.

This also complicates VKS attempts to shuttle bomb through forward air fields.


3/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuttle_b…
Read 5 tweets

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