It bothers me about the alarmist takes on Russian nuclear sabre rattling that nukes are reserved for an extreme case & the conditions of an existential threat must be met to contemplate use.
Even with a more “liberal” 🇷🇺 doctrine, I don’t see how this war would tick the boxes.
As much as Putin would like to twist and turn it, it’s not a defensive war for Russia. It’s also not an existential one. It’s a war of choice.
AND it’s supposed to be a minor regional conflict, so nuclear use in such a context would signal extreme weakness.
Military experts have pointed out that Russia would hardly gain much by using tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. On the other hand, politically that would change the conflict significantly, for the worse for Russia.
I’d assume that since Putin sees himself at war with the wider west, he would want to reserve nukes for a NATO-Russia war. What is he going to escalate to if he already goes nuclear in Ukraine. More and bigger nukes ?
I don’t mean to take the risk of nuclear escalation lightly, but I just struggle to see what the rationale could be from Putin’s point of view to actually use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
It seems to work well on the rhetorical level though.
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As a Finn, I know what it feels like to be part of a nation that is several generations into the healing process after an unjust aggression that was successfully averted but not without massive consequences. That’s why it’s killing me what we are doing to Ukrainians. A thread:
In the Winter War Finland wasn’t important enough for anyone in the world (not even its neighbours) to receive substantial military aid. The result could’ve been different if only we had had an air force. Sounds familiar ?
Finns were tactically & strategically totally superior to the Soviet army and inflicted incredible losses on the invader. But when the Soviets managed to shift the fight to an attritional frontline, Finland couldn’t sustain the fight due to much less manpower. Sounds familiar ?
For me, the most frustrating thing about Zeitenwende is that I hoped for it to include Germany learning to make right decisions and not always having to go through the loop of first making a bad decision and then being forced to correct course under pressure from partners. Alas
As a diplomatic source in Berlin astutely described it, “Zeitenwende could have been a quantum leap but they made it a time loop”
Also, it’s mind boggling that Germany, not only the largest economy in Europe but the 3rd largest in the world, thinks that allocating €34bn in total aid (incl military, humanitarian & financial) is somehow sufficient for a war on our continent… bundesregierung.de/breg-de/schwer…
With the Kursk operation proceeding beyond all expectations, Ukraine has reminded both Russia and the West that the war is far from settled.
I wonder whether many decision-makers and analysts in the west fully appreciate what’s at stake in this war. Some thoughts:
First: there’s no “deal solution” available. Not even Trump can “deal his way out” because there’s no status quo to return to.
At this point the war has unfolded a global effect that is the question whether the western-dominated rules-based world order will prevail.
It’s very much a win or lose situation. Russia has gathered around itself a group of states (Iran, North Korea, China) that are eager to challenge the West’s dominant position and all profit from the continuation of the war.
People have been puzzling over Ukraine’s objectives in the Kursk operation. Politically, I can think of at least 7:
- catch Russia off guard and bring the war to Russians in a way they haven’t experienced before
- make Putin look stupid and hopefully generate discontent
- boost morale in Ukraine
- kill morale in Russia
- seize control of the information sphere
- show the west that Russia can be attacked without it resulting in WW3 (🤞)
- reassure western supporters that Ukraine can win this war
- put an end to the recently increased talk about when would be a good time to start negotiating by mixing up the front line
- tactically, to force Russia to move troops in a way that opens possibilities for Ukraine elsewhere
This reminds me of a conversation I had in November 2022 with a Russian opposition-supporter who had fled Russia. They said that Finland’s visa restrictions on Russians are undermining our own value system.
I explained that the extensive access Russians enjoyed to Europe was a privilege, not a right. Therefore, it can be revoked if the trust that’s the basis of granting such a privilege is broken.
No other third country nationals from the EU’s eastern neighbourhood had such access
Apart from the necessity to make Russian citizens feel the consequences of the war, which includes taking away that access to Europe, it’s also a security question. Due to Russia’s extremely cynical methods, it’s hard to know who might turn out to be a “little green man”.
In the past 2 years, most Finns also seriously asked themselves the question: would I be ready to die defending my country ? And for most of them, the answer was yes. Finns know that a war would mean many of us dying. That’s why we want to prevent one (hence NATO membership)
In spring 2022, I had this conversation with literally all my friends: Finns living abroad wondering whether they should go back to Finland just in case, and even most left wing artist friends inquiring whether they could also contribute in some way to the war effort if need be
Now, the mood is different. Russia has emptied the border of troops and equipment (they’re all in Ukraine…) and it looks like it’ll take them a while to reconstitute in a way that would pose a serious military threat to Finland. The new military districts only exist in excel