The FSB has allowed the largest data leak. It's not just about the electronic documents that were published by "Important Stories" and "Ukrainian Truth", but the Ukrainian side has also gotten its hands on the documentation of all Russian structures in the Kursk region.
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The fleeing Russians left everything behind, including top secret documents. According to the leadership, they were supposed to burn the most sensitive documents to prevent them from leaking, but they didn't. Most of the documents were handed over to journalist Dmytro
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Karpenko, who is publishing them in parts on his Telegram and YouTube channels. What's more interesting is not the facts associated with them, but the lies they contain. The Russian leadership has long relied on the FSB, just as the USSR relied on the NKVD, the KGB, and
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everything before and after. The security forces have always served as the main lever of influence on both the people and intra-party relations. Throughout the years of their existence in Russia, the security agencies, in order to justify their existence, their work and
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usefulness, are constantly busy looking for external and internal enemies. The atmosphere of paranoia in these structures is the fundamental driving force. The documents obtained reveal the network of lies in the FSB and how it spreads from the very bottom of the chain from
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the officer's report to the very top on Putin's desk. Agent messages, questionnaires of recruited agents, denunciations and reports - they are all united by a common tendency to lie in those who prepared these documents. In an attempt to get a medal or a prize for uncovering
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a secret chain of foreign agents, FSB officers conduct investigative activities, creating the appearance of vigorous activity. However, relying on the false reports of his special services, Putin at some point decided that he would be met with flowers in Ukraine. Putin
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really believes the information that is reported to him up the chain. He believes in anti-Russian conspiracies of the Anglo-Saxons and the incredible successes of Russia, crucified boys, NATO mercenaries and other nonsense because this is what the FSB agent networks report
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to him. Thus, one of the reports said that Ukraine is recruiting children under 16 and pensioners over 65 into its "volunteer units" in order to later present them as victims of the conflict. The training of these units is conducted by an English-speaking instructor from
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Wales. Another agent wrote about the "Azov children's camps". The atmosphere of paranoia is the main feature of the FSB. A normal, healthy person could never work in the Russian security forces. They recruit a certain type of people. If there is no external and internal
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enemy, there is no point in the security forces. Therefore, they invent one for themselves and "take him into development", writing crazy reports, based on which Putin runs the country. He seriously believes in hordes of neo-Nazis marching through Ukrainian cities,
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secret NATO bio-labs and conspiracy theories. Based on these reports, Putin did not expect to encounter resistance in Ukraine and did not know the real state of his army. He probably does not know the real state of his nuclear forces either.
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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