The biggest "Ah-Hah!" in the thread was the observation that the Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries and depots were less an oil campaign than a transportation campaign aimed at sucking up Russian rail capacity.
>>"Oil & Oil (Petroleum Products),
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...they did move more in August than previously. This may have been because they HAD to due to the oil depot problems.
Remember, any time they ADD or REMOVE an export ban on gasoline (or similar) it causes difficulties for Russian Railways."
In so many words, Ukrainian depot & refinery targeting is forcing the creation of priority Russian diesel & kerosine shipments that are eating up the declining Russian locomotive engine capacity.
Finally, all the other long crunchy data @prune602 laid out is screaming END-RUN PRODUCTION at me a 'la WW2 Nazi Germany's railway collapse.
Things like less intermediate goods being moved because oil & gasoline had to be just jumps out.
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The whole idea of "End-Run Production," if it is remembered at all in DC, is usually applied to the Imperial Japanese in the closing months of WW2 when 1945 Japanese production was only 32% of its peak.
The clip below is from "The Great Crusade - A New Complete History of the Second World War, Revised," page 420.
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The collapse of the Russian railway system carrying capability is incredibly important from the End-Run Production point of view as it 43% of all Russian transportation, much more for east-west movement and 86% of the rail freight is electric powered.
Ukraine is forcing massive reprioritization of Russian railway traffic at the same time it is hitting Moscow power plants to disrupt the central rail hub Moscow represents.
Russian electric engines on depowered rail lines block diesel engine trains.
At 1,300 KIA/MIA a day, the Russians lose all the ground combat elements of a Russian division a week.
The drop in Russian artillery losses from 70 to 10 a day reflects either fewer tubes being used or an unwillingness to expose tubes w/o heavy drone jamming covering them.
It appears the Ukrainian Kusk incursion has been accompanied by a new Security Service of Ukraine fixed wing FPV drone called the Gray Widow-1 that has a range of 50 km to stop Russian road & rail traffic.
The video of the Gray Widow-1 operations make clear it is now in service.
It's an easy to use munition that is logistically simpler to move and set up than a 60mm mortar and outranges a M109A6 155mm/L39 Cal gun firing an Excalibur GPS guided shell.
I've seen pro-Russian trolls waving this IMF freak flag after one of my posts pointing out the history of how Russian agricultural sector collapse precedes a bigger economic collapse.
Let's look at the official Russian numbers, courtesy of Joe Bloggs. 1/
This is a spreadsheet comparing the hard numbers of US versus Russian economic growth of Jan 2018 - Dec 2023.
BLUF:
The US economy grew more.
2/
This spreadsheet is a comparison of economic purchasing power of the Russian economy over time given the ruble's decline in value in the world economy in terms of the US dollar.
BLUF:
Russian world purchasing power fell 16% from Dec. 2017 to Dec 2023. 3/
This is an English translation 🧵of a Russian language article describing the RuAF "final 10 km to the front line" motor transport logistics made up of donated and stolen civilian motor transport.
The Front-Line troops and Russian Army MP's are now drawing guns on one another as the Russian MP's latest leader in occupied Ukraine is trying to enforce a year-old order to confiscate "Non-standard" motor transport from the front-line troops.
2/
Culturally, this 2024 Russian wartime behavior mirrors that of the Soviet state in late 1941-early 1942 period as described in "The Soviet Home Front, 1941-1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II" by John Barber & Mark Harrison.