Thread by @JominiW

1/ Ukraine TVD, Day 921: As of 02 September, the VSRF retains the strategic initiative and positive operational momentum throughout the Ukrainian TVD. The ZSU continues efforts to expand the Kursk lodgment, with Russian ground forces attempting to push Ukrainian troops from Korenevo. OGV Sever offensive actions, through reduced in scale, maintain the ability to fix a significant number of Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv region. In the Donbas elements of the 90GTD, 27GMRD, and 201MRD carry on their advance towards Pokrovsk, with the 201MRD now threatening the operational flank of OSUV Tavriya south of the M30 highway. In Zaporizhzhia, OSV Vostok appears to be preparing for offensive action in the Vuhledararea. The VKS stepped up strikes on Ukraine's energy grid while the PSU conducted a large drone strike targeting fuel and energy complex facilities in the Moscow region. #UkraineRussiaWar️️ #UkraineFrontLines #RussianArmy #UkraineNeverSurrenders #Russia

2/ Current weather outlook for the Ukraine TVD. Weather will not significantly impact ongoing operations. Weather favors offensive action. Courtesy of @davidhelms570

https://x.com/davidhelms570/status/1830616611260076081

3/ Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you).

4/ Northern Strategic Direction: The ZSU will continue prioritizing offensive action in the Kursk Oblast to wrestle the strategic initiative away from the VSRF. Operational-Tactical Group (OTU) Sumy(?) will very likely maintain efforts to isolate the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade along the Glushkovo-Kulbaki-Yelizavetovkaline (south of the Seym River). There is a roughly even chance OTU Kharkiv will revive a significant effort to push Russian troops out of north Vovchansk and threaten an advance toward the Belgorod international border. Belarus very likely will not reduce its increased troop presence in the Gomel and Breast Oblasts. The ZSU will almost certainly keep substantial forces deployed throughout northern Ukraine to deter incursions or false flag actions launched from Belarus. #Sumy #Belarus

5/ Operational Direction Kursk: Operational-Tactical Group (OTU) Sumy(?) will very likely maintain efforts to isolate the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade along the Glushkovo-Kulbaki-Yelizavetovka line (south of the Seym River). The 255th Assault and 101st Mechanized Battalions will very likely resume efforts to seize Korenevo. Elements of the 80th Air Assault Brigade likely supported by the 24th Assault Battalion and a battalion from the 88th Mechanized Brigade will advance north along the 38K-24 highway towards Lgov. Efforts by Ukrainian forces to advance east of Sudzha are ongoing, as SVRF forces supported by the 47th Tank Division appear to be blunting OTU Sumy(?) offensive actions in this direction. Kursk will likely remain a tertiary priority for VKS close air support. #Sumy #Kursk #kurskoblast

6/ Operational Direction Kharkiv: 6th Combined Arms Army will carry on limited offensive action towards Lyptsi and Vovchansk. Forward units of the 18th Guards Motorized Rifle Division will almost certainly continue using small infantry assault groups to identify and target artillery supporting Ukrainian forward defenses before assaulting prepared positions. In Vovchansk Russian troops will likely focus offensive activity toward Ternova and Rubizhne while defending north of Vovchansk to maintain possession of the small lodgment in this area. ZSU forces will continue to remain on the defensive and look for opportunities for localized counterattacks to regain territory. Kharkiv will continue to have low priority of resources and reinforcements as those are earmarked for Kursk or Pokrovsk. #Kharkiv #Belgorod #Vovchansk #Lyptsi

7/ Donbas Strategic Direction: The SVRF will maintain their Main Effort toward Pokrovskspearheaded by OSV Trentr. Priority of reinforcements and TVD level assets will likely remain with 90GTD, 27GMRD, and 201MRD. 201MRD will likely pivot south from Ukrainsk to advance south towards Kurakhove, outflanking west-east oriented Ukrainian fortification between the M30 and H15 highways. There is a roughly even chance this advance will be in coordination with one from the Vuhledar direction to dislodge ZSU forces defending from Maksymiliyanivka to Vodiane. OSV Yug will continue their push to seize Toretsk to set conditions for an advance north along the H20 highway. The ZSU almost certainly will trade space for time to establish new defenses west of the Pokrovsk-Kurakhove line. #Donbas #ChasivYar #Toretsk #Lyman #Kupyansk #Donetsk

8/ Operational Direction Pokrovsk: The Operational Group of Forces Center (OSV Tsentr) will continue their assault west between the H32 and M30 highways to seize Pokrovsk and set conditions for further offensive action in western Donetsk Oblast. Supporting OSV Tsentr, the 51st Combined Arms Army of the Operational Group of Forces South (OSV Yug) will continue its attack through Toretsk which will enable an advance towards Kostyantynivka from the southeast. The 201st Motorized Rifle Division will complete its pivot of maneuver and attack south towards Kurakhove by way of assaulting Ukrainsk, flanking ZSU west-east oriented fortifications from the north. Priority of VSRF resources will remain with OSV Tsentr. OTU Donetsk will very likely reposition defensive lines to halt these Russian advances. #Pokrovsk #Toretsk #NuiYork #selydove

9/ This update kicks off a new effort to analyze theater-wide actions. These assessments will expand in scoop and scale, stay tuned for new platforms and media products to keep you up to date on not only the war in Ukraine but conflicts and geopolitical hotspots across the globe.

10/ This open-source operational summary of the Ukrainian TVD is based on information from the ZSU & VSRF daily operations briefs, various Ukrainian & Russian Telegram channels, western intel agencies public statements, military analysts, & my own professional experience. Any errors in the information presented here are strictly my own and will be corrected in the following update.