NEW: Russia appears to be relying on several countries, including India, Serbia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of its efforts to evade Western sanctions.
More key takeaways ⬇️🧵(1/5)
2/ Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Lviv City, Lviv Oblast, and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during another mid-sized combined drone and missile strike on the night of September 3 to 4.
3/ Ukrainian authorities are investigating another report of apparent Russian war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on September 4 that Germany will provide 17 additional IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine by 2026.
4/ Ukrainian officials announced a series of resignations and appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 3 and 4.
5/ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to portray itself as suitably addressing its obligations towards Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine.
NEW: Western decision-making continues to artificially suppress Ukraine's overall long-range strike capability. 🧵(1/6)
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.
Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars.
Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas.
2/ Austin reiterated a Biden Administration talking point that since Russia has moved aircraft conducting glide bomb strikes out of range of US-provided ATACMS missiles, it somehow renders Ukraine’s request to use ATACMS in Russian territory against hundreds of known stationary military objects moot.
ISW has previously noted there are at least 209 of 245 (over 85 percent) known Russian military objects in range of ATACMS that are not air bases and not within range of US-provided HIMARS that the US does allow Ukraine to use in Russia under limited circumstances.
3/ Austin also argued that Ukraine has its own domestically produced capabilities that can attack Russian targets well beyond the range of Western-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles.
Most of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities come from domestically produced long-range drones, which Ukraine cannot use to cause the same level of damage as long-range missiles due to drone payload limitations. Russian forces can also more easily harden facilities against Ukrainian drones than Western-provided missiles.
Ukraine has begun to produce and successfully field long-range precision weapons with payloads more comparable to Western-provided long-range missiles but currently lacks the quantity of these domestically produced systems to significantly threaten Russian military targets within Russia at scale
Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City. 🧵(1/5)
2/ Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions northeast of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).
Russian forces continued attacking north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on September 5.
Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that personnel in the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City) are suffering from a shortage of potable water and refuse to conduct some unspecified operations.
3/ Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 5.
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka, Hlushkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Berestove, Andriivka, and Myasozharivka and towards Lozova; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna, Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Novosadove; and west of Kreminna near Torske on September 4 and 5.
NEW: Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. 🧵(1/7)
Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.
2/ Russian forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City) and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area.
Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near term
3/ Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions west of Donetsk City. 🧵(1/4)
2/ Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on September 4.
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novohrodivka and marginally advanced west of Mykolaivka (both southeast of Pokrovsk).
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Karlivka (further southeast of Pokrovsk) as of September 4, although ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement by August 30.
A Ukrainian brigade reported on September 4 that one of its battalions and elements of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction repelled a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area in the Pokrovsk direction.
3/ Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on September 4.
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in eastern Maksymilyanivka.
Ukrainian military officials reported on September 3 that Ukrainian forces repelled a company-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area in the Kurakhove direction. The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the Russian mechanized assault reported that Russian forces simultaneously attacked from three directions with a total of 10 armored vehicles and that Ukrainian artillery, mortar, drone strikes, and small arms fire damaged or destroyed six of these vehicles, while a mine damaged another.
Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka on September 3 and 4.
2/ Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
3/ South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war in Ukraine.
The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature. 🧵(1/6)
2/ Putin has thus far avoided redeploying the type of combat effective and experienced frontline units that will likely be necessary to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
3/ Zelensky's recent statement to NBC suggests that Ukrainian forces will likely maintain positions in the over 1,100 square kilometers of territory where Ukrainian forces are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast until Putin chooses to commit such forces.