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https://twitter.com/beefeater_fella/status/1831470059237093382

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Beefeater

Sep 4

04 September, 2024 - The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and two entities as part of a coordinated U.S. government response to Moscow’s malign influence efforts targeting the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

Russian state-sponsored actors have long used a variety of tools, such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) deep fakes and disinformation, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions.

Beginning in early 2024, executives at RT—Russia’s state-funded news media outlet—began an even more nefarious effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers in support of their malign influence campaign.

RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government in content meant to influence U.S. audiences.

“Today’s action underscores the U.S. government’s ongoing efforts to hold state-sponsored actors accountable for activities that aim to deteriorate public trust in our institutions,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. “Treasury will not waver in our commitment to safeguarding our democratic principles and the integrity of our election systems.”

Today’s designations complement law enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice and the Department of State’s designation of the Rossiya Segodnya media group and five of its subsidiaries, RIA Novosti, RT, TV-Novosti, Ruptly, and Sputnik, as Foreign Missions, steps to impose visa restrictions, and release of a Rewards for Justice (RFJ) reward offer of up to $10 million relating to information pertaining to foreign interference in a U.S. election.

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Next 👉 Sanctions target RT (Russia Today)

Sanctions targeting russian propagandists and RT:

RT, formerly Russia Today, is a Russian state-funded news outlet that began broadcasting internationally in 2005. In 2017, RT registered as an agent of a foreign government in the United States.

Beginning in early 2024, RT executives began an effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers. RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government.

Margarita Simonovna Simonyan (Simonyan) is the Editor-in-Chief of RT and a central figure in Russian government malign influence efforts. She allowed the operations of a front company to occur under the cover of RT.

Elizaveta Yuryevna Brodskaia (Brodskaia) is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of RT, who has reported to Russian President Putin and other government officials. Anton Sergeyvich Anisimov (Anisimov) is an RT Deputy Editor-in-Chief, who conducts activities on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

Andrey Vladimirovich Kiyashko (Kiyashko) is the Deputy Director of the RT English-Language Information Broadcasting and is responsible for updating Russian government officials and providing an overview of RT’s operations.

Konstantin Kalashnikov (Kalashnikov) is RT’s Digital Media Projects Manager, who, in early 2022, worked with Kiyashko. In mid‑2023, Brodskaia and Kiyashko implemented a large-scale influence operation for RT on U.S. social media with the intent of obscuring RT’s connection to the content meant to influence online audiences.

Elena Mikhaylovna Afanasyeva (Afanasyeva) is an employee of RT’s Digital Media Projects Department and reports to Kalashnikov. Starting in early 2024, Afanasyeva covertly interacted with prominent U.S. social media influencers under the cover of a fake persona, purporting to be an employee at a U.S. company to obscure RT’s and the Russian government's involvement.

The pro-Kremlin hacktivist group RaHDit is composed of active and former Russian intelligence officers. Aleksey Alekseyevich Garashchenko (Garashchenko) is the head of RaHDit and was an FSB officer at the time he started leading the group.

Garashchenko directly interacts with members of the Russian intelligence and security services, members of the Russian Presidential Administration, and employees from RT.

Anastasia Igorevna Yermoshkina (Yermoshkina) is an affiliate of Garashchenko. Aleksandr Vitalyevich Nezhentsev (Nezhentsev) works with Garashchenko and is an administrator and developer of cyber tools used by the FSB. Nezhentsev also leads a team focusing on developing new tools that can be used in the surveillance of information data files.

Today, OFAC designated Simonyan, Brodskaia, Anisimov, Kiyashko, Kalashnikov, Afanasyeva, Garashchenko, Yermoshkina, and Nezhentsev pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.

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Next 👉 Sanctions implications

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.

In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.

Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.

In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned persons may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action.

The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

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Next 👉 The history of RT - important read!

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Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Sep 2

Mongolia threatens Putins pipeline deal. Putin rushes to Mongolia to save the deal, risking arrest under the ICC warrant of arrest.

Mongolia is a key transit route for new Russia-China pipeline. The landlocked country is a key transit route for Russian gas supplies to China and will host almost 1000 kilometres of the planned Sila Sibiri 2 pipeline.

With capacity of 50 billion cubic metres of gas per annum, the project aims to help replace volumes lost after Russia almost halted its pipeline gas exports to Europe in 2022 following its invasion of Ukraine.

Russian state-controlled gas giant Gazprom and the Russian government have repeatedly assured that talks are progressing with China and Mongolia over the Sila Sibiri 2 route and gas supply terms.

On June 2, the Financial Times (FT) reported that China and Russia did not conclude a deal on the pipeline because China demanded to receive it at Russia’s subsidized domestic prices and that it would only purchase a small fraction of the pipeline’s planned annual capacity.

But reported on August 22nd, 2024 - The planned pipeline intended to transport gas from Russia to northeastern China known as Power of Siberia-2 has likely fallen through. Former Mongolian Security Council member Munkhnaar Bayarlkhaag said Moscow has failed to reach an agreement with Beijing.

Bayarlkhaag added that Beijing might’ve been displeased with Russian state-owned energy conglomerate Gazprom’s potentially obtaining unilateral control over the Mongolian section of the pipeline. “This would have meant a sudden and long-term increase in Moscow’s influence in Mongolia, to the detriment of Beijing,” he said. “Though never explicitly verbalized, it would have been ‘fair’ to include the Chinese into the Mongolian section’s development from the beginning.”

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on Monday, Aug 19, Mongolia, whose territory the pipeline would transit through, did not include the project in its national development plans through 2028.

Although Russia has seen an increase in gas exports to China through the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline, this has not been sufficient to compensate for the decline in European exports.

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Next 👉 Mongolia’s decoupling from Russian gas and their obligation to arrest Putin.

Mongolia has rolled out a plan to end its energy shortfall by the end of 2028, long before it expects cheap Russian gas to finally start flowing into the country.

The Mongolian parliament’s final approval this week of a government-proposed, five-year development plan that excludes any gas input from Sila Sibiri 2, means the nation will need to rely on coal, hydropower and renewable energy sources to eliminate energy shortfall, according to a copy of the plan available on the parliament’s website.

According to the development plan, two hydropower stations with a total capacity of 400 megawatts, and one 450-MW coal-fired power plant are to be built before the end of 2028 to answer the increasing energy demands of the country and its capital Ulaanbaatar, where energy use exceeds available supply by about one third during winter.

As well as the proposed new power plants, Mongolia’s energy policy will also focus on wind and solar energy sources, the plan said. The country is estimated to have an ultimate capacity to produce 2600 gigawatts of renewable power, which could potentially cover its energy needs and provide capacity to export electricity to neighbouring countries, according to the approved document.

Putin risks being arrested in Mongolia - he arrived on Monday 02 September, 2024 - for a state visit in Mongolia, which lies on the route of a planned new gas pipeline connecting Russia and China. He is clearly desperate to prevent the collapse of the pipeline deal with Mongolia. He is due to hold talks with Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh on Tuesday.

Ukraine urged Mongolia last week to arrest Putin on a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court warrant last year, when it accused him of the war crime of illegally deporting hundreds of children from Ukraine. The Kremlin has dismissed the accusation, saying it is politically motivated, and has said it has no worries about Putin making the trip.

The warrant obliges the court's 124 member states, including Mongolia, to arrest Putin and transfer him to The Hague for trial if he sets foot on their territory.

What will the consequences be if Mongolia fails to arrest Putin - have they given Putin cast iron assurances that they will not meet their obligations as an ICC signatory? What will the @IntlCrimCourt do if Mongolia fails in its obligation to arrest Putin?

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Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 26

Debunking the malinformation - Ukrainian drone strikes are just a temporary inconvenience.

Foreign Policy has published many insightful think-tank opinions on Russia and the illegal war conducted by Russia in Ukraine, (see references tweet).

However - I take substantial issue with a recent publication that purports Ukrainian drone strikes have minimal effect.

The article was published by a so-called “energy expert” Sergey Vakulenko, from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. The article suggests that while the drone strikes are a boost to Ukrainian morale - they have little effect on Russia’s oil revenues.

In April 2023, the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center opened in Berlin, Germany. who wrote for the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre. @CarnegieRu / @CarnegieEndow. The center focuses on major policy challenges across the wider region in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is home to the digital publication Carnegie Politika. The current director of the center is Alexander Gabuev.

Key points in the publication:

So far this year, Ukraine says that it has successfully attacked more than 30 Russian oil installations, some deep inside Russia.

“The latest estimates are that about 17 percent of Russia’s (admittedly ample) oil-refining capacity has been damaged to some extent by the strikes. But more broadly, Russia continues to export huge volumes of oil and even a fair bit of natural gas, ensuring that oil revenues continue to fuel its war machine

In some ways, the energy fight is an adjunct to the fight on the battlefield. Ukraine’s ability to damage (even for short periods of time) Russian refineries and fuel depots is meant, in part, to undermine logistics for the Russian army, which continues to occupy large swaths of southern and eastern Ukraine.

Blowing up expensive installations deep inside Russia is also a psychological boon for Ukraine, which has been largely on the back foot since early 2022. Russia’s systematic destruction of the Ukrainian electric power grid, meanwhile, is meant to undermine civilian morale and resilience ahead of winter.”

The White House had initially warned Kyiv not to strike Russian oil installations, fearing Russian reprisals as well as an inconvenient spike in oil and gasoline prices ahead of the U.S. election, but Ukraine has plowed ahead regardless (just as it did with the Kursk incursion).

The big question is: Do all the eye-grabbing explosions at refineries and fuel depots make much of a difference to Russia’s surprisingly resilient oil-based economy?

But the damage done is brief and relatively easy to repair,” said Sergey Vakulenko, an energy expert at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Will it make drastic impacts on Russian oil revenues? Probably not. The drones cannot do what the sanctions were unable to achieve.”

In some cases, Vakulenko said, the oil installations that Ukraine is targeting, chosen because they are within easy range of drones, may not be the critical marks that Kyiv imagines.

Many of the older refineries in western Russia were built to take advantage of export customs loopholes that made it more beneficial to export barely refined oil products, even very low-quality ones, than to export regular crude.

These aren’t the crown jewels, but the cracked zircons. “The benefits of hitting those refineries may not be what the Ukrainians thought,” said Vakulenko, who was previously an oil executive at Russian and international companies.”

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Next 👉 Debunking the mal-information

Debunking this view:

This report smacks of a biase from the start, showing a reluctance to recognise the facts or credit the real and wider impact drone strikes have on Russia.

This biased opinion is highlighted from the outset where the author says 17 percent of Russia’s oil-refinery has been damaged “to some extent” and “admittedly ample”. To admit something reluctantly has strong overtones that the opposite is about to be argued, and true to form - the article then sets out to minimise the perceived impact of drone strikes on Russia oil infrastructure.

The author of this article, a “senior fellow” and “energy expert” Sergey Vakulenko, from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

In April 2023, the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center opened in Berlin, Germany. The center focuses on major policy challenges across the wider region in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is home to the digital publication Carnegie Politika. The current director of the center is Alexander Gabuev.

Challenging the analysis:

👉 The assertion is that oil installations being targeted are within easy range of drones, is misleading.

In fact a growing number of attacks are penetrating deep into Russia. For example, Reuters reported on May 9, 2024 - “A Ukrainian drone struck a major oil processing plant in Russia's Bashkiria region on Thursday from some 1,500 km (932 miles) away, its longest-range such attack since the start of the war.”

The Kyiv source said the drone flew 1,500 km, calling it a record, and hit a catalytic cracking unit in an attack that showed "Russian refineries and oil depots serving the military complex cannot feel safe even in the deep rear".

While the article published on foreignpolicy. Com suggests hitting a catalytic cracking is of little consequence and easily repaired, tries to diminish the effects of ordinary Russians and oil refinery employees having their businesses attacked in the plain sight of day - 1500km from the nearest Ukraine border.

👉In terms of the impacts of the drone strikes.

The suggestion the impact is minimal sounds like a Kremlin playbook response. Ukraine has stepped up its drone attacks on oil processing facilities in Russia since the start of the year, disrupting 15% of Russia's oil refining capacity according to an estimate by a NATO official at the beginning of April.

15% of Russia’s refining capacity of 5.2 million barrels per day (According to Bloomberg, Russia refined 5.2 million barrels of oil per day on average in April 2024, compared to 5.5 million in January. ). This the equivalent of 780,000 barrels per day of refined oil income.

Hydracarbonprocessing .com reported that Russia's primary offline oil refining capacity has been raised by 114% from the previous plan to 4.1 million metric tons for June mainly to due to last-month stoppages at the Tuapse and Komsomoslk plants, Reuters calculations show. Llll reported “In May, idle capacity stood at 3.8 MMt.

The Russian oil refining industry has been targeted by Ukrainian drone attacks. Technical outages have also contributed to idle capacity. Russia and Ukraine have both used drones to strike critical infrastructure, military installations and troop concentrations in their more than 2-yr conflict, with Kyiv hitting Russian refineries and energy facilities in recent months.

According to the current plan, which is likely be revised upward, the offline refining capacity in July is seen declining to 1.8 MMt, according to Reuters calculations based on data from industry sources.

To suggest the impact of the drone strikes on Russia’s oil refining capacity is just a “psychological boon”, with minimal, temporary or of no consequence - is misleading and factually incorrect.

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Next 👉 Catalyst Crackers..

👉 Targeting catalytic cracking units - a description that tries to characterise the drone strikes result in minimal effect:

Ukrainian drones also struck two oil depots near the town of Anapa in Russia's southern Krasnodar region causing large-scale fires, Russian authorities said a Ukrainian drone attack caused a fire and damaged several oil tanks at a refinery in Krasnodar region.

About six drones were destroyed, but debris fell on a facility near the village of Yurovka, sparking a fire, they wrote on the Telegram messaging app. Russian propaganda really admits to targets and damage but again - the suggestion the drone strikes targeting catalytic cracking equipment being at most a temporary inconvenience is a Kremlin disinformation line.

Here they have admitted to damaging “several tanks” and debris falling on a nearby village - which would have been distressing to Russian’s who thought they would not end up on the front end of the war - especially since Putin promised Russians he would protect them and has failed to do so.

The impact of the Ukrainian drone attack on August 18, targeting an oil depot in Russia's Rostov region - set fire to some 20 diesel fuel tanks with an estimated volume of 5,000 cubic meters of fuel each.

A second attack 5 days later when the original fires had still not been extinguished, targeted the kerosene tanks. A day earlier, Eto Rostov Novosti warned about the potential explosion of kerosene tanks at the Proletarsk oil depot, describing it as “much more dangerous” than diesel fires that have been raging at the facility for almost a week.

The fire was reportedly approaching the kerosene tanks, raising concerns about a possible explosion that could surpass previous ones in power.

This one attack alone, demonstrates the flawed assumptions and analysis suggesting the drone strikes do not impact the russian oil infrastructure in any meaningful way. To emphasise this - reports have been published in the Rostov Gazeta, which wrote that oil depot owners in Rostov Oblast are rushing to sell their assets due to threats of new attacks from Ukraine.

“The number of advertisements for such facilities increased after the drone strikes on the fuel storage in Proletarsk. Several oil depots and refineries in the region, including those in Volgodonsk, Azov, and Matveyev Kurgan, are now up for sale, according to the publication.”

Does this sound like the minor inconvenience the ForeignPolicy publication suggests Ukrainian drone strikes are?

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Next 👉 The latest drone strikes and conclusion

Read 8 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 25

Selling more oil at higher prices ought to be the stuff of dreams for a petrostate. But for Russia it is a sign of a new, punishing phase in its war with Ukraine.

Months of Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries have crimped Russia’s ability to produce refined fuels, such as diesel and petrol, and turned the world’s third-largest oil producer into an importer of petrol.

Russian oil companies have tried to pare their losses by selling unrefined oil overseas, pushing exports to a new highs in 2024.

Despite the US administration’s fears that the global oil and fuel market could be destabilised, the price dynamic for both categories of commodities to date does not suggest that the Ukrainian strikes have driven prices up.

On the contrary, the need to reduce processing and the impossibility of storing crude have forced Russian exporters to increase exports. At the same time, the refinery shutdowns have driven down sales of petroleum products abroad, resulting in losses primarily for Russian companies.

The Ukrainian attacks and the resulting drop in fuel production have created a number of challenges for the Kremlin, including the need to deal with logistical tensions, strengthen air defence and increase imports of petroleum products.

Given the political importance of fuel availability, reduced processing has forced the Russian government to use tools of intervention in order to ensure that the market is adequately saturated.

For example, it has forced the fuel sector to redirect supplies onto the domestic market at the expense of the foreign markets.

Should the Ukrainian strikes continue and cause more temporary shutdowns at refineries, the government will probably have to step up its intervention, and that will generate costs for the state and may lead to market imbalances.

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Next 👉 A convenient target

Refineries are a convenient target.

Oil is seen as the mainstay of the Russian economy, so elements of the oil industry are obvious and symbolic targets. Unlike oil fields, which are vast with dispersed islands of equipment and located in remote Siberia, refineries appear to be a far more rewarding target.

Refineries cost tens of billions of dollars to build; they are large targets and therefore hard to miss; and there is a lot of flammable and explosive matter, making substantial fire damage probable after the hit. There are also plenty of Russian refineries relatively close to Ukrainian territory.

From the attack planners’ standpoint, it would be ideal if Russia were not only to lose export volumes, but also experience difficulties in supplying enough fuel for its army and economy.

To seriously affect Russia’s refined oil market - significant attacks are required, as Russian refining capacity is 2.5 times bigger than its fuel consumption. Evidently the ongoing refinery attacks are working as Russia implemented a ban on refined exports.

From the attack planners’ standpoint, it would be ideal if Russia were not only to lose export volumes, but also experience difficulties in supplying enough fuel for its army and economy. Alas, that would require a very large-scale attack, as Russian refining capacity is 2.5 times bigger than its fuel consumption.

This logic is not new. Eighty years ago, U.S. and British military planners had a similar idea: to bring Germany and its army to its knees by targeting oil refineries in Germany, Austria, and Romania. For a year from May 1944, over 200,000 tons of bombs were dropped in more than 600 raids, with about 2.5 percent landing on refinery installations. Even under that scale of attack, after the initial shock, German fuel production stabilized at about 40 percent of its previous level.

News reports show that damaged units at many of the refineries were brought back in operation after two to three weeks of repairs, and Bloomberg-reported refining volumes are down from their peaks but above the troughs and again within the customary volume band.

But the capacity to repair refineries is severely restricted now in Russia - the equipment and technology is largely dependent on western companies, who have exited Russia since the illegal invasion of Ukraine.

Some shortages of fuel in Russia became evident in early 2024. Russia did import some volumes of gasoline from Belarus, which was widely celebrated by the media. But the volume in question was a single trainload in one week—less than 0.5 percent of one week’s consumption—while Russia kept exporting naphtha (straight-run gasoline) and diesel.

Considering that not a single unit converting naphtha into gasoline was subject to an attack, that import was most likely for logistical reasons, rather than because of a countrywide shortage of fuels.

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Next 👉 Russian regime interventions

Necessary government intervention

The drop in fuel production caused by the Ukrainian attacks has forced the Russian government to take numerous measures aimed at preventing prices from rising above the average inflation rate in the country.

It should be noted that thanks to the government’s intervention and the industry’s flexible attitude, Russia has effectively managed to avoid shortages on the market during the period of the most serious shutdowns of its refining capacity as a result of the Ukrainian strikes.

The Russian government’s first countermeasure was to impose a ban on gasoline exports. It decided to do so on 27 February, even before the Ukrainian drone attacks escalated. Alongside this decision, it also raised the requirement for producers to sell diesel on the domestic exchange from the previous 12.5% to 16% of their total production volume.

However, these regulatory changes failed to halt the trend of rising wholesale fuel prices, which reflected fears of local shortages as a result of uneven market supply. On 22 March, 2 April and 25 April, deputy prime minister Alexandr Novak hosted government meetings which were attended by officials from the country’s oil & fuel companies and Russian Railways.

According to press releases, they discussed the issue of prioritising fuel supplies for the domestic market. Unofficial media reports said that the government had instructed its subordinate institutions to give priority to fuel supplies over other categories of goods, and also told them to increase the financial penalties for delays in unloading railway wagons with petroleum products.

In the end, the government managed to avoid shortages precisely because it prioritised redirecting production from intact refineries and reducing fuel exports, which allowed it to saturate the domestic market. The industry also tapped into the reserves it had already accumulated.

Supplies from abroad were important as well. According to Reuters, Russia increased its imports of gasoline from Belarus several-fold; this report was later confirmed by decision-makers.

Furthermore, there were unconfirmed reports that Russia had asked Kazakhstan to set up a fuel reserve which could be released in the event of shortages in the Russian Federation.

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Next 👉 Impacts on Russia

Read 8 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 23

Two can play the ignore game. But there can only be one winner.

👉 Russian Gas to Europe:

The energy implications of the Kursk invasion go far beyond Russia. At Sudzha, a pipeline sends Russian natural gas to the EU. While it may come as a surprise to many given the war in Ukraine, European countries like Austria, Hungary and Slovakia still buy gas from Russia – all of it flowing through the town of Sudzha in Kursk.

Sudzha, located about 10km (6 miles) from the Ukrainian border, plays a key role in the transit of natural gas to the EU. An average of 42 million cubic metres (1.5 billion cubic ft) of Russian gas flows into Ukraine every day, the town playing host to a gas metering system that measures supplies flowing into Europe.

Despite the war with Russia, Kyiv has allowed the gas to continue flowing through its Soviet-era gas pipeline unabated as part of a $2bn-a-year contract between state-owned Naftogaz and Russia’s Gazprom.

👉 Russian Oil to Europe:

The European Commission has said there was “no immediate risk” of oil shortages in Hungary or Slovakia after the two countries complained about Ukraine’s decision last month to place sanctions on Russian supplier Lukoil, which transits exports to the two countries via the war-torn country.

While the EU as a whole has moved to diversify its oil and gas supplies away from Russia, the two eastern members have continued to receive oil via the Soviet-era Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline, and Ukraine’s move prompted Budapest and Bratislava to demand intervention from the Commission.

The Druzhba oil pipeline has remained functioning following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, even as the EU weaned itself off most other sources of Russian energy. The southern branch of the pipeline runs via Ukraine to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and has been the primary source of supply for their refineries for years.

A few countries in the EU were given temporary dispensation to continue receiving Russian oil in December 2022 when the EU began to sanction russian oil supply into Europe. That temporary dispensation was offered to give the countries time to set up alternative, non-russian supply sources.

In the nearly three years since, Hungary has not attempted to arrange alternative suppliers - they have instead increased their dependence on Russian oil, and Orban has put Hungary at risk of Energy meltdown-down as the EU was always committed to cutting off Russia entirely.

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Next 👉 Hungary and Slovakia have abused the temporary dispensation given to them by the EU.

Hungary and Slovakia used a sanctions carveout to keep pumping it in. Hungary has even ramped up Russian oil imports.

Only around 3% of Europe’s crude oil supplies now come from Russia, the EU claims, an alternative pipeline route through Croatia has sufficient spare capacity to meet the needs of both countries.

The argument comes at a time of increasing diplomatic tensions between Brussels and Budapest. Ukrainian is now blocking the transit of pipeline crude sold by Russia's largest private oil firm, Lukoil, effectively stripping the two countries of a third of their oil imports.

Szíjjártó from Hungary warned in an interview on Hungarian television station ATV last week that until the issue of oil transit is settled, Hungary would continue to block €6.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.

He claims that hat Lukoil currently accounts for one-third of Hungarian oil imports and around 45 per cent of Slovakian oil imports, making the Ukrainian ban a fundamental threat to the energy security of both countries.

‘This is an unacceptable and incomprehensible move by a country that wants to be a member of the European Union and that, with a single decision, puts the oil supply of two EU member states at fundamental risk,’ he said.

Slovakia and Hungary - two countries that have opposed western allies' military aid to Ukraine as it fights Russia's invasion - have complained to Brussels about Kyiv's move to put Lukoil on its sanctions list, saying it prevented them from buying Russian oil for their refineries, threatening security of supply.

Hungary and Slovakia have gone to the rule book, arguing the penalties violate a 2014 trade deal between Kyiv and the EU and asking the European Commission, the EU’s executive, to intervene.

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Next 👉 Remember Hungary ignoring the EU over their concerns of Hungary relaxing Russian visa entry into the EU?

👉 Hungary relaxing Russian visa requirements to enter and work in the EU:

Remember how Hungary ignored the August 19th deadline to respond to the EU about their concerns of Hungary relaxing visa restrictions for Russians being allowed to/ encouraged to come to Hungary?

The EU set out its concerns that Hungary’s actions are a substantial security risk for the European Union and the Schengen free movement - which russian can now take advantage of and infiltrate the EU with belligerent actors.

Hungary chose to ignore the EU’s request and missed the deadline. Meanwhile after months of using its veto in the EU Council to delay sanctions against Russia and block EU aid to Ukraine, Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán sparked outrage when he used the first weeks of his country’s turn as chair of intergovernmental talks to conduct a unilateral “peace mission” to Moscow and Beijing.

Fast forward to August 23, 2024 - news has broken that the EU have ignored and refused to meet with vatnik Szíjjártó to discuss his concerns about Lukoil oil now being sanctioned. A major blow to the pro-russian relationship Victator Orban established with Putin.

Fast forward to today: Two can play the ignore game:

BRUSSELS, Aug 23 (Reuters) - The European Commission has declined Hungary and Slovakia's request that it mediate a consultation procedure with Ukraine over sanctions imposed by Kyiv on Russian oil producer Lukoil, a Commission spokesperson said on Friday.

"Commission services have preliminarily concluded that urgent consultations do not appear to be warranted," the spokesperson said.

The spokesperson said Brussels had no indication Ukraine's sanctions had caused a risk to European security of energy supplies, since Russian oil was still flowing through the Druzhba pipeline that links Russia, via Ukraine, to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

"It appears that the sanctions imposed by Ukraine on Lukoil do not affect ongoing oil transit operations via Druzhba carried out by trading companies, as long as Lukoil is not the formal owner of the oil," the spokesperson said.

Check mate Orban.

Get in line vatnik, follow the European Union’s policies and principals or pay the price.

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👇 Informative, evidence lead research for the price of a few coffees!

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Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 23

OFAC implements new sanctions - 23 August 2024

Context:

Building on the sanctions already imposed on Russia in response to its continued war of aggression against Ukraine, today the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of State targeted nearly 400 individuals and entities both in Russia and outside its borders—including in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions.

The United States government will continue to support Ukraine as it defends its independence and hold Russia accountable for its aggression.

“Russia has turned its economy into a tool in service of the Kremlin’s military industrial complex. Treasury’s actions today continue to implement the commitments made by President Biden and his G7 counterparts to disrupt Russia’s military-industrial base supply chains and payment channels,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo.

“Companies, financial institutions, and governments around the world need to ensure they are not supporting Russia’s military-industrial supply chains.”

Treasury is targeting numerous transnational networks, including those involved in procuring ammunition and military materiel for Russia, facilitating sanctions evasion for Russian oligarchs through offshore trust and corporate formation services, evading sanctions imposed on Russia’s cyber actors, laundering gold for a sanctioned Russian gold company, and supporting Russia’s military-industrial base by procuring sensitive and critical items such as advanced machine tools and electronic components.

Today’s sanctions further limit Russia’s future revenue from metals and mining. Treasury is also targeting Russian financial technology companies that provide necessary software and IT solutions for Russia’s financial sector.

Treasury is aware of Russian efforts to facilitate sanctions evasion by opening new overseas branches and subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions.

Foreign regulators and financial institutions should be cautious about any dealings with overseas branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions, including efforts to open new branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions that are not themselves sanctioned. Treasury has a range of tools available to respond to the establishment of new evasion channels.

The State Department is targeting entities and individuals involved in Russia’s future energy, metals, and mining production and exports; sanctions evasion; Russia’s military-industrial base, including armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production, Belarusian support for Russia’s war effort, and air logistics entities; additional subsidiaries of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom; and malign actors involved in the attempted, forcible “re-education” of Ukraine’s children.

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Next 👉 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION

🔐 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION, AND BACKFILL

Consistent with commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders, Treasury continues to target transnational networks that supply Russia with military materiel and sensitive dual-use goods like those included in the multilateral Common High Priority List, jointly developed by the United States, European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Treasury is also targeting multiple networks that facilitate or enable illicit financial schemes and sanctions evasion on behalf of Russian revenue generators and oligarchs.

Many of today’s designations were enabled or informed by extensive coordination with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Today’s action targets almost a dozen distinct networks, designating more than 100 individuals and entities across 16 jurisdictions, including the People’s Republic of China, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates.

🔐 RUSSIA’S TECHNOLOGICAL BASE

Today, Treasury is targeting more than 60 Russia-based technology and defense companies that are critical for the sustainment and development of Russia’s defense industry, including entities involved in weapons development and modernization, automation and robotics, development and acquisition of dual-use electronics, digital surveillance, Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence.

These sanctions target Russia’s defense industry while protecting the access by Russian citizens to crucial telecommunications and other digital technology.

🔐 LIMITING RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC METALS AND MINING SECTOR

Guided by commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders to reduce Russia’s revenues from metals, today Treasury is targeting entities involved in Russia’s metals and mining sector, including steel, iron, and coal mining firms and auxiliary firms that provide specialized services to Russian metals and mining companies.

🔐 RUSSIAN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY

Today, OFAC is targeting Russian financial technology companies as a part of implementing G7 commitments to curtail Russia’s use of and access to the international financial system to further its war against Ukraine.

👉 Atol is a Russian technology developer involved in services related to payments.

👉 Centre of Financial Technologies Group (CFT)is one of the largest software companies in the Russian market. CFT provides an array of software products for banking and payment solutions for the Russian financial market.

👉 Diasoft Ltd (Diasoft) is one of Russia’s largest developers and suppliers of information technology (IT) solutions for the financial sector.

Atol, CFT, and Diasoft were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

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Next 👉 Ammunition Procurement Network

🔐 Ammunition Procurement Network:

Italian national Giulio Sfoglietti (Sfoglietti) has been involved in a procurement network involving a Türkiye facilitator to purchase more than $150 million worth of military equipment, ammunition, and ordnance for the Russian military from potential suppliers in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran. Türkiye national Hayri Tahirbeyoglu (Tahirbeyoglu) is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Türkiye-based ammunition, weapons, and military materiel company Taha Savunma Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (Taha Savunma) and has worked with Sfoglietti on the procurement of ammunition and weapons for likely Russian end-use. Sfoglietti has also worked to procure microelectronics and chips for Russia-based end-users.

Sfoglietti associate Russian national Marat Khanbalevich Gabitov (Gabitov) has worked with an employee of U.S.-designated Russian defense conglomerate State Corporation Rostec to procure microelectronics related to radio frequency (RF) equipment. Gabitov has also worked to procure microelectronics, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other machinery and equipment for Russia-based end-users.

Sfoglietti was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel and technology sectors of the Russian Federation economy. Tahirbeyoglu and Taha Savunma were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. Gabitov was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

🔐 Promtekh Supply Chain:

U.S.-designated Russia-based Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Promyshlennye Tekhnologii (Promtekh) has used a network of companies located in Türkiye, France, and Hong Kong to send high priority goods to Promtekh’s subsidiaries. Russia-based Aspectriym Limited Trade Development (Aspectriym) is a subsidiary of Promtekh and is a defense procurement firm involved in the wholesale of electronic equipment and parts.

France-based Industrial Technologies Group France (ITGF) is a sister firm of U.S.-designated Promtechcomplekt JSC, a subsidiary of Promtekh, and has worked with Aspectriym to procure foreign- and U.S.-made electronic components. Hong Kong-based Interasia Trading Group Limited (Interasia Trading) is the sole owner of ITGF. Russian national Igor Aleksandrovich Reutov (Reutov) is the Executive Director of ITGF. Reutov is also the owner of Estonia-based Free Sky Solutions OU (Free Sky) and the Managing Partner of France-based Aerialia. Aerialia was established in January 2024.

ITGF also created a Türkiye-based firm, Enutek Makina Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Enutek). Enutek has made hundreds of shipments of technology, including high priority dual-use technology such as electronic integrated circuits and ceramic capacitors, to U.S.-designated Promtekh subsidiaries, including Promtech Ulyanovsk, Dubna Switching Equipment Plant, and Promtech Irkutsk. Enutek was established in December 2022.

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Next 👉 Other foreign suppliers

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