NEW: Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. 🧵(1/7)
Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.
2/ Russian forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City) and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area.
Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near term
3/ Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.
4/ The Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.
5/ The Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk.
6/ Russian forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine indefinitely, and multiple intensified offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast, in addition to the persisting operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, will likely cause Russian offensive operations to culminate sooner than the Russian military command intends.
7/ Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2024: isw.pub/UkrWar090524
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NEW: Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024. 🧵(1/7)
2/ The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
3/ Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024.
NEW: The Russian MoD likely attempted to cover up the recent removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors. (1/4)
2/ Ukrainian military officials denied claims of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean "technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol.
3/ Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
NEW: Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. (🧵1/7)
2/ Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21. The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
3/ The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said on November 22 that Iran will “significantly increase” its uranium enrichment capacity in response.
NEW: The Houthis have become a major strategic threat with ties to multiple US adversaries. The US has sought to “avoid escalation” in response to Houthi actions since Oct 2023 with half-measures that have failed to materially degrade Houthi military capabilities. (🧵1/8)
2/ The Houthis are undeterred and have collected significant insight into US defenses against their attack systems of all varieties. The Houthis will almost certainly exploit this insight to improve the efficacy of their own attacks and provide it to other US adversaries.
3/ The US failure to disrupt or deter Houthi escalation in the Red Sea has forced US policymakers to prioritize the Red Sea over the Western Pacific. This prioritization of the Middle East in this way is unsustainable, especially in the event of a Taiwan Strait scenario.
NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21. 🧵(1/4)
2/ Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine.
3/ Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical. Putin's recent threats against the West have centered on Western states allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes into “Russian territory,” but Ukrainian forces have been striking what the Kremlin illegally defines as “Russian territory” for a long time.
Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
2/ Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
3/ Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.