Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City. 🧵(1/5)
2/ Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions northeast of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).
Russian forces continued attacking north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on September 5.
Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that personnel in the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City) are suffering from a shortage of potable water and refuse to conduct some unspecified operations.
3/ Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 5.
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka, Hlushkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Berestove, Andriivka, and Myasozharivka and towards Lozova; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna, Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Novosadove; and west of Kreminna near Torske on September 4 and 5.
4/ Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations in the area on September 5.
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) along the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, and south of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Predtechyne and Ivanopillia on September 4 and 5.
5/ Russian forces recently advanced in the Kherson direction amid continued Russian assaults in the area on September 4 and 5.
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently seized positions on the eastern part of Kozulyskyi Island (southwest of Kherson City) in the Dnipro River Delta.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
NEW: Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024. 🧵(1/7)
2/ The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
3/ Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024.
NEW: The Russian MoD likely attempted to cover up the recent removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors. (1/4)
2/ Ukrainian military officials denied claims of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean "technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol.
3/ Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
NEW: Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. (🧵1/7)
2/ Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21. The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
3/ The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said on November 22 that Iran will “significantly increase” its uranium enrichment capacity in response.
NEW: The Houthis have become a major strategic threat with ties to multiple US adversaries. The US has sought to “avoid escalation” in response to Houthi actions since Oct 2023 with half-measures that have failed to materially degrade Houthi military capabilities. (🧵1/8)
2/ The Houthis are undeterred and have collected significant insight into US defenses against their attack systems of all varieties. The Houthis will almost certainly exploit this insight to improve the efficacy of their own attacks and provide it to other US adversaries.
3/ The US failure to disrupt or deter Houthi escalation in the Red Sea has forced US policymakers to prioritize the Red Sea over the Western Pacific. This prioritization of the Middle East in this way is unsustainable, especially in the event of a Taiwan Strait scenario.
NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21. 🧵(1/4)
2/ Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine.
3/ Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical. Putin's recent threats against the West have centered on Western states allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes into “Russian territory,” but Ukrainian forces have been striking what the Kremlin illegally defines as “Russian territory” for a long time.
Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
2/ Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
3/ Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.