(Ben) 本记明 Profile picture
Sep 7 12 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Resuming the @tochnyi coverage of the slow-motion disappearance of Russia's last piggy bank, the liquid part of the so-called National Wealth Fund.

There was a slight contraction of the value of the fund in dollar (-1.5%) but overall the net worth of the fund has remained stable Image
The stability of the fund since last January prompts four remarks:
1. it fits a seasonal patern of limited withdrawls in the first 10 months of the year (things get hairy when bills come due in December)
2. the absence of any replenishment show that the government is tight
3. past experience suggests that the Kremlin tends to sterilize funds that have fallen below a certain threshold to avoid the humiliation of having to close them. Sure it remains a cushion in the worst case scenario but in effect that money cannot be touched any longer.
4. Moscow has not dipped in this particular cookie jar to pay for its electoral promises suggesting that either these have been shelved or that they are being paid for by reallocating already invested money, creating non-trivial systemic risks.
But, as @Prune602 judiciously remarked a while back: market value, does not tell the whole story!

The volume of gold held by the NWF has been steadily diminishing since last January's big drop. More than 60t have been sold (18%). Image
Not suprisingly, that's almost the exact proportion of the appreciation of the value of gold since early January 2024. So basically, the appreciation of the value of gold is masking the unloading of the metal by the NWF.

Some may recognise the practice of rebalancing.
But rebalancing implies reinvesting the proceeds in new assets to maintain the target distribution of the portfolio. Here no such purchase is visible in the liquid part of the portfolio.

This is strictly an opportunistic move to empty the piggy bank without appearing to touch it
The official press releases do note that "gold [is] being sold and the proceeds used to finance certain projects." But while Yuans appear to be withdrawls to purchase Yuan-denominated Russian corporate bonds, the gold never reappears on the account books, it just goes poof!
So despite the apparent stability of the fund's value, the NWF is being drained at a relatively rapid pace by the Kremlin. What's more, of course, is that the fund is now severely exposed to the value of gold. If the price of the precious metal was to drop significantly, it would
immediately show on the balance sheet and probably severely affect the trust in the government.

The Kremlin would thus have to either bite the bullet or allocate tens of billions of dollars in replenishing its piggy bank just to show it can.
I'm not saying there is massive opportunity for ballsy traders but... well... Image
And of course: an immense thank you to @clockworkChris for the amazing graphics! (only the first one, obviously, the second one is quick and dirty and Chris is not responsible for any of it)

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More from @ulyssecolonna

Mar 4
Petit thread en français sur la "forteresse Russie", le fond souverain du président Poutine. A-t-il eu l'effet escompté? Est-il en bon état? La Russie est-elle, comme elle l'affirme, juste trop riche pour perdre? Un petit thread par l'équipe de @tochnyi. Image
La Russie n'a pas de fond souverain similaire aux énormes fond d'investissement 🇳🇴 ou 🇸🇦. Plutôt, il s'agit d'une sorte de banque de développement achetant des bons et des actions d'entreprises locales stratégiques. En plus, le fond a aussi un énorme compte en banque.
Ce compte (valant $115mrd en 2021) est investi en monnaies étrangères. Les mouvements vers et depuis ce compte sont géré par une loi budgétaire. Si les entrées des taxes sur le pétrole sont fortes, il se rempli, si elles sont faibles, il se vide. C'est un matelat de compensation.
Read 15 tweets
Feb 21, 2023
A frustrating aspect of the sanctions has been that I don’t get the individual ones. Why does Ivan Popov care beyond how it affects where he parks his mega-yacht?
A recent article from ⁦@guardian⁩ begins to solvethe riddle. W/ ⁦@AgatheDemarais⁩ ⁦@elinaribakovaImage
Fascinatingly the article reports that in the opening stage of the full-scale invasion, the US Treasury attempted a financial Blitz against Moscow but that this opening move was deftly parried by the CBR.
I actually had believed that the West had not really been offensive.
Read 4 tweets
Feb 21, 2023
Must-read article in Kommersant.

TLDR: RU refineries are pumping out oil products abroad like never before and draining the government’s coffers in the process by cashing in on poorly designed subsidies. We’re talking $30bn in 2022. kommersant.ru/doc/5839463
Basically, the RU government had a price guarantee for exporting refineries to compensate them for losses if domestic and export prices were out of whack and the contraction of EU demand made it so. So the Kremlin opened its wallet and just poured cash on these guys.
The amounts spent are just staggering. We’re talking a third of the MoD’s 2023 budget!!!!

Kommersant said the value of the subsidies would be lowered but not that it would just end. The only figure mentioned in the article points to a 4% decline
Read 4 tweets
Feb 6, 2023
Aujourd’hui le plan européen pour limiter les revenus tirés par le gouvernement russe des exportations de dérivés du pétrole rentre en action. Une belle occasion de se demander si les sanctions sur le gaz et le brut fonctionnent.

lemonde.fr/economie/artic…
Pourquoi est-ce crucial?
Parce que depuis des années la fuite en avant du militarisme russe va de pair avec l’augmentation des revenus du gouvernement tirés de l’exportation des hydrocarbures. Couper l’un c’est mortellement toucher l’autre.
Le plan occidental tient en deux points:
1. Diminuer les revenus du gouvernement russe tirés de l’exportation des hydrocarbures
2. Ne pas affecter le prix du pétrole sur le marché international
Read 25 tweets
Jun 13, 2022
Ladies and gents, the one and only @mark4harrison has published an essay on how to conduct the current western campaign of sanctions. The man is a fucking intellectual legend who deserves all the respect our little souls can muster. But in this case he also happens to be wrong
Again, let me restate: the man is brilliant and has been fighting the battle for knowledge for decades. He ought to be endlessly praised. Even in this piece, he makes a very valid arching point: don’t get caught in the mercantilist fallacy.
To be clear: @mark4harrison argues that more western money reaching Moscow is not necessarily a bad thing. Basically, due to sanctions, that money cannot be used to buy anything of worth for the war effort while internally it is pretty much pointless to have dollars.
Read 15 tweets

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