Rumours of the NWF's demise are greatly exagerated.

For now.

Here is our monthly report on Russia's National Wealth Fund for @tochnyi As exposed in an earlier post, the MinFin is taking advantage of the rising value of its assets in ruble terms to sell off some without the total value of the fund being affected.

https://x.com/ulyssecolonna/status/1844097342515053056

Resuming the @tochnyi coverage of the slow-motion disappearance of Russia's last piggy bank, the liquid part of the so-called National Wealth Fund.

There was a slight contraction of the value of the fund in dollar (-1.5%) but overall the net worth of the fund has remained stable The stability of the fund since last January prompts four remarks:
1. it fits a seasonal patern of limited withdrawls in the first 10 months of the year (things get hairy when bills come due in December)
2. the absence of any replenishment show that the government is tight

Petit thread en français sur la "forteresse Russie", le fond souverain du président Poutine. A-t-il eu l'effet escompté? Est-il en bon état? La Russie est-elle, comme elle l'affirme, juste trop riche pour perdre? Un petit thread par l'équipe de @tochnyi. La Russie n'a pas de fond souverain similaire aux énormes fond d'investissement 🇳🇴 ou 🇸🇦. Plutôt, il s'agit d'une sorte de banque de développement achetant des bons et des actions d'entreprises locales stratégiques. En plus, le fond a aussi un énorme compte en banque.

A frustrating aspect of the sanctions has been that I don’t get the individual ones. Why does Ivan Popov care beyond how it affects where he parks his mega-yacht?
A recent article from ⁦@guardian⁩ begins to solvethe riddle. W/ ⁦@AgatheDemarais⁩ ⁦@elinaribakova⁩ Source: theguardian.com/world/2023/feb…

Must-read article in Kommersant.

TLDR: RU refineries are pumping out oil products abroad like never before and draining the government’s coffers in the process by cashing in on poorly designed subsidies. We’re talking $30bn in 2022. kommersant.ru/doc/5839463 Basically, the RU government had a price guarantee for exporting refineries to compensate them for losses if domestic and export prices were out of whack and the contraction of EU demand made it so. So the Kremlin opened its wallet and just poured cash on these guys.

Aujourd’hui le plan européen pour limiter les revenus tirés par le gouvernement russe des exportations de dérivés du pétrole rentre en action. Une belle occasion de se demander si les sanctions sur le gaz et le brut fonctionnent.

lemonde.fr/economie/artic… Pourquoi est-ce crucial?
Parce que depuis des années la fuite en avant du militarisme russe va de pair avec l’augmentation des revenus du gouvernement tirés de l’exportation des hydrocarbures. Couper l’un c’est mortellement toucher l’autre.

https://twitter.com/peterbdoran/status/1617878074749779970

Hmmm thé cap has teeth after all energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/qa/ho…

Ladies and gents, the one and only @mark4harrison has published an essay on how to conduct the current western campaign of sanctions. The man is a fucking intellectual legend who deserves all the respect our little souls can muster. But in this case he also happens to be wrong

https://twitter.com/voxeu/status/1536297969011392513

Again, let me restate: the man is brilliant and has been fighting the battle for knowledge for decades. He ought to be endlessly praised. Even in this piece, he makes a very valid arching point: don’t get caught in the mercantilist fallacy.

Je viens de regarder la vidéo de @surlechampFr La Production standardisée : La Bataille de Lépante (1571) ... petit thread... A mon sens la capacité de Venise à construire une grande flotte en pièce détachées est certes intéressante mais secondaire par rapport à d’autres aspect en amont de la bataille. En avant tout au point de vue financier.