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Institute for the Study of War

Sep 11

NEW: Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.

2/ US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia.

3/ Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10.

The Kremlin is reportedly allocating roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648 million) to strengthen its technical ability to restrict internet traffic on its sovereign internet.

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Institute for the Study of War

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 10

NEW: Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 9.

Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Siversk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk.

More key takeaways ⬇️ 🧵(1/6)

2/ Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”

3/ Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.

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Institute for the Study of War

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 7

NEW: Western decision-making continues to artificially suppress Ukraine's overall long-range strike capability. 🧵(1/6)

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.

Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars.

Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas.

2/ Austin reiterated a Biden Administration talking point that since Russia has moved aircraft conducting glide bomb strikes out of range of US-provided ATACMS missiles, it somehow renders Ukraine’s request to use ATACMS in Russian territory against hundreds of known stationary military objects moot.

ISW has previously noted there are at least 209 of 245 (over 85 percent) known Russian military objects in range of ATACMS that are not air bases and not within range of US-provided HIMARS that the US does allow Ukraine to use in Russia under limited circumstances.

3/ Austin also argued that Ukraine has its own domestically produced capabilities that can attack Russian targets well beyond the range of Western-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles.

Most of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities come from domestically produced long-range drones, which Ukraine cannot use to cause the same level of damage as long-range missiles due to drone payload limitations. Russian forces can also more easily harden facilities against Ukrainian drones than Western-provided missiles.

Ukraine has begun to produce and successfully field long-range precision weapons with payloads more comparable to Western-provided long-range missiles but currently lacks the quantity of these domestically produced systems to significantly threaten Russian military targets within Russia at scale

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Institute for the Study of War

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 7

NEW: Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the Wall Street Journal. The missile shipment is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. 🧵(1/7)

2/ Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Ababil missiles have a range of around 86 kilometers and can carry a payload of 45 kilograms, while Fateh-360 missiles have a range of around 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.

3/ It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Iran has meanwhile expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran throughout 2024 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia, according to Reuters. Russia has recently intensified drone and missile attacks into Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles.

Read 7 tweets

Institute for the Study of War

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 6

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1831867946399867074

Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City. 🧵(1/5)

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1831867946399867074

2/ Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions northeast of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).

Russian forces continued attacking north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on September 5.

Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that personnel in the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City) are suffering from a shortage of potable water and refuse to conduct some unspecified operations.

3/ Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 5.

Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka, Hlushkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Berestove, Andriivka, and Myasozharivka and towards Lozova; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna, Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Novosadove; and west of Kreminna near Torske on September 4 and 5.

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Institute for the Study of War

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 6

NEW: Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. 🧵(1/7)

Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.

2/ Russian forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City) and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area.

Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near term

3/ Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.

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