The Ukrainian drone strikes on Moscow once again demonstrate the futility of weapons restrictions and the Kremlin's lack of red lines. This is the largest drone attack on Moscow from Ukraine. Drones hit Ramenskoye, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky. Several drones hit residential
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buildings. This may be due to the work of Russian air defense. Ukraine is aiming at military targets because bombing civilians does not improve the situation at the front. Drones do not cause much destruction since their warhead is about 10 times smaller than that of Russian
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FAB-500 bombs, but they have a psychological effect. Russia is not going to stop. The loss of part of the Kursk region, huge losses of personnel, a declining economy - Russia is not going to withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory. In this case, the aggressor can only
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be stopped by moving the war to Russian territory and destroying the Putin regime. The Kremlin will survive the loss of Kursk, but the landings in Moscow are very close to the work of many propagandists and the Russian leadership. And this worries those on whom Putin's
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regime relies. Drone attacks become commonplace and will only happen more often. However, threats to Putin's regime do not only come from Ukraine. Internal ethnic conflicts with residents of the Caucasus are becoming more frequent, and on September 3, another fight on this
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basis took place in the city of Anapa. As the Anapa Media portal wrote, on the night of September 3, on Pionersky Prospekt, a girl refused to meet a representative of one of Russia's neighboring republics and received a portion of insults. When other guys stood up for her,
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a crowd of Caucasians attacked them and began to beat them up. Later, the commander of "Akhmat" Apti Alaudinov stood up for them, blaming the girl for everything. Russia is losing strength, and this is felt by representatives of those peoples who have been humiliated and
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discriminated against throughout their coexistence with Russia. Tensions are growing between Akhmat and Russian troops. If Russia starts to fall apart, it will be because of the war in Ukraine, but it will start with Chechnya and Dagestan. Russia is still trying to advance,
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but the advance in the Pokrovsky direction has slowed. "Agency" published the size of the territories captured by Russia from August to September based on DeepState data and it is clear that the advance has slowed. Russia is starting to show signs of resource problems, but
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Ukraine in turn has also transferred additional forces and more experienced brigades, like Azov, to stop the advance. The intensity of the offensive remains high, but the attacks are repelled more successfully. Ukraine is having a very hard time. Every day. Two and a half
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years. The length of the entire front line is more than 3 thousand km. The line of active combat operations is more than 970 km, but Ukraine is not defeated and it is obvious that Russia cannot win. However, how much longer the war will continue, no one can say.
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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