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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Mar 8

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On the evening of Thursday, March 6th, groups of former officers and members of the Assad regime army carried out an organized attack targeting military sites, police stations, and security patrols belonging to the new Syrian administration in the Alawite-majority Syrian coastal region. The Syrian Ministry of Defense moved urgently to reassert control over the area, which led to a large number of deaths on both sides, as well as the deaths of dozens of civilians. An analytical reading of the circumstances of this attack, the parties behind it, and its repercussions on the Syrian and regional scene.
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Before delving into the political analysis, I will clarify some details about the attack that began with an organized assault carried out by hundreds of fighters armed with individual and medium weapons, as well as some heavy weapons, targeting the cities of Jableh, Tartous, Latakia, Banias, Draykish and Qardaha, and cutting off the two international highways, Aleppo-Latakia and Homs-Tartous. In the early hours of the attack, they were able to take control of several neighborhoods in the aforementioned cities and kill at least 150 Syrian security personnel and dozens of civilians, particularly in the cities of Jableh and Latakia. They were also able to besiege the naval college in Latakia and control the Istamo helicopter airport in the Latakia countryside. This attack was led by the former brigadier general in the Assad army, Ghaith Dallah, one of the leaders of the 4th Division that was headed by Maher al-Assad and supported by Iran and the IRGC, known to be a war criminal and responsible for committing war crimes during the Syrian revolution. Given the size and the spread of this attack, it is evident that we are dealing with a well-thought-out plan whose goal was to impose these groups’ complete control over the Syrian coast, taking advantage of the fragile security situation in Syria under the new Syrian administration. So, who is behind this attack and behind Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah?
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One day before this attack began, the Iranian Fars News Agency, which is closely associated with the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, published a statement attributed to a group calling itself the “Syrian Islamic Resistance Front - Uli al-Bas” affirming its presence in Syrian territory and its efforts to confront the new Syrian administration positioning themselves as part of the "Resistance Axis" led by Iran. They called on the Syrian people to support them and emphasized that the coming days will confirm their presence. This militia, which first appeared after the fall of the Assad regime, had previously published statements claiming to carry out attacks against the IDF in southern Syria. While all eyes were on the Syrian coast, at the same time there was a mobilization of Israeli forces in the demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border. According to a statement issued by the same group, it confirmed that it had fired on an Israeli force in southern Syria, which underscores a direct connection between this militia affiliated with the Iranian Quds Force and the groups led by Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 24

Thread 🧵
Yesterday, during a graduation ceremony for IDF officers, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a number of important remarks addressing three key issues: Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. An analytical reading of these statements and their impact on the map of the region.
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I will break down this analysis by examining each file separately and I will explain the possibilities of what Netanyahu promised in this speech, as well as the obstacles the Israeli government may face within a strategy that I will call the “Security circle”. In my opinion, this strategy is a direct result of the attacks of October 7 and the shift it caused in the perspective of Israeli politicians and military officials, both within Israel and in the region.
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Gaza file
Netanyahu confirmed that he will bring back all Israeli hostages from Gaza without exception, that Hamas will not control the Strip, and that his government will work to disarm them. This statement is very important for several reasons. Regarding the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas, it can be said that Netanyahu, despite the doubts, is still committed to the exchange deal that began mid-last month. However, there are still questions about Netanyahu and his government’s vision for the form of the second phase. With voices within the government coalition urging Netanyahu not to move forward with the second phase, alongside American pressure pushing for its initiation, Netanyahu finds himself in a dilemma. He believes that returning to war again at the end of the first phase would result in more hostages being killed, and discontent from Trump and his administration, whose support he urgently needs on both the Gaza evacuation and the Iranian nuclear issue. On the other hand, advancing to the second phase would mean a sustainable cessation of the war and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, something that several of his government ministers reject, which threatens to fragment the coalition and lead to early elections, something Netanyahu does not want at this stage. This dilemma has led Netanyahu to seek a way out by requesting an extension of the first phase of the agreement. This will allow for the release of more hostages without allowing the Gaza reconstruction process to begin or implementing a permanent ceasefire, thus satisfying the Israeli domestic front and its government ministers, while also keeping Trump’s plan to relocate the residents of the Gaza Strip possible. Beginning Gaza's reconstruction would disrupt Trump's plan, which, as of now, remains theoretical, despite being adopted by Netanyahu’s government and many opposition parties in Israel.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 18

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On the 12th of this month, the Syrian SANA news agency reported a phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, during which Putin congratulated al-Sharaa on the presidency during the transitional phase. The two leaders also discussed the strategic relationship between Syria and Russia. A geopolitical reading of the relationship between Moscow and the new Syrian administration between interests and the differences of the previous phase.
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Since the launch of the Syrian armed opposition’s military operation from Idlib on November 27 of last year, all eyes have been on Moscow and its stance regarding the rapid collapse of Assad’s army. Despite the limited participation of Russian warplanes in this operation, compared to Russia’s overall air power, it can be said that Moscow was not eager to continue supporting Assad’s survival in power after nearly nine years of direct military intervention in Syria. Of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine drained Moscow’s military capabilities in supporting the Assad regime militarily, but this is not the full picture. Practically speaking, Moscow could have sent some air squadrons within hours to its air base in Khmeimim from the first day of the Syrian armed opposition’s advance. The Russian military could have also used its warships in the Mediterranean or even those in the Black Sea to bolster Assad’s forces in the face of the opposition’s advance. However, it is clear that Moscow was unwilling to do so. In the same context, and according to what security sources confirm, Tehran had at least demanded that Russia secure guarantees from the Israeli side not to target their forces that might enter Syria from Iraq or those might arriving by air. However, Moscow did not respond to the Iranian request. Thus it can be said that the Russian leadership, which was a fundamental factor in keeping Assad in power since the fall of 2015, no longer sees the benefit of this role, a shift proven by Putin’s abandonment of supporting Assad’s continued rule.
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n return, Moscow agreed to receive Assad, his family, and a number of military and security officers on its territory. This step was adopted for three reasons: First, Moscow does not want to lose its reputation as a protector of dictatorships, as several leaders in Africa are watching the situation in Syria and rely on Russian protection. Second, Assad, his family, and a number of Syrian generals in his army have investments, deposits and trade in the Russian market, and Moscow is currently in dire need of any money to support the Russian economy. Third, Moscow wants to keep Assad as a valuable negotiating card, whether with the new Syrian administration or even with international parties that have ties with Assad and do not want the details of these relationships to be exposed. Therefore, it can be said that Russia, days before Assad's fall, had made its decision and had already begun building communication channels with the Syrian opposition, initially through the Turkish gateway.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 14

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While eyes in Lebanon and for those interested in Lebanese affairs are directed towards the borders with Israel, with February 18 being the scheduled date for the IDF to withdraw to their positions prior to last September, developments at Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut and the Syrian-Lebanese border have reaffirmed that the Lebanese scene remains complex. An analytical reading of the political and military developments in the Lebanese arena.
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On November 26, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his government’s approval of a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, brokered by the United States and France, which began at dawn on the 27th of the same month. While all 13 terms of the agreement have been revealed, the agreement remains controversial, especially within Lebanese parties. Following the agreement, General Joseph Aoun was elected president, and Nawaf Salam was chosen as prime minister of the new Lebanese government, which was announced a few days ago. Despite the positive atmosphere in Beirut, this cautious optimism has already begun to face challenges on multiple fronts, most notably the domestic front. While Lebanese political parties, with regional and international support, are trying to push Lebanon into a new phase entitled “Lebanon after the defeat of the Hezbollah-Assad-Tehran axis,” Hezbollah rejects the narrative of its defeat in the last war with Israel, emphasizing its political and popular influence, and asserting that there is no new Lebanon without Hezbollah and its weapons. This polarization between the two competing narratives may pose a dilemma for the new era headed by Joseph Aoun and the government of Nawaf Salam, as it may be difficult to satisfy all parties at the same time.
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To better understand the Lebanese scene, it is essential to clarify the popular reality there, away from what is presented by Western or Arab media. Yes, Hezbollah has suffered huge human estimated at around five thousand dead, with double that number wounded, and the deaths of the first and second ranks of the leadership, along with the deaths of Nasrallah, a key symbol of the "Resistance Axis" in the region. A security source confirmed to me that during the war, thousands of militia fighters refused to go to southern Lebanon to fight. And yes, the last war caused massive destruction in most of the towns and cities where the Shiites of Lebanon live, who constitute the human reservoir of the militia. However, despite this difficult reality, Hezbollah still enjoys considerable popular support among the Shiite community in Lebanon and beyond, and they are prepared to bear these losses despite their impact to their economic reality. The relationship between Hezbollah and the Shiites in Lebanon is an ideological religious relationship, not an institutional partisan one. Therefore, talking about the end of Hezbollah in Lebanon, at least as a political party, is an incorrect assessment. This is what Hezbollah in alliance with the Amal Movement tried to confirm by blocking Joseph Aoun’s election from the first round, and then by securing four ministers in Nawaf Salam’s government and finally by staging protests in front of Rafic Hariri International Airport (Beirut Airport) in response to the refusal to allow an Iranian plane to land. Hezbollah makes it clear that any confrontation with it would mean a confrontation with a significant part of the Shiite sect in Lebanon.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 4

Thread 🧵
A car bomb exploded yesterday in the city of Manbij, located in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. The blast killed approximately 15 civilians, most of whom were women, making it the deadliest attack in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. While social media users pointed fingers at the SDF militia, the new Syrian administration refrained from identifying those responsible. In an official statement, they focused on pursuing the perpetrators of this terrorist attack. An analytical reading of the security and political circumstances of this explosion.
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On December 9th, the SDF withdrew from the city of Manbij towards the eastern bank of the Euphrates river. According to informed sources, this withdrawal came after an agreement between Ankara and Washington, under which the Euphrates river will serve as the dividing line between the SDF forces and the Syrian administration forces in preparation for direct negotiations between Damascus and the SDF to reach a diplomatic solution to de-escalate the conflict. Indeed, a delegation from the SDF traveled to Damascus and intensive rounds of negotiations have been ongoing to this day without any notable results. Returning to the city of Manbij, which has been the subject of a dispute between the SDF and the armed Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye since the Kurdish militias, backed by the international coalition against ISIS, crossed the Euphrates River and imposed their control over the city of Manbij after expelling ISIS fighters in 2016, has been plagued by a series of car bombings since the SDF’s withdrawal. In less than two months car bombs eight car bombings have taken place with yesterday's attack being the deadliest. So, who is behind these bombings?
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It can be said that there are three parties accused by the conflicting sides. First, the SDF claims that the Syrian groups supported by Türkiye are behind these car bombings, arguing that Ankara is looking for a pretext to launch a military action against them in the eastern Euphrates region. In practice, the car bombings and motorcycle bombings have not stopped in the areas of the northern Aleppo countryside over the past six years, despite the strenuous efforts of the Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye to prevent them. Dozens of fighters from these factions, along with hundreds of civilians, have been killed in these explosions. Moreover, Türkiye is well aware that there is no military solution to the eastern Syrian file unless the ongoing diplomatic process in Damascus fails or if Washington gives the green light to this move by withdrawing its forces from the east of the Euphrates. Therefore, Türkiye or the Syrian groups affiliated with it have no interest in instigating such bloody events.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 1

Thread 🧵
In a first-of-its-kind event, at approximately 11 PM last night, an Israeli force that had penetrated the vicinity of the village of Tranjah, located in the disengagement zone in southern Syria, was exposed to gunfire from the Syrian side, followed by the IDF combing the area and firing illuminating bombs. An analytical reading of the scene on the Israeli-Syrian border after the fall of the Assad regime.
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Less than an hour after this attack, a group called the Islamic Resistance in Syria claimed responsibility. In their statement, they confirmed firing towards a vehicle belonging to the Israeli Defense Forces in the village of Tranjah in the northern Quneitra countryside, which resulted in casualties on the Israeli side, and then the group withdrew. This statement is the second for this group since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. A few days ago, they issued a statement confirming that the resistance in Syria has not ended and that the coming days will bring surprises. So, who is the Islamic Resistance in Syria?
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During the first years of the Syrian revolution, with the intervention of the Iranian Quds Force and the Hezbollah militia, they started forming groups of Syrian fighters who mainly belonged to the Shiite sect. The circle of fighters later expanded to include Sunnis loyal to Assad. As Assad expanded his control over southern Syria in the governorates of Quneitra and Daraa, Hezbollah leader Ali Musa Daqduq, who was assassinated last November by Israeli warplanes, took over the so-called "Golan file". This involved working to form a network of agents affiliated with the Iranian Quds Force and Hezbollah in southern Syria. The Military Security Branch of the Assad regime coordinated the work of this network by issuing security id cards to its members. During that period, the work of this network was limited to collecting information on the locations of the IDF and on the movements of Israeli patrols on the opposite side of the disengagement zone in the Golan. However, with the fall of Assad, Tehran gave the green light to this network to work on carrying out attacks against Israeli forces in the disengagement zone, which these forces had penetrated during the past two months.
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