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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

May 2

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In light of the current developments in Syria and the Israeli military escalation, I will provide a brief analysis of these developments, which are directly linked to the clashes that took place in the past few days between the new Syrian administration and groups of Syrian Druze.
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The dispute between the new Syrian administration and a part of the Druze community in Syria has resurfaced with violent clashes witnessed in two neighborhoods near the Syrian capital, Damascus, amid the refusal of Druze communities to surrender their weapons, affirming their non-recognition of the current Syrian government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. Before analyzing the latest developments, I find it necessary to provide a simple explanation of the Druze community's position on the political changes in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime.
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The Syrian Druze can be divided politically into three main groups. The first is represented by cleric Hikmat al-Hijri, who has close ties to the Druze religious leader in Israel, Muwaffaq al-Tarif. Al-Hajri rejects the new Syrian administration and calls for decentralization in Syria, with the Druze regions being self-governed. The second group consists of officers and soldiers from the Assad army who participated in the killing of the Syrian people over the past fourteen years. They are represented by the Military Council in Suwayda, which maintains ties with al-Hajri and shares his ideas. These individuals fear being prosecuted by the new Syrian administration. The third group is represented by a group of religious leaders, headed by al-Jarbou' and Laith al-Bal'ous, the leader of the Men of Dignity militia. This group supports Syrian unity and central governance and maintain positive relations with the new Syrian administration.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Apr 16

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While the United States continues to build up its air, defense, and missile capabilities in the Middle East and its surrounding areas, and while the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip continues without decisive results, Netanyahu's visit to Washington took place, followed a few days later by the first round of indirect negotiations between the Iranians and Americans in Muscat. An analytical reading of the latest developments related to the Iranian nuclear program and the Israeli stance towards it.
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The Middle East is currently undergoing a transitional phase in which the spheres of influence are being redefined. However, the final shape of the geopolitical landscape has not yet been completed. While the October 7 attack constituted an earthquake that plunged the region into a series of conflicts that have altered the shape of several regions and countries (Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria), the negotiations between Washington and Iran, primarily focused on the Iranian nuclear program, and the outcomes of these negotiations, will be the most important event after which we will be faced with a semi-final reality for the balances to stabilize again. Therefore, all political, economic, and military analyses and readings of the Middle East remain temporary, awaiting this key event. From this perspective, we find that several regional governments have adopted a policy of caution and non-confrontation, monitoring the Iranian arena and American movements, while in Israel, it seems that the Netanyahu government considers itself directly responsible for the changes in the shape of the region and therefore believes it has the right to impose its vision for the new Middle East. The escalation in the Gaza Strip has returned, and Israeli strikes have increased in Lebanon and Syria, while defensive capabilities around the Dimona nuclear reactor in central Israel are being bolstered and the target bank in Iran is being expanded. This Israeli rush was the reason Trump invited Netanyahu to the White House.
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On April 7, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met with US President Trump. The visit was hastily organized at Trump's personal request. Four hot topics were discussed between the two leaders:
The Syrian file: The American side conveyed a calming stance from the Turkish side. Trump urged Netanyahu to deal rationally and calmly with the Turkish role in the Syrian arena. Trump also encouraged direct consultations between Turkish and Israeli officials, which actually took place about 48 hours later in Azerbaijan.
The Gaza Strip file: Netanyahu conveyed his commitment to Trump's plan to transfer the residents of the Strip elsewhere and for Israeli and American companies to undertake the reconstruction of the area. Despite Trump's understanding of Netanyahu and his government's viewpoint on the need to defeat Hamas and force it to either disarm or leave Gaza, he insisted on the need to reach an agreement to end this war as quickly as possible.
The tariffs issue: Trump had imposed on many countries, including Israel. Netanyahu attempted to reduce the new tariff, which was set at a rate of 17% on Israeli products exported to the US.
While the most important issue, which could be considered the reason behind Trump's invitation to Netanyahu to Washington, was the Iranian file.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Apr 5

Thread 🧵
On the evening of April 2, Hama and T4 military airports in central Syria were subjected to Israeli airstrikes, which led to the complete destruction of both airports. Israeli media outlets reported confirmations from Defense Ministry officials that the raids were preemptive strikes to prevent the construction of a Turkish air base in Syria. An in-depth reading of Turkish-Israeli relations in the Syrian arena.
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More than 3 months ago, I analyzed the Syrian scene following the fall of the Assad regime and the huge losses suffered by the Iranian project in the region. I reached the conclusion that there are two projects in the region that will play a role in the Syrian arena: the Turkish project and the Israeli project. I wondered whether Ankara and Jerusalem would compete or cooperate in the Syrian arena. Today, it seems that we are witnessing the beginning of a competition between these two visions. Despite the escalating rhetoric from politicians and media in both countries, one cannot judge Turkish-Israeli relations merely by the broad outlines, but rather we must delve deeper into the details. Are we facing an inevitable clash between Türkiye and Israel in Syria? To answer this question, we must explain and analyze the vision of each project in the Syrian arena separately, starting with the Israeli vision. 👇
x.com/evacool_/statu…
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Yes, without a doubt, Israel had a direct role in the fall of the Assad regime on December 8th. The strikes that the IDF launched against the Iranian presence in Syria, especially during the year preceding the fall of Assad, were severe, the most important of which was targeting the meeting of the leaders of the IRGC responsible for the Syria and Lebanon files at the Iranian consulate in Damascus, headed by General Zahedi. These strikes prompted Tehran to reposition its advisors in Syrian territory and withdraw a large number of them to Iranian soil. They also limited the movements of the multinational militias (Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani, Syrian, Palestinian) affiliated with the IRGC in Syria. The Israeli military operation against the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon also contributed to removing this militia from the military equation in Syria. In the two weeks leading up to Assad's fall, as the battles in Aleppo intensified and Assad's forces collapsed there, Tehran tried, through the Russian mediator, to obtain the green light to urgently send Iranian and Iraqi forces to support Assad. However, the Israeli side prevented this, and in two incidents, Israeli warplanes blocked the entry of two Iranian planes loaded with elite soldiers and military equipment from entering Syrian airspace. These Israeli moves were part of the Israeli government's vision, adopted after the October 7 attacks, which aimed to destroy the Iranian project in the region, and Assad's Syria was a crucial link in this project. The role played by the Assad regime in supplying Iranian weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon prompted the Israeli government to re-evaluate the viability of Assad remaining in power in Damascus. Assad, once seen as a leader protecting Israel's northern borders, became a weak leader unable to reject Iranian orders, and thus, no longer useful to Israel and its security. Therefore, within this vision, his downfall became necessary. However, with the rapid unfolding of events, the alternative was the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham organization, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Apr 2

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In a television interview with the advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader and his special envoy, Ali Larijani, he warned that any American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program would force Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. An analytical reading of the of the rising tensions between Iran, Israel, and Washington recently, exploring possible scenarios and the regional stance.
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This is not the first time that a senior Iranian official has spoken about the possibility of Tehran changing its nuclear doctrine in the event of an external attack on its nuclear program. About two months ago, the Supreme Leader’s advisor, Kamal Kharrazi, who is currently personally responsible for the nuclear negotiations with the West, issued the same warnings. It is important to emphasize, based on current data, that Iran has the military and technical capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb at any time it desires. The only obstacle is the fatwa of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which prohibits the military development of the Iranian nuclear program. However, both Larijani and Kharrazi are figures close to Khamenei, and therefore it can be said that these warnings come from the Supreme Leader himself and must be taken seriously. So, what are Iran’s alternative options if Trump chooses to pursue the military option to deal with the Iranian nuclear program?
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Some may wonder, if Tehran does not want nuclear weapons, and there is a fatwa from the Iranian Supreme Leader prohibiting them, then why does its nuclear project exceed all permissible limits for a nuclear program for civilian purposes by producing uranium at high levels (recently, uranium enrichment in Iran was increased to 60%) and continuously increasing the number of centrifuges?
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Mar 25

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After more than 530 days of war in the Gaza Strip and a pause of over a month before it reignited, the political and military landscape today appears extremely complex. An analytical reading of the political scene and diplomatic offers to end or temporarily halt the war between Israel and Hamas.
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On the ground
At the dawn of March 18, the IDF announced the launch of a large-scale attack on Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip, based on directives from the political echelon. This attack marks a new beginning for a war in which the field situation has become less impactful, given the return of significant American military support for the IDF through new batches of bunker-bustier missiles and multi-purpose munitions, and the reorganization of ground forces. On the Hamas side, despite launching several rockets in coordination with the Islamic Jihad militia, all of which were intercepted by the IDF's Iron Dome, it is clear that the Palestinian militia's rocket arsenal has been depleted, and its stockpile is nearing exhaustion. In terms of manpower, Hamas has been able to reorganize some of its forces and recruit new fighters. However, these forces face three major challenges that limit their ability to withstand and inflict casualties on IDF forces: first, a shortage of ammunition for small arms and anti-tank launchers; second, a lack of experience among the remaining forces and the new recruits, which hampers their ability to carry out ground maneuvers given the technological development and air cover for the attacking forces, making any movement by Hamas fighters and other Palestinian militias outside the tunnels extremely dangerous. Third, there is significant damage to the tunnel networks, which have become like isolated islands, some of which have been severely damaged to the point of becoming dangerous to be within them. In parallel, the ground communications network that was located within these tunnels has been damaged, making communication between battalions and units extremely complicated. Therefore, the field and military reality confirms that any new Israeli military operation will not be as costly as it was over the past year and six months, while Hamas will avoid the option of direct confrontation and rely on ambushes and sniper tactics.
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Politically
It can be said that the decision of the Israeli government, led by Netanyahu, to return to war and not move forward with the second phase of the deal is linked to the perception this government reached, that the results of the war over the past year and five months were insufficient and did not achieve the war goals set by the government at the outset, which was to eliminate Hamas. While some viewed the killing of the senior leaders of the militia, headed by the mastermind of the October 7 attacks, Yahya Sinwar, and the militia’s chief of staff and military commander, Mohammed Deif, as an important achievement that could be translated as the end of the militia, the way Hamas appeared during the truce period and the military parades that accompanied the release of the Israeli hostages painted a different picture. This has influenced the convictions of the Israeli government, which considered that going to the second phase under these circumstances would mean accepting the reality of Hamas’s continued control over the Gaza Strip. Consequently, and after lengthy discussions between the Netanyahu government and the Trump administration, the decision was made to return to war in the hope of achieving the most important goal, which is to end Hamas in Gaza, in addition to the possibility that this military operation would lead to the imposition of a new reality in the Strip that would open the way for the implementation of Trump's plan to rebuild Gaza. While the sounds of artillery and airstrikes escalate, the negotiating tables in Egypt and Qatar remain open, and several offers are currently being discussed and studied.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Mar 8

Thread 🧵
On the evening of Thursday, March 6th, groups of former officers and members of the Assad regime army carried out an organized attack targeting military sites, police stations, and security patrols belonging to the new Syrian administration in the Alawite-majority Syrian coastal region. The Syrian Ministry of Defense moved urgently to reassert control over the area, which led to a large number of deaths on both sides, as well as the deaths of dozens of civilians. An analytical reading of the circumstances of this attack, the parties behind it, and its repercussions on the Syrian and regional scene.
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Before delving into the political analysis, I will clarify some details about the attack that began with an organized assault carried out by hundreds of fighters armed with individual and medium weapons, as well as some heavy weapons, targeting the cities of Jableh, Tartous, Latakia, Banias, Draykish and Qardaha, and cutting off the two international highways, Aleppo-Latakia and Homs-Tartous. In the early hours of the attack, they were able to take control of several neighborhoods in the aforementioned cities and kill at least 150 Syrian security personnel and dozens of civilians, particularly in the cities of Jableh and Latakia. They were also able to besiege the naval college in Latakia and control the Istamo helicopter airport in the Latakia countryside. This attack was led by the former brigadier general in the Assad army, Ghaith Dallah, one of the leaders of the 4th Division that was headed by Maher al-Assad and supported by Iran and the IRGC, known to be a war criminal and responsible for committing war crimes during the Syrian revolution. Given the size and the spread of this attack, it is evident that we are dealing with a well-thought-out plan whose goal was to impose these groups’ complete control over the Syrian coast, taking advantage of the fragile security situation in Syria under the new Syrian administration. So, who is behind this attack and behind Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah?
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One day before this attack began, the Iranian Fars News Agency, which is closely associated with the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, published a statement attributed to a group calling itself the “Syrian Islamic Resistance Front - Uli al-Bas” affirming its presence in Syrian territory and its efforts to confront the new Syrian administration positioning themselves as part of the "Resistance Axis" led by Iran. They called on the Syrian people to support them and emphasized that the coming days will confirm their presence. This militia, which first appeared after the fall of the Assad regime, had previously published statements claiming to carry out attacks against the IDF in southern Syria. While all eyes were on the Syrian coast, at the same time there was a mobilization of Israeli forces in the demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border. According to a statement issued by the same group, it confirmed that it had fired on an Israeli force in southern Syria, which underscores a direct connection between this militia affiliated with the Iranian Quds Force and the groups led by Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah.
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