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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 19

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After about seven days since Israel launched Operation Rising Lion against the Iranian regime and its nuclear program, Iranian missiles continue to target Israeli territories amid what appears to be American hesitation. A geopolitical and military analysis of the developments in the war, the options available to each side, and the prospects for a diplomatic solution.
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First, I will provide a summary report of the latest military developments from each side and what each party has been able to achieve so far, starting with Israel.
Israel:
Since the first moment of this war, the IDF have been operating across four military levels targeting Iran. The first level involves military assassinations, the latest of which was the targeting of General Ali Shadmani, who served as deputy commander of the Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters, the most important Iranian military base. Shadmani was promoted after the assassination of the Chief of Staff and his deputy on the first day of the Israeli military operation, and according to Israeli sources, he assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the Iranian army. While Iranian sources denied his death, Iranian media confirmed he sustained serious injuries. The assassination followed the targeting of the head of Iranian intelligence and his deputy. It is likely that the assassination campaign will remain a priority for the IDF and Mossad in the coming days. The second level of the Israeli military operation concerns the Iranian missile program. From the first hour of Operation Rising Lion, missile depots and launch pads were at the top of the targets. This can be observed by examining the pattern of Israeli air attacks, which focused on the vicinity of the Iranian capital, Tehran, where a large number of military sites and missile depots are located. Additionally, strikes have targeted western Iran in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, and Ilam, where the main missile storage and launch platforms of the Iranian military and the IRGC are situated.
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The third level is the Iranian nuclear program. According to the IDF, the Natanz nuclear facility sustained significant damage, both to the above-ground and underground structures. Powerful strikes have also been directed against the Isfahan nuclear facility and the Arak reactor, in addition to several other nuclear facilities and research centers. A large-scale assassination campaign was also carried out, targeting Iranian nuclear scientists directly responsible for developing this program. The fourth level involves the army of agents. The scale of these agents' activity since the first hour of this war, their technical and military capabilities, and their widespread deployment confirm that we are not dealing with small cells with a limited number of individuals, but rather an army that spans the entire Iranian territory. From the far east of Iran, where an Iranian fuel transport plane was destroyed at Mashhad Airport, through the dozens of drones launched by this army in Tehran and its surroundings, all the way to the far west of Iran, where these agents target any air defense batteries attempting to intercept Israeli warplanes. Approximately seven days into this war, these four levels of operation continue, with Iran attempting to reorganize its military and security capabilities to mitigate losses.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 13

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Thirteen hours after the Israeli Defense Forces launched 'Operation Rising Lion' against Iran's nuclear program, which began with the implementation of a shock and awe strategy through a large-scale assassination operation that included key commanders of the Iranian army and the IRGC, the official in charge for the Iranian nuclear program, and key Iranian nuclear scientists, it seems we are facing a new turning point in the Middle East. A preliminary geopolitical and military analysis of the "war" between Israel and Iran.
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Initially, in the military context, the IDF has, so far, carried out more than seven waves of attacks inside Iranian territory, targeting the following: Iranian military and IRGC commanders, nuclear scientists, the Natanz nuclear reactor and several facilities affiliated with the nuclear program, air defense bases, military airports, ballistic missile warehouses and launch pads, facilities used within the Iranian missile program, drone production plants, and some oil refineries. By tracking the map of the strikes, we notice that the Israeli attacks have mainly focused on the Iranian capital, Tehran, and its surroundings, as well as central and western Iran. This focus, particularly Tabriz and Kermanshah, is due to the fact that Iran has a limited number of ballistic missiles capable of striking Israeli territory, with an average range of about 1,800 km, which are primarily stored in western Iran. In the absence of Iranian air defenses and their near-total destruction, Israeli warplanes and drones continue to fly in Iranian skies with greater freedom to strike any Iranian military bases suspected of posing a threat. This overwhelming attack has clearly impacted Iran’s response so far.
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On the Iranian side, the assassination of the army and IRGC leaders has disrupted the chain of command and control. The officers who have been promoted to senior positions are in a state of confusion amid the ongoing attacks, the inability to fully assess the extent of the damage inflicted on the army and the IRGC, and the fear of Iranian communications being breached, which would mean the assassinations could continue. All these factors render Iran almost paralyzed militarily, unable to show any form of resistance in the face of the technologically advanced Israeli Defense Forces, which is ready for this war (it has been preparing for it for years). These facts confirm that the Iranian regime is currently in a predicament, which Iranian officials may view them as an existential threat to the regime. It is important to emphasize that Iranian society is fundamentally internally divided, and some Iranians want to change the regime. This increases fears in Tehran that this attack could spark an internal popular movement, forcing the Iranian regime to keep some of its focus internally. But the most important question at the moment is: What are Khamenei's options?
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 6

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Yesterday evening, the Israeli Air Force carried out its largest wave of airstrikes on Beirut's southern suburbs and the most significant, as described by the IDF, since the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel was declared in late November. According to the IDF, the attack targeted Hezbollah infrastructure responsible for the production and development of drones for military use. The strike came just days after the Trump administration dismissed its envoy to Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, and amid Hezbollah's continued refusal to discuss the surrender of its weapons to the Lebanese state. It also occurred just days before the Lebanese army began its plan to withdraw weapons from the Palestinian camps in Beirut. An analytical reading of the Lebanese scene, highlighting the Beirut-Ramallah agreement regarding the disarmament of the Palestinian camps on Lebanese territory.
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Lebanon remains in a state of negative stagnation. Despite the election of Joseph Aoun as president and the formation of a more independent government, the political, economic, and military landscape remains unstable. Politically, the results of last month's municipal elections were disappointing, revealing that a large part of Lebanese society is still unprepared for change and a revolt against the current political elite. In Shiite areas, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement still hold the undisputed upper hand, while most independent candidates have failed. Economically, the political stalemate and unstable military situation are affecting Lebanon's standing as a country attractive to international investment. Even a number of Gulf businessmen who had shown interest in returning to open projects in Lebanon have backed off from this step. Militarily, the Lebanese Army and the US-led security committee continue to operate in areas south of the Litani River to end Hezbollah's presence there. However, the task remains incomplete due to Hezbollah's refusal to hand over maps of these sites. My sources also confirm that Hezbollah has begun relying on local manufacturing to compensate for the shortage of foreign weapons supplies. At the same time, there are ongoing intensive attempts to import weapons via Syria, in light of daily announcements by the Syrian security forces about the discovery of arms shipments coming from Iraq and the Syrian coast heading towards Lebanese territory. The Lebanese scene can be summarized as the Lebanese state stands at a crossroads. The Lebanese state has a desire to begin a new era, and this ambition receives both Arab and international support. However, this desire is hindered by the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, which, according to its leader, Naim Qassem, will not hand over its weapons unless the IDF withdraw from five positions in southern Lebanon, unless Israel stops its air strikes inside Lebanese territory, and unless the Lebanese state begins the reconstruction process. These conditions seem complex and difficult to fulfill, placing the Lebanese state in an extremely precarious position. To find a way out of this dilemma, the issue of weapons in Palestinian camps has come into focus.
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Some may wonder about the significance of the Palestinian camps file in Lebanon and why the Lebanese state is going to end it. It can be said that there are three parties supporting this initiative. The first is the Lebanese state. According to the ceasefire agreement, which was based on UN Resolution 1701, the restriction of weapons to the Lebanese state also includes the Palestinian camps. On the other hand, the Lebanese government is facing international pressure to implement the outcomes of Resolution 1701 and withdraw Hezbollah’s weapons as soon as possible. Therefore, in order to buy time and avoid confronting Hezbollah at the current stage, focusing on the Palestinian camps issue becomes an appropriate solution. The second is Hezbollah. Yes, Hezbollah, despite its close relations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah benefits from this step. In a conversation I had with a Lebanese official, it was confirmed to me that Hezbollah, in one of the discussions that took place between one of its representatives and officials from the Lebanese state, indicated that the militia refuses to hand over its weapons as long as there are weapons in the Palestinian camps. The Hezbollah official referred primarily to the Ain al-Hilweh camp in the city of Sidon, where he pointed out that the Palestinians in the camp are Sunni, and that withdrawing Hezbollah’s weapons without withdrawing the weapons of the Palestinian camps might put the Shiites in Sidon and Lebanon In danger. Of course, this claim is simply a justification for Hezbollah's tacit support so that the Lebanese state prioritizes the Palestinian camps issue, thus giving Hezbollah more time. If the weapons withdrawal from the Palestinian camps fails, Hezbollah will refuse to hand over its weapons. The third party is Israel, as the Palestinian militias in Lebanon still pose a threat to Israeli territory. During the last war with Lebanon, these militias participated in attacks towards northern Israel by launching rockets and conducting infiltration operations across the border. Therefore, it seems that this month will be focused on the Palestinian camps in Lebanon.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

May 2

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In light of the current developments in Syria and the Israeli military escalation, I will provide a brief analysis of these developments, which are directly linked to the clashes that took place in the past few days between the new Syrian administration and groups of Syrian Druze.
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The dispute between the new Syrian administration and a part of the Druze community in Syria has resurfaced with violent clashes witnessed in two neighborhoods near the Syrian capital, Damascus, amid the refusal of Druze communities to surrender their weapons, affirming their non-recognition of the current Syrian government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. Before analyzing the latest developments, I find it necessary to provide a simple explanation of the Druze community's position on the political changes in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime.
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The Syrian Druze can be divided politically into three main groups. The first is represented by cleric Hikmat al-Hijri, who has close ties to the Druze religious leader in Israel, Muwaffaq al-Tarif. Al-Hajri rejects the new Syrian administration and calls for decentralization in Syria, with the Druze regions being self-governed. The second group consists of officers and soldiers from the Assad army who participated in the killing of the Syrian people over the past fourteen years. They are represented by the Military Council in Suwayda, which maintains ties with al-Hajri and shares his ideas. These individuals fear being prosecuted by the new Syrian administration. The third group is represented by a group of religious leaders, headed by al-Jarbou' and Laith al-Bal'ous, the leader of the Men of Dignity militia. This group supports Syrian unity and central governance and maintain positive relations with the new Syrian administration.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Apr 16

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While the United States continues to build up its air, defense, and missile capabilities in the Middle East and its surrounding areas, and while the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip continues without decisive results, Netanyahu's visit to Washington took place, followed a few days later by the first round of indirect negotiations between the Iranians and Americans in Muscat. An analytical reading of the latest developments related to the Iranian nuclear program and the Israeli stance towards it.
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The Middle East is currently undergoing a transitional phase in which the spheres of influence are being redefined. However, the final shape of the geopolitical landscape has not yet been completed. While the October 7 attack constituted an earthquake that plunged the region into a series of conflicts that have altered the shape of several regions and countries (Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria), the negotiations between Washington and Iran, primarily focused on the Iranian nuclear program, and the outcomes of these negotiations, will be the most important event after which we will be faced with a semi-final reality for the balances to stabilize again. Therefore, all political, economic, and military analyses and readings of the Middle East remain temporary, awaiting this key event. From this perspective, we find that several regional governments have adopted a policy of caution and non-confrontation, monitoring the Iranian arena and American movements, while in Israel, it seems that the Netanyahu government considers itself directly responsible for the changes in the shape of the region and therefore believes it has the right to impose its vision for the new Middle East. The escalation in the Gaza Strip has returned, and Israeli strikes have increased in Lebanon and Syria, while defensive capabilities around the Dimona nuclear reactor in central Israel are being bolstered and the target bank in Iran is being expanded. This Israeli rush was the reason Trump invited Netanyahu to the White House.
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On April 7, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met with US President Trump. The visit was hastily organized at Trump's personal request. Four hot topics were discussed between the two leaders:
The Syrian file: The American side conveyed a calming stance from the Turkish side. Trump urged Netanyahu to deal rationally and calmly with the Turkish role in the Syrian arena. Trump also encouraged direct consultations between Turkish and Israeli officials, which actually took place about 48 hours later in Azerbaijan.
The Gaza Strip file: Netanyahu conveyed his commitment to Trump's plan to transfer the residents of the Strip elsewhere and for Israeli and American companies to undertake the reconstruction of the area. Despite Trump's understanding of Netanyahu and his government's viewpoint on the need to defeat Hamas and force it to either disarm or leave Gaza, he insisted on the need to reach an agreement to end this war as quickly as possible.
The tariffs issue: Trump had imposed on many countries, including Israel. Netanyahu attempted to reduce the new tariff, which was set at a rate of 17% on Israeli products exported to the US.
While the most important issue, which could be considered the reason behind Trump's invitation to Netanyahu to Washington, was the Iranian file.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Apr 5

Thread 🧵
On the evening of April 2, Hama and T4 military airports in central Syria were subjected to Israeli airstrikes, which led to the complete destruction of both airports. Israeli media outlets reported confirmations from Defense Ministry officials that the raids were preemptive strikes to prevent the construction of a Turkish air base in Syria. An in-depth reading of Turkish-Israeli relations in the Syrian arena.
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More than 3 months ago, I analyzed the Syrian scene following the fall of the Assad regime and the huge losses suffered by the Iranian project in the region. I reached the conclusion that there are two projects in the region that will play a role in the Syrian arena: the Turkish project and the Israeli project. I wondered whether Ankara and Jerusalem would compete or cooperate in the Syrian arena. Today, it seems that we are witnessing the beginning of a competition between these two visions. Despite the escalating rhetoric from politicians and media in both countries, one cannot judge Turkish-Israeli relations merely by the broad outlines, but rather we must delve deeper into the details. Are we facing an inevitable clash between Türkiye and Israel in Syria? To answer this question, we must explain and analyze the vision of each project in the Syrian arena separately, starting with the Israeli vision. 👇
x.com/evacool_/statu…
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Yes, without a doubt, Israel had a direct role in the fall of the Assad regime on December 8th. The strikes that the IDF launched against the Iranian presence in Syria, especially during the year preceding the fall of Assad, were severe, the most important of which was targeting the meeting of the leaders of the IRGC responsible for the Syria and Lebanon files at the Iranian consulate in Damascus, headed by General Zahedi. These strikes prompted Tehran to reposition its advisors in Syrian territory and withdraw a large number of them to Iranian soil. They also limited the movements of the multinational militias (Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani, Syrian, Palestinian) affiliated with the IRGC in Syria. The Israeli military operation against the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon also contributed to removing this militia from the military equation in Syria. In the two weeks leading up to Assad's fall, as the battles in Aleppo intensified and Assad's forces collapsed there, Tehran tried, through the Russian mediator, to obtain the green light to urgently send Iranian and Iraqi forces to support Assad. However, the Israeli side prevented this, and in two incidents, Israeli warplanes blocked the entry of two Iranian planes loaded with elite soldiers and military equipment from entering Syrian airspace. These Israeli moves were part of the Israeli government's vision, adopted after the October 7 attacks, which aimed to destroy the Iranian project in the region, and Assad's Syria was a crucial link in this project. The role played by the Assad regime in supplying Iranian weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon prompted the Israeli government to re-evaluate the viability of Assad remaining in power in Damascus. Assad, once seen as a leader protecting Israel's northern borders, became a weak leader unable to reject Iranian orders, and thus, no longer useful to Israel and its security. Therefore, within this vision, his downfall became necessary. However, with the rapid unfolding of events, the alternative was the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham organization, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani.
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