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Before delving into the political analysis, I will clarify some details about the attack that began with an organized assault carried out by hundreds of fighters armed with individual and medium weapons, as well as some heavy weapons, targeting the cities of Jableh, Tartous, Latakia, Banias, Draykish and Qardaha, and cutting off the two international highways, Aleppo-Latakia and Homs-Tartous. In the early hours of the attack, they were able to take control of several neighborhoods in the aforementioned cities and kill at least 150 Syrian security personnel and dozens of civilians, particularly in the cities of Jableh and Latakia. They were also able to besiege the naval college in Latakia and control the Istamo helicopter airport in the Latakia countryside. This attack was led by the former brigadier general in the Assad army, Ghaith Dallah, one of the leaders of the 4th Division that was headed by Maher al-Assad and supported by Iran and the IRGC, known to be a war criminal and responsible for committing war crimes during the Syrian revolution. Given the size and the spread of this attack, it is evident that we are dealing with a well-thought-out plan whose goal was to impose these groups’ complete control over the Syrian coast, taking advantage of the fragile security situation in Syria under the new Syrian administration. So, who is behind this attack and behind Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah? 
I will break down this analysis by examining each file separately and I will explain the possibilities of what Netanyahu promised in this speech, as well as the obstacles the Israeli government may face within a strategy that I will call the “Security circle”. In my opinion, this strategy is a direct result of the attacks of October 7 and the shift it caused in the perspective of Israeli politicians and military officials, both within Israel and in the region. 
Since the launch of the Syrian armed opposition’s military operation from Idlib on November 27 of last year, all eyes have been on Moscow and its stance regarding the rapid collapse of Assad’s army. Despite the limited participation of Russian warplanes in this operation, compared to Russia’s overall air power, it can be said that Moscow was not eager to continue supporting Assad’s survival in power after nearly nine years of direct military intervention in Syria. Of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine drained Moscow’s military capabilities in supporting the Assad regime militarily, but this is not the full picture. Practically speaking, Moscow could have sent some air squadrons within hours to its air base in Khmeimim from the first day of the Syrian armed opposition’s advance. The Russian military could have also used its warships in the Mediterranean or even those in the Black Sea to bolster Assad’s forces in the face of the opposition’s advance. However, it is clear that Moscow was unwilling to do so. In the same context, and according to what security sources confirm, Tehran had at least demanded that Russia secure guarantees from the Israeli side not to target their forces that might enter Syria from Iraq or those might arriving by air. However, Moscow did not respond to the Iranian request. Thus it can be said that the Russian leadership, which was a fundamental factor in keeping Assad in power since the fall of 2015, no longer sees the benefit of this role, a shift proven by Putin’s abandonment of supporting Assad’s continued rule. 
On November 26, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his government’s approval of a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, brokered by the United States and France, which began at dawn on the 27th of the same month. While all 13 terms of the agreement have been revealed, the agreement remains controversial, especially within Lebanese parties. Following the agreement, General Joseph Aoun was elected president, and Nawaf Salam was chosen as prime minister of the new Lebanese government, which was announced a few days ago. Despite the positive atmosphere in Beirut, this cautious optimism has already begun to face challenges on multiple fronts, most notably the domestic front. While Lebanese political parties, with regional and international support, are trying to push Lebanon into a new phase entitled “Lebanon after the defeat of the Hezbollah-Assad-Tehran axis,” Hezbollah rejects the narrative of its defeat in the last war with Israel, emphasizing its political and popular influence, and asserting that there is no new Lebanon without Hezbollah and its weapons. This polarization between the two competing narratives may pose a dilemma for the new era headed by Joseph Aoun and the government of Nawaf Salam, as it may be difficult to satisfy all parties at the same time. 
On December 9th, the SDF withdrew from the city of Manbij towards the eastern bank of the Euphrates river. According to informed sources, this withdrawal came after an agreement between Ankara and Washington, under which the Euphrates river will serve as the dividing line between the SDF forces and the Syrian administration forces in preparation for direct negotiations between Damascus and the SDF to reach a diplomatic solution to de-escalate the conflict. Indeed, a delegation from the SDF traveled to Damascus and intensive rounds of negotiations have been ongoing to this day without any notable results. Returning to the city of Manbij, which has been the subject of a dispute between the SDF and the armed Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye since the Kurdish militias, backed by the international coalition against ISIS, crossed the Euphrates River and imposed their control over the city of Manbij after expelling ISIS fighters in 2016, has been plagued by a series of car bombings since the SDF’s withdrawal. In less than two months car bombs eight car bombings have taken place with yesterday's attack being the deadliest. So, who is behind these bombings? 
Less than an hour after this attack, a group called the Islamic Resistance in Syria claimed responsibility. In their statement, they confirmed firing towards a vehicle belonging to the Israeli Defense Forces in the village of Tranjah in the northern Quneitra countryside, which resulted in casualties on the Israeli side, and then the group withdrew. This statement is the second for this group since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. A few days ago, they issued a statement confirming that the resistance in Syria has not ended and that the coming days will bring surprises. So, who is the Islamic Resistance in Syria?
On November 19, 2023, the Houthi militia announced the hijacking of the ship "Galaxy Leader," declaring the beginning of what they called "supporting Gaza operations." These attacks focused on two main fronts: the first was targeting commercial and military ships, either crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, those in the Red Sea, or those they could reach in the Arabian Sea. According to the latest data, the militia has claimed 110 attacks against commercial ships and 116 attacks against warships from November 2023 to December 2024. The second front was through direct targeting of Israeli territory using drones and ballistic missiles. According to the militia, they launched around 400 missiles and drones towards Israeli territory over a year and three months. Although Israeli defenses managed to intercept most of these attacks, the Houthi threats to Israeli national security have become a concern for military and political officials, given the militia's developing capabilities and its geographical distance, which poses a challenge in dealing with and stopping them. However, it can be said that after the latest developments, the Houthis have become a top priority for Israel in the coming phase. 
The visits of SDF delegations to Damascus today are not their first. Even during Assad's rule, there were tough negotiations in search of a consensus that would suit the Assad regime and the SDF. The two sides were linked by military relations in Afrin, a joint alliance in Manbij, and disputes and clashes in the eastern Deir ez-Zor countryside. However, it can be said that the military operation launched by Turkey in coordination with the Syrian armed opposition in eastern Syria under the name 'Operation Peace Spring' in 2019 marked a significant shift in relations between the Assad regime and the SDF, as forces belonging to the Assad regime entered eastern Syria to fight Turkey and the Syrian armed opposition, then stationed its forces in the Manbij area. Oil cooperation between the two sides also increased. But despite this rapprochement and despite Russian mediation, all visits by delegations of this militia failed due to the intransigence of both sides’ positions. The SDF insisted on the principle of self-administration for eastern Syria, while Assad affirmed the centrality of the Syrian state. 
After years of negotiations between two countries bound by shared interests and common enemies, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Moscow and Tehran has finally been signed. Despite this agreement, the smiles on the faces of both Raisi and Putin conceal a more complex reality. Yes, Tehran has increased its military cooperation with Moscow since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the Syrian file and the two countries' partnership in protecting Assad and his regime from falling have been crucial in driving this rapprochement. However, despite these shared interests, it does not appear that this is a decisive strategic alliance. Beneath the surface, there are larger and more heated disagreements between today's allies and yesterday's enemies. 
Over the past few days, the Qatari capital, Doha, has witnessed intensive rounds of indirect negotiations between representatives of the Israeli government and Hamas, in coordination with representatives of the Biden administration, the Qatari and Egyptian governments, in addition to the very important role of President Trump's envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff. During these rounds, viewpoints were brought closer and gaps between the two sides were bridged, so that today we are facing a comprehensive deal divided into three stages that ends the war, releases the hostages, and paves the way for the beginning of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. As for the most important details of this deal, according to what has been leaked so far, they are as follows: 
Even 24 hours before the start of the first round of voting in the Lebanese parliament, General Joseph Aoun did not have the 86 votes that would suffice for him to win the elections, and bypass article nr. 49 of the Lebanese constitution that prevents any first class employee in the Lebanese state from running for the presidency unless he has resigned or retired at least two years before the voting date. Thus, the 86 votes necessary to amend the constitution mean that the representatives of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement would vote in support of Joseph Aoun, which was not possible at that time. However, contacts led by the French presidential envoy, Jean Le Drian, personally, with the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, and Qatar, created a breakthrough in the position of Hezbollah and Nabih Berri, who chose not to vote for Joseph Aoun in the first round, then supported his vote in the second round, so that he won 99 votes out of 128, and Lebanon entered a new phase different from what it was in the past three decades. 
After the killing of the leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, in 2010, the organization entered a state of collapse and dispersion, to the point that many observers specializing in jihadist groups thought that it was the end. Indeed, the number of their fighters decreased to hundreds, hiding in the Anbar desert and its hills, or being hunted in the border villages with Syria. (This scene looks similar to what the organization is experiencing today, whose presence in Iraq and Syria has become limited to the Anbar desert and the Syrian desert). However, with the outbreak of protests in the Sunni areas of Iraq denouncing the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the organization began to reorganize its forces, publishing a statement called “Anbar Spring,” in which they confirmed that they were present in Anbar and that their revival was a matter of time. Indeed, in the summer of 2013, the organization attacked the Taji and Abu Ghraib prisons, as part of an operation called “Destruction of the Walls,” and released about 500 of their fighters, who were the nucleus of what was later called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant “ISIS.” Will history repeat itself? 
Before I present the latest developments in the presidency file and the ceasefire file on the Israeli-Lebanese border, it is important to shed light on the Hezbollah militia after a war that lasted for about a year in which they lost their leader Hassan Nasrallah and most of their military leaders, in addition to the damage to their strategic weapons stockpile and the great destruction of their financial networks. Today, the militia still exists, and it is still the strongest militarily in Lebanon, which is reflected in their political influence. The militia also still sees its connection with the Iranian regime as central to their existence. Therefore, I can say that Israel achieved half a victory and Hezbollah suffered half a defeat. Within this equation, Hezbollah does not accept any concessions internally because it sees them as a complement to its military defeat and thus a threat to its existence and influence in the Lebanese arena. This is how Hezbollah deals with the presidency file and the ceasefire agreement. 
Despite the importance of the leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in coordinating the work of this Iraqi militia in its war against ISIS, the final word was given by General Qassem Soleimani. After his death, Ismail Qaani was appointed as commander of the Quds Force but did not receive the same respect. According to informed Iraqi sources, disagreements occurred between the Iranians and a number of leaders of Iraqi parties and militias. Qaani was not able to impose his opinion on everyone, which forced Tehran to request the intervention of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to mediate. Later, Iran appointed Muhammad al-Kawtharani, a Hezbollah official, as responsible for the Iraqi file. 
On January 15, 2016, the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran entered into force. This agreement was not a set of technical provisions that temporarily limited Tehran's ability to produce a nuclear bomb only, but rather an international concession that gave Khamenei's regime a green light to expand its influence and control over the Middle East, starting with supporting the Assad regime to control the city of Aleppo, through blackmailing Saudi Arabia with missiles from the Houthi militia from Yemen, up to the attacks of October 7. Today, it can be said that the understandings of the JCPOA agreement, in its regional aspect, have ended by a decision from Israel after Trump ended its economic aspect in his first term. 
A few days ago, I described in detail the Iranian regime plan for the region, which became clearer day after day. Today, the Iraqi Parliament Speaker has confirmed what I had previously mentioned about the adoption by the Iraqi militias supported by Iran of the decision to stop their attacks on Israel in agreement with the Iraqi government in Baghdad. In fact I predicted this step, which surprised many observers, after the earthquake of the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus. I suggest you go through it again.👇👇👇
On the ground, the IDF is still continuing its combing operations for infrastructure such as tunnels and ammunition in large areas in southern Lebanon, in parallel with air strikes targeting any military movements of the Hezbollah militia, the latest of which were raids on several crossings on the Syrian-Lebanese border, which targeted smuggling operations. As a security source confirmed to me that Syrian groups affiliated with the Hezbollah militia tried to transfer weapons that were stored in secret areas in the western and southern Homs countryside towards the Lebanese interior, which prompted the IDF to strike these crossings, in parallel with the continued Israeli reconnaissance aircraft monitoring all Lebanese territories, including the Lebanese capital Beirut. Through my monitoring of the movements of the Israeli brigades in southern Lebanon, I do not see any indications of their withdrawal from these areas soon. 
A few days after the October 7, 2023 attacks launched by Hamas militias against Israeli territory around the Gaza Strip, discussions began in Tehran and with the parties of the Iranian axis in the region about their expectations of the Israeli response and about their plans for retaliation. As an informed security source indicated to me, the Iranians did not expect the Netanyahu government to adopt the decision to incur the ground operation in the Gaza Strip. They believed that the response would be through an intensive air campaign that would last for a few weeks, then move towards negotiations that would lead to the release of the hostages in exchange for Israeli concessions that included the files of Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iranian nuclear program. 
First, I will present to you the latest field developments of the Israeli military operation that was launched on Syrian territory: 
On the ground: 
The Syrian regime is no longer as militarily and security-wise as it was in 2011, and its allies in #Iran are no longer as strong and as powerful as they were in 2013 when they began their military intervention in #Syria. Similarly, #Hezbollah is no longer as it was in 2012 when it penetrated #Damascus and the southern countryside of #Homs and #Russia today is not Russia of 2015. On the other hand, the armed Syrian opposition today is no more numerous than it was in the first years of the revolution, and it does not have the allies and friends it had before. The Sunni countries in the region abandoned them, and #Europe forgot about #Assad's crimes and recently knocked on his door in preparation for restoring diplomatic relations. With Trump coming to the White House, it has become clear that the withdrawal of #US forces from eastern Syria is a matter of time. So, what happened? In my opinion, beyond politics and military, freedom triumphs again over dictatorship, no matter how solid and cohesive this dictatorship seems.