Middle East Expert | Jihadist groups. Bylines @AFP @AJArabic @AlQudsAlarabi, @The_NewArab, @Syriawise, @Arabnews.
For enquiries: contact@evakoulourioti.com
7 subscribers
On this day a year ago, I published a thread discussing the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel, describing it as fragile and expressing doubts about its implementation by both sides, particularly by Hezbollah. Today, my predictions have been confirmed. The militia, which had evaded implementing UN Resolution 1701 after the July War of 2006, is once again evading the same resolution and the ceasefire agreement's provisions under various pretexts. While Hezbollah officials claim to have implemented the agreement by withdrawing from south of the Litani River, this claim does not match the reality on the ground, as the continued presence of fighters remain south of the Litani, who are targeted and killed by the IDF, demonstrates. Even a year after the agreement went into effect, the Israeli Air Force continues to destroy rocket launchers, weapons depots, and militia infrastructure south of the Litani. As for the areas north of the Litani, Hezbollah officials argue that there is no provision requiring the militia to handover its weapons to the Lebanese state. This claim is also false, as the agreement clearly states that the Lebanese state must take possession of the militia's weapons starting from the Litani River, meaning throughout all Lebanese territory. Furthermore, the agreement itself is based on Lebanon and Hezbollah's acceptance of the full implementation of UN Resolution 1701, which explicitly stipulates that weapons in Lebanon must be exclusively held by the state. On the other hand, Lebanese officials believe that the main reason of the current escalation is the Israeli side's refusal to fully withdraw from southern Lebanon, where it still maintains a presence on five strategic hills and three military outposts inside Lebanese territory. Many consider this to be a breach of the agreement by the Netanyahu government, which explicitly stipulates a complete Israeli withdrawal within 60 days of the ceasefire. The Israeli side justifies this decision by stating that Lebanon, which promised to withdraw Hezbollah from south of the Litani within 60 days, failed to carry out its commitments. Consequently, Israel had to maintain control over certain points that allow it to protect the security of Israeli villages in the north. In conclusion, both sides are exchanging accusations, and the result is the same: a year after the ceasefire agreement went into effect, the situation on the Israeli-Lebanese border once again tops the agenda of Israel’s security cabinet, both small and expanded. The drums of war are beating louder with each passing day as we approach the end of this year, a period many see as the last chance before a new war breaks out. So, has war truly become inevitable, or is there still a chance to avoid it through diplomacy?
While some focus on the symbolism of this visit, which undoubtedly confirms the flexibility of politics and that yesterday's enemy may be tomorrow's ally, I believe that some have gone beyond reality, claiming that Syria is now under American protection, that Washington will lay out roses before al-Sharaa’s steps, and that Syria will become the Switzerland of the Middle East. In reality, however, what unites Syria and America are two main factors: the political pragmatism of the Syrian administration and the opportunism of the American administration. Here, I will provide a simplified explanation of the development of Syrian-American relations after the fall of the Assad regime and the assumption of the presidency by Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa in Syria. 
In his first speech after the Lebanese government's decisions, dedicated to developments in Lebanon, Naim Qassem, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, emphasized that the militia will not surrender its weapons to the Lebanese state and that they are ready for what he called a Karbala battle (named after the Iraqi city of Karbala) if necessary to confront the Lebanese government's decisions. Qassem also threatened that tampering with the militia's weapons threatens Lebanon's survival as a state. This escalatory speech by Hezbollah's leadership came one day after the visit of the Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Ali Larijani, to Beirut and his meeting with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament. Larijani's visit was part of a tour that included Iraq and came after he assumed his new position. Larijani is now responsible for the file of Iranian regional influence in light of the inability of the commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, to manage this file properly. Larijani conveyed Khamenei's position to Hezbollah and a diplomatic message to the Lebanese state. It is clear from Naim Qassem's statements that Iran is still firmly supports Hezbollah's weapons. Meanwhile, a US delegation headed by US Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Morgan Ortagus arrived in Beirut. The delegation came to emphasize the importance of implementing the Lebanese government's decisions and translating these decisions into action, stressing that Lebanon's international future is linked to the outcomes of these decisions. Between Iran's adherence to the Hezbollah card and its attempt to restore regional deterrence, which has been shattered over the past two years due to Israeli military actions on the one hand, and America's insistence on the need for Lebanon to break free cloak and not become a source of tension in the region on the other, the Lebanese today find themselves facing complex choices whose outcomes will determine Lebanon's near and distant future. To paint a clearer picture of the current Lebanese scene, it is necessary to examine the perspectives of the internal and external actors, each separately, starting with Hezbollah. 
First, I must clarify that the scene is extremely complex in Syria in general and in Suwayda in particular. To understand the details of what is happening now will not be possible without examining the file from a broader perspective. The disputes did not begin with a kidnapping by Bedouins of a Druze citizen, nor did they start with the military clashes that took place months ago in the Jaramana and Sahnaya areas around the Syrian capital, Damascus. Since the fall of the Assad regime last December, one of the most prominent clerics of the Druze community in Syria, Sheikh Hekmat al-Hijri, has refused the entry of any representatives of the new Syrian administration government into Suwayda Governorate, justifying this step at first by saying that Suwayda Governorate has own special nature and therefore the locals of the governorate should have priority in managing it. Then, as the Syrian administration made concessions on this matter and demanded at least that the governor appointed by the administration be allowed to enter the governorate and receive the requests and complaints of the governorate’s residents, the governor was subjected to physical attacks and was expelled. Then Sheikh al-Hijri raised his demands to demand decentralization in Syria, and that Suwayda must manage itself. He justified this by saying that the Druze in Syria do not trust the new Syrian administration, which, in his opinion, is composed of “jihadists and takfiris.” Every time the new Syrian administration, now an interim government, tries to negotiate with representatives of the Suwayda Governorate, Sheikh al-Hijri stands in the way of any rapprochement in viewpoints, despite the fact that Druze religious leaders, most notably Sheikh al-Hanawi and Sheikh al-Jarbou’, have confirmed more than once their acceptance of the entry of the Syrian interim government and Syrian security into the governorate. However, al-Hijri, who supports a militia called the Military Council of the Suwayda Governorate, which has now become his military arm and is primarily made up of former officers and members of the Assad army who fear prosecution by the new Syrian authorities for war crimes committed over the past 14 years. Some of them had direct relations with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia and Iran, and drug dealers within a wide network for the Captagon trade, previously linked to the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran, in addition to groups that were previously part of the so-called National Defense in the governorate who are loyal to him. Thus, Sheikh Al-Hijri, in addition to his religious influence in the province, has military and financial influence, supported by his close relations with Sheikh Muwaffaq Al-Tarif, the leader of the Druze in Israel, giving him regional backing to justify his intransigence in confronting the Syrian administration. 
Gaza
Of course, it is still too early to estimate the extent of the military damage sustained by the Iranian regime, whether in their nuclear or missile programs, or their human losses among military leaders and scientists specializing in nuclear development. However, there is no doubt that the Iranian regime has suffered a severe military blow that will require years before it can restore its capabilities and the billions of dollars that Tehran does not have amid continued US economic sanctions. Iran, today, is exposed in the air, as its air defenses and anti-air missiles collapsed in less than 48 hours, and it is exposed in terms of security, in light of a horrific human and electronic security breach that is still ongoing. However, the most important and essential point that Israel has managed to prove is that a military operation against the Iranian regime is not impossible and will not bring catastrophe to the world or the region. Iran, which the American and European media have always presented as a frightening power in the Middle East, was by the Israeli "Rising Lion" operation to be a fragile state in terms of security and militarily and strategically weak. What contributed to this reality is the Israeli military movements that began after October 7, 2023, in the region. But of course, there was severe human and material damage on the Israeli side, given the limited capabilities of the Israeli Iron Dome to intercept some types of Iranian missiles, which put pressure on the political leadership in Jerusalem. With the start of the first hours of the ceasefire, each side began to present what had happened as a victory. Did Israel win or did Iran? 
First, I will provide a summary report of the latest military developments from each side and what each party has been able to achieve so far, starting with Israel.
Initially, in the military context, the IDF has, so far, carried out more than seven waves of attacks inside Iranian territory, targeting the following: Iranian military and IRGC commanders, nuclear scientists, the Natanz nuclear reactor and several facilities affiliated with the nuclear program, air defense bases, military airports, ballistic missile warehouses and launch pads, facilities used within the Iranian missile program, drone production plants, and some oil refineries. By tracking the map of the strikes, we notice that the Israeli attacks have mainly focused on the Iranian capital, Tehran, and its surroundings, as well as central and western Iran. This focus, particularly Tabriz and Kermanshah, is due to the fact that Iran has a limited number of ballistic missiles capable of striking Israeli territory, with an average range of about 1,800 km, which are primarily stored in western Iran. In the absence of Iranian air defenses and their near-total destruction, Israeli warplanes and drones continue to fly in Iranian skies with greater freedom to strike any Iranian military bases suspected of posing a threat. This overwhelming attack has clearly impacted Iran’s response so far. 
Lebanon remains in a state of negative stagnation. Despite the election of Joseph Aoun as president and the formation of a more independent government, the political, economic, and military landscape remains unstable. Politically, the results of last month's municipal elections were disappointing, revealing that a large part of Lebanese society is still unprepared for change and a revolt against the current political elite. In Shiite areas, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement still hold the undisputed upper hand, while most independent candidates have failed. Economically, the political stalemate and unstable military situation are affecting Lebanon's standing as a country attractive to international investment. Even a number of Gulf businessmen who had shown interest in returning to open projects in Lebanon have backed off from this step. Militarily, the Lebanese Army and the US-led security committee continue to operate in areas south of the Litani River to end Hezbollah's presence there. However, the task remains incomplete due to Hezbollah's refusal to hand over maps of these sites. My sources also confirm that Hezbollah has begun relying on local manufacturing to compensate for the shortage of foreign weapons supplies. At the same time, there are ongoing intensive attempts to import weapons via Syria, in light of daily announcements by the Syrian security forces about the discovery of arms shipments coming from Iraq and the Syrian coast heading towards Lebanese territory. The Lebanese scene can be summarized as the Lebanese state stands at a crossroads. The Lebanese state has a desire to begin a new era, and this ambition receives both Arab and international support. However, this desire is hindered by the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, which, according to its leader, Naim Qassem, will not hand over its weapons unless the IDF withdraw from five positions in southern Lebanon, unless Israel stops its air strikes inside Lebanese territory, and unless the Lebanese state begins the reconstruction process. These conditions seem complex and difficult to fulfill, placing the Lebanese state in an extremely precarious position. To find a way out of this dilemma, the issue of weapons in Palestinian camps has come into focus. 
The Middle East is currently undergoing a transitional phase in which the spheres of influence are being redefined. However, the final shape of the geopolitical landscape has not yet been completed. While the October 7 attack constituted an earthquake that plunged the region into a series of conflicts that have altered the shape of several regions and countries (Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria), the negotiations between Washington and Iran, primarily focused on the Iranian nuclear program, and the outcomes of these negotiations, will be the most important event after which we will be faced with a semi-final reality for the balances to stabilize again. Therefore, all political, economic, and military analyses and readings of the Middle East remain temporary, awaiting this key event. From this perspective, we find that several regional governments have adopted a policy of caution and non-confrontation, monitoring the Iranian arena and American movements, while in Israel, it seems that the Netanyahu government considers itself directly responsible for the changes in the shape of the region and therefore believes it has the right to impose its vision for the new Middle East. The escalation in the Gaza Strip has returned, and Israeli strikes have increased in Lebanon and Syria, while defensive capabilities around the Dimona nuclear reactor in central Israel are being bolstered and the target bank in Iran is being expanded. This Israeli rush was the reason Trump invited Netanyahu to the White House. 
More than 3 months ago, I analyzed the Syrian scene following the fall of the Assad regime and the huge losses suffered by the Iranian project in the region. I reached the conclusion that there are two projects in the region that will play a role in the Syrian arena: the Turkish project and the Israeli project. I wondered whether Ankara and Jerusalem would compete or cooperate in the Syrian arena. Today, it seems that we are witnessing the beginning of a competition between these two visions. Despite the escalating rhetoric from politicians and media in both countries, one cannot judge Turkish-Israeli relations merely by the broad outlines, but rather we must delve deeper into the details. Are we facing an inevitable clash between Türkiye and Israel in Syria? To answer this question, we must explain and analyze the vision of each project in the Syrian arena separately, starting with the Israeli vision. 👇
This is not the first time that a senior Iranian official has spoken about the possibility of Tehran changing its nuclear doctrine in the event of an external attack on its nuclear program. About two months ago, the Supreme Leader’s advisor, Kamal Kharrazi, who is currently personally responsible for the nuclear negotiations with the West, issued the same warnings. It is important to emphasize, based on current data, that Iran has the military and technical capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb at any time it desires. The only obstacle is the fatwa of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which prohibits the military development of the Iranian nuclear program. However, both Larijani and Kharrazi are figures close to Khamenei, and therefore it can be said that these warnings come from the Supreme Leader himself and must be taken seriously. So, what are Iran’s alternative options if Trump chooses to pursue the military option to deal with the Iranian nuclear program? 
On the ground
Before delving into the political analysis, I will clarify some details about the attack that began with an organized assault carried out by hundreds of fighters armed with individual and medium weapons, as well as some heavy weapons, targeting the cities of Jableh, Tartous, Latakia, Banias, Draykish and Qardaha, and cutting off the two international highways, Aleppo-Latakia and Homs-Tartous. In the early hours of the attack, they were able to take control of several neighborhoods in the aforementioned cities and kill at least 150 Syrian security personnel and dozens of civilians, particularly in the cities of Jableh and Latakia. They were also able to besiege the naval college in Latakia and control the Istamo helicopter airport in the Latakia countryside. This attack was led by the former brigadier general in the Assad army, Ghaith Dallah, one of the leaders of the 4th Division that was headed by Maher al-Assad and supported by Iran and the IRGC, known to be a war criminal and responsible for committing war crimes during the Syrian revolution. Given the size and the spread of this attack, it is evident that we are dealing with a well-thought-out plan whose goal was to impose these groups’ complete control over the Syrian coast, taking advantage of the fragile security situation in Syria under the new Syrian administration. So, who is behind this attack and behind Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah? 
I will break down this analysis by examining each file separately and I will explain the possibilities of what Netanyahu promised in this speech, as well as the obstacles the Israeli government may face within a strategy that I will call the “Security circle”. In my opinion, this strategy is a direct result of the attacks of October 7 and the shift it caused in the perspective of Israeli politicians and military officials, both within Israel and in the region. 
Since the launch of the Syrian armed opposition’s military operation from Idlib on November 27 of last year, all eyes have been on Moscow and its stance regarding the rapid collapse of Assad’s army. Despite the limited participation of Russian warplanes in this operation, compared to Russia’s overall air power, it can be said that Moscow was not eager to continue supporting Assad’s survival in power after nearly nine years of direct military intervention in Syria. Of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine drained Moscow’s military capabilities in supporting the Assad regime militarily, but this is not the full picture. Practically speaking, Moscow could have sent some air squadrons within hours to its air base in Khmeimim from the first day of the Syrian armed opposition’s advance. The Russian military could have also used its warships in the Mediterranean or even those in the Black Sea to bolster Assad’s forces in the face of the opposition’s advance. However, it is clear that Moscow was unwilling to do so. In the same context, and according to what security sources confirm, Tehran had at least demanded that Russia secure guarantees from the Israeli side not to target their forces that might enter Syria from Iraq or those might arriving by air. However, Moscow did not respond to the Iranian request. Thus it can be said that the Russian leadership, which was a fundamental factor in keeping Assad in power since the fall of 2015, no longer sees the benefit of this role, a shift proven by Putin’s abandonment of supporting Assad’s continued rule. 
On November 26, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his government’s approval of a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, brokered by the United States and France, which began at dawn on the 27th of the same month. While all 13 terms of the agreement have been revealed, the agreement remains controversial, especially within Lebanese parties. Following the agreement, General Joseph Aoun was elected president, and Nawaf Salam was chosen as prime minister of the new Lebanese government, which was announced a few days ago. Despite the positive atmosphere in Beirut, this cautious optimism has already begun to face challenges on multiple fronts, most notably the domestic front. While Lebanese political parties, with regional and international support, are trying to push Lebanon into a new phase entitled “Lebanon after the defeat of the Hezbollah-Assad-Tehran axis,” Hezbollah rejects the narrative of its defeat in the last war with Israel, emphasizing its political and popular influence, and asserting that there is no new Lebanon without Hezbollah and its weapons. This polarization between the two competing narratives may pose a dilemma for the new era headed by Joseph Aoun and the government of Nawaf Salam, as it may be difficult to satisfy all parties at the same time. 
On December 9th, the SDF withdrew from the city of Manbij towards the eastern bank of the Euphrates river. According to informed sources, this withdrawal came after an agreement between Ankara and Washington, under which the Euphrates river will serve as the dividing line between the SDF forces and the Syrian administration forces in preparation for direct negotiations between Damascus and the SDF to reach a diplomatic solution to de-escalate the conflict. Indeed, a delegation from the SDF traveled to Damascus and intensive rounds of negotiations have been ongoing to this day without any notable results. Returning to the city of Manbij, which has been the subject of a dispute between the SDF and the armed Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye since the Kurdish militias, backed by the international coalition against ISIS, crossed the Euphrates River and imposed their control over the city of Manbij after expelling ISIS fighters in 2016, has been plagued by a series of car bombings since the SDF’s withdrawal. In less than two months car bombs eight car bombings have taken place with yesterday's attack being the deadliest. So, who is behind these bombings? 
Less than an hour after this attack, a group called the Islamic Resistance in Syria claimed responsibility. In their statement, they confirmed firing towards a vehicle belonging to the Israeli Defense Forces in the village of Tranjah in the northern Quneitra countryside, which resulted in casualties on the Israeli side, and then the group withdrew. This statement is the second for this group since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. A few days ago, they issued a statement confirming that the resistance in Syria has not ended and that the coming days will bring surprises. So, who is the Islamic Resistance in Syria?
On November 19, 2023, the Houthi militia announced the hijacking of the ship "Galaxy Leader," declaring the beginning of what they called "supporting Gaza operations." These attacks focused on two main fronts: the first was targeting commercial and military ships, either crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, those in the Red Sea, or those they could reach in the Arabian Sea. According to the latest data, the militia has claimed 110 attacks against commercial ships and 116 attacks against warships from November 2023 to December 2024. The second front was through direct targeting of Israeli territory using drones and ballistic missiles. According to the militia, they launched around 400 missiles and drones towards Israeli territory over a year and three months. Although Israeli defenses managed to intercept most of these attacks, the Houthi threats to Israeli national security have become a concern for military and political officials, given the militia's developing capabilities and its geographical distance, which poses a challenge in dealing with and stopping them. However, it can be said that after the latest developments, the Houthis have become a top priority for Israel in the coming phase.