Middle East Expert | Jihadist groups. Bylines @AFP @AJArabic @AlQudsAlarabi, @The_NewArab, @Syriawise, @Arabnews.
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Over the past few days, the Qatari capital, Doha, has witnessed intensive rounds of indirect negotiations between representatives of the Israeli government and Hamas, in coordination with representatives of the Biden administration, the Qatari and Egyptian governments, in addition to the very important role of President Trump's envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff. During these rounds, viewpoints were brought closer and gaps between the two sides were bridged, so that today we are facing a comprehensive deal divided into three stages that ends the war, releases the hostages, and paves the way for the beginning of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. As for the most important details of this deal, according to what has been leaked so far, they are as follows: 
Even 24 hours before the start of the first round of voting in the Lebanese parliament, General Joseph Aoun did not have the 86 votes that would suffice for him to win the elections, and bypass article nr. 49 of the Lebanese constitution that prevents any first class employee in the Lebanese state from running for the presidency unless he has resigned or retired at least two years before the voting date. Thus, the 86 votes necessary to amend the constitution mean that the representatives of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement would vote in support of Joseph Aoun, which was not possible at that time. However, contacts led by the French presidential envoy, Jean Le Drian, personally, with the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, and Qatar, created a breakthrough in the position of Hezbollah and Nabih Berri, who chose not to vote for Joseph Aoun in the first round, then supported his vote in the second round, so that he won 99 votes out of 128, and Lebanon entered a new phase different from what it was in the past three decades. 
After the killing of the leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, in 2010, the organization entered a state of collapse and dispersion, to the point that many observers specializing in jihadist groups thought that it was the end. Indeed, the number of their fighters decreased to hundreds, hiding in the Anbar desert and its hills, or being hunted in the border villages with Syria. (This scene looks similar to what the organization is experiencing today, whose presence in Iraq and Syria has become limited to the Anbar desert and the Syrian desert). However, with the outbreak of protests in the Sunni areas of Iraq denouncing the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the organization began to reorganize its forces, publishing a statement called “Anbar Spring,” in which they confirmed that they were present in Anbar and that their revival was a matter of time. Indeed, in the summer of 2013, the organization attacked the Taji and Abu Ghraib prisons, as part of an operation called “Destruction of the Walls,” and released about 500 of their fighters, who were the nucleus of what was later called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant “ISIS.” Will history repeat itself? 
Before I present the latest developments in the presidency file and the ceasefire file on the Israeli-Lebanese border, it is important to shed light on the Hezbollah militia after a war that lasted for about a year in which they lost their leader Hassan Nasrallah and most of their military leaders, in addition to the damage to their strategic weapons stockpile and the great destruction of their financial networks. Today, the militia still exists, and it is still the strongest militarily in Lebanon, which is reflected in their political influence. The militia also still sees its connection with the Iranian regime as central to their existence. Therefore, I can say that Israel achieved half a victory and Hezbollah suffered half a defeat. Within this equation, Hezbollah does not accept any concessions internally because it sees them as a complement to its military defeat and thus a threat to its existence and influence in the Lebanese arena. This is how Hezbollah deals with the presidency file and the ceasefire agreement. 
Despite the importance of the leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in coordinating the work of this Iraqi militia in its war against ISIS, the final word was given by General Qassem Soleimani. After his death, Ismail Qaani was appointed as commander of the Quds Force but did not receive the same respect. According to informed Iraqi sources, disagreements occurred between the Iranians and a number of leaders of Iraqi parties and militias. Qaani was not able to impose his opinion on everyone, which forced Tehran to request the intervention of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to mediate. Later, Iran appointed Muhammad al-Kawtharani, a Hezbollah official, as responsible for the Iraqi file. 
On January 15, 2016, the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran entered into force. This agreement was not a set of technical provisions that temporarily limited Tehran's ability to produce a nuclear bomb only, but rather an international concession that gave Khamenei's regime a green light to expand its influence and control over the Middle East, starting with supporting the Assad regime to control the city of Aleppo, through blackmailing Saudi Arabia with missiles from the Houthi militia from Yemen, up to the attacks of October 7. Today, it can be said that the understandings of the JCPOA agreement, in its regional aspect, have ended by a decision from Israel after Trump ended its economic aspect in his first term. 
A few days ago, I described in detail the Iranian regime plan for the region, which became clearer day after day. Today, the Iraqi Parliament Speaker has confirmed what I had previously mentioned about the adoption by the Iraqi militias supported by Iran of the decision to stop their attacks on Israel in agreement with the Iraqi government in Baghdad. In fact I predicted this step, which surprised many observers, after the earthquake of the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus. I suggest you go through it again.👇👇👇
On the ground, the IDF is still continuing its combing operations for infrastructure such as tunnels and ammunition in large areas in southern Lebanon, in parallel with air strikes targeting any military movements of the Hezbollah militia, the latest of which were raids on several crossings on the Syrian-Lebanese border, which targeted smuggling operations. As a security source confirmed to me that Syrian groups affiliated with the Hezbollah militia tried to transfer weapons that were stored in secret areas in the western and southern Homs countryside towards the Lebanese interior, which prompted the IDF to strike these crossings, in parallel with the continued Israeli reconnaissance aircraft monitoring all Lebanese territories, including the Lebanese capital Beirut. Through my monitoring of the movements of the Israeli brigades in southern Lebanon, I do not see any indications of their withdrawal from these areas soon. 
A few days after the October 7, 2023 attacks launched by Hamas militias against Israeli territory around the Gaza Strip, discussions began in Tehran and with the parties of the Iranian axis in the region about their expectations of the Israeli response and about their plans for retaliation. As an informed security source indicated to me, the Iranians did not expect the Netanyahu government to adopt the decision to incur the ground operation in the Gaza Strip. They believed that the response would be through an intensive air campaign that would last for a few weeks, then move towards negotiations that would lead to the release of the hostages in exchange for Israeli concessions that included the files of Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iranian nuclear program. 
First, I will present to you the latest field developments of the Israeli military operation that was launched on Syrian territory: 
On the ground: 
The Syrian regime is no longer as militarily and security-wise as it was in 2011, and its allies in #Iran are no longer as strong and as powerful as they were in 2013 when they began their military intervention in #Syria. Similarly, #Hezbollah is no longer as it was in 2012 when it penetrated #Damascus and the southern countryside of #Homs and #Russia today is not Russia of 2015. On the other hand, the armed Syrian opposition today is no more numerous than it was in the first years of the revolution, and it does not have the allies and friends it had before. The Sunni countries in the region abandoned them, and #Europe forgot about #Assad's crimes and recently knocked on his door in preparation for restoring diplomatic relations. With Trump coming to the White House, it has become clear that the withdrawal of #US forces from eastern Syria is a matter of time. So, what happened? In my opinion, beyond politics and military, freedom triumphs again over dictatorship, no matter how solid and cohesive this dictatorship seems. 
This #Hezbollah militia missile attack on northern Israel was not a surprise to me personally, just as I was not surprised by the Israeli strikes that targeted the militia’s violating moves in #Lebanon. It was naive for anyone in Netanyahu’s government to expect that Hezbollah would abide by the terms of the agreement, the content of which would limit their influence over the Lebanese state and the region. From the point of view of the militia’s leadership and their masters in Tehran, their approval of this agreement is what is known as taqiyya, which is to show something other than what you mean. They wanted to stop the militia’s human and military depletion in the hope that they would do what they did after the 2006 war, and that Netanyahu’s government would not be prepared to engage in war again once it stopped.
Before going into the political analysis of the scene in #Beirut and #Jerusalem, I will start with the latest updates on the field reality on both sides of the border: 
In a series of tweets published by the account of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali #Khamenei on the X platform, it was clearly indicated that the Iranian response to Israel is coming and will be strong, and the threat was also directed at the American side. In an eye-catching post, Khamenei recalled the attack by Khomeini’s followers on the American embassy in #Tehran in November 1979, which may carry implicit messages directed towards America that must be taken into consideration.
On the ground, it can be said that the #IDF began a new advance in southern #Lebanon at dawn today by penetrating towards the strategic town of Al-Khiyam, which is located about 6 km from the Israeli border. This movement comes after the IDF took complete control of all the Lebanese border villages, with the increase in air strikes in the governorates of Bekaa, Hermel, Nabatieh and the city of Tyre. The border area between #Syria and Lebanon also witnessed broader strikes, some of which targeted crossings and some of which targeted military points of the #Hezbollah militia inside Syrian territory in the southern #Homs countryside and Qalamoun. 
#Gaza file
There is no doubt that this conflict is complex and has regional and international ramifications, but it can be said that there are four active players in it, that need to be studied individually in terms of their vision of this war, whether diplomatically or militarily. These are: #Israel - #Hezbollah - #Iran - #USA. 
First, it is necessary to clarify the military deployment of #Hezbollah within the Syrian geography, as the border area with Lebanon constitutes the most important point of concentration of the militia within the Syrian geography, from the western and southern countryside of Homs, to Qalamoun, reaching the western countryside of #Damascus, with mobile concentration points in the Quneitra Governorate on the border with #Israel. Hezbollah also has a military advisory presence in eastern #Syria, with combat points in the Aleppo Governorate. 
First of all, it must be emphasized that Sinwar was not just the head of the #Hamas political bureau in #Gaza and outside it, that can be replaced without changing the militia’s policy and plans, as was the case after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh. However, we are dealing with a figure with great influence and weight in the political and military leadership, and his word within the militia has been considered as of the highest gravity in recent years. Therefore, in my opinion, Hamas will be forced to make changes in its policy, whether in the file of negotiations, war, or hostages.