NEW: Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11. 🧵(1/7)
1/ The size, scale, and potential prospects of the September 11 Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast are unclear and the situation remains fluid as of tonight's assessment.
2/ Geolocated footage published on September 11 indicates that Russian forces retook positions east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo). Additional geolocated footage published on September 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced north and northeast of Snagost (south of Korenevo) during a company-sized mechanized assault.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched the mechanized counterattack from the north near Korenevo and that Russian forces quickly advanced into Snagost. Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces fully seized Snagost, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.
4/ Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced northwest of Snagost and seized Krasnooktyabrskoye; advanced west of Snagost and seized Komarovka and Vishnevka; advanced southwest of Snagost and seized Apanasovka and 10-y Oktyabr; advanced southeast of Snagost and seized Obukhovka; and advanced south of Snagost and seized Byakhovo, Vnezapnoye, and Gordeevka.
A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Olgovka (just east of Korenevo).
5/ Ukrainian forces reportedly began new attacks against the Russian counterattack west of Snagost and throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
6/ A Ukrainian brigade reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast reported on September 11 that Ukrainian forces began attacking Russian forces' flank west of Snagost after the initial Russian counterattack into Snagost.
7/ Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting small mechanized cross-border assaults into Glushkovo Raion near Medvezhye (SW of Snagost and along the int'l border) and in another unspecified area along the international border. isw.pub/UkrWar091124
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NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war. ⬇️(1/3)
Trump stated on March 17 that he plans to speak with Putin on March 18 and "want[s] to see if [he and Putin] can bring the war to an end." Trump added that he and Putin will "be talking about land," "power plants," and "dividing up certain assets."
The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to a 30-day ceasefire proposal that is contingent on Russia's "acceptance and concurrent implementation." The proposal stated that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction between the temporary ceasefire and future negotiations on a peace settlement.
Putin rejected the temporary ceasefire proposal on March 13 and claimed that the cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precedes formal negotiations to end the war.
The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal noted that the United States and Ukraine discussed the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported Ukrainian children — all of which will require future talks with Russia. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal did not mention talks with Russia about Ukrainian territory, energy infrastructure, or assets.
Putin also suggested on March 13 that he may call Trump to discuss "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal, such as Ukraine's continued ability to mobilize forces and receive military aid from partners and allies — issues notably not included in the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.
2/ Putin is attempting to change the sequence of talks in order to push Trump into making preemptive concessions on issues that are not part of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire but are part of Russia's war aims.
3/ The acceptance of these Russian demands in the context of negotiations for an immediate ceasefire would cede valuable US and Ukrainian leverage during future negotiations to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.
MORE: Reuters reported on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the temporary ceasefire would have to "take into account" Russia's advances on the battlefield and "address [Russia's] concerns."
▪️ Bloomberg reported on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations "are taken into account."
▪️ A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire but did not specify whether such a halt would include all international weapons provisions to Ukraine or only those from select countries.
▪️ Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which Ukraine cannot agree.
2/ Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them.
3/ The Kremlin's reported intention to make demands supporting its overall war objectives before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire violates the stated purpose of the ceasefire and the sequence of negotiations that US President Donald Trump has laid out.
NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Details⬇️(1/3)
▪️ Putin stated in his February 27 address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February 27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia.
▪️ Putin and other Russian officials have previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian ultranationalists.
▪️ Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts.
▪️ Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts.
Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial concessions.
2/ Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.
3/ The Kremlin may use the Russian occupation of limited territory in these oblasts as a false premise to demand that Ukraine surrender even more territory.
NEW: The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO. (1/3)
2/ Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this idea is "not even up for discussion."
3/ Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion.
NEW: Sources close to the Japanese government assess that the PLAN and CCG likely conducted a joint maritime blockade drill in the Miyako Strait for the first time on December 22. The drill involved three PLAN vessels and three CCG vessels. (1/7)
2/ The PLAN ships circumnavigated the southern tip of Taiwan and Japan’s Sakishima islands before entering the strait, which is located between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain.
3/ The ships then sailed through the Miyako Strait toward the East China Sea.[134] The CCG vessels turned off their transponders in the strait according to Automatic Identification System (AIS) data.