Armenia exits the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) .
This thread is offers some context, history, Ukraine related relevance and a chronology of recent events leading to Armenia rejecting the Russian led CTSO.
👉 A little bit about Armenia..
Armenia is an ancient country. Its history dates back to well before the Bronze Age and traces the beginnings of civilization. Armenia is the first country to adopt Christianity as its state religion. Today, 97% of the Armenia’s population are Christians, and Armenia has one of the most beautiful churches in the world.
The Armenian capital, Yerevan, is one of the world’s oldest inhabited cities. Founded in 782 BC by King Argishti, it is even older than Rome. There are six UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Armenia: Haghpat Monastery, Sanahin Monastery, Echmiadzin cathedral and churches, Zvartnots archaeological site, Geghard Monastery and Azat Valley.
Mining in Armenia is concentrated around the extraction of metals iron, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, gold, silver, antimony, and aluminum.
Armenia is a landlocked country located in the South Caucasus region of Eurasia. Armenia is bordered by Georgia in the north, the Republics of Azerbaijan and Artsakh in the east, Nakhchiva (Azerbaijan's exclave) Iran in the south, and Turkey in the west. Armenia occupies a land area of 11,484 square miles.
The population of the country is estimated at 2.9 million. Until independence, the economy of Armenia heavily depended on industry. The industry relied on outside sources. The main domestic energy source is hydroelectric. The country’s vast majority of energy is produced with imported fuel from countries such as Russia.
Natural resources play an important role in boosting the economy of Armenia. The natural resources are used domestically and are also exported. Geographically, Armenia is mountainous. This geographical peculiarity renders the country rich in mineral resources.
The mineral resources of Armenia include iron, zinc, aluminum, copper, molybdenum, gold, lead, silver and antimony. The country is also rich in other rare and hard to find metals.
Armenia possesses some of the world’s most diverse nonmetallic minerals including tuff, zeolites, nephelite syenites, perlite, scoria, marble, pumice stone, and basalts. The industrial minerals found in the country are cement, diatomite, limestone, and gypsum.
The mining industry is, therefore, one of the principal areas of Armenia’s economy. In Armenia, 24.8% of the population lived below the national poverty line in 2022.
Armenia is the 7th safest country in the world, according to NUMBEO. The analytical platform's Crime Rate and Safety Index by Country report has ranked Armenia 7th out of 146 countries, while the city of Yerevan is 15th out of 329 cities.
1/8 Next 👉 What is the CTSO?
👉 What is the CTSO?
The CSTO is a Russia-dominated alliance of former Soviet states that have pledged to protect one another in the event of an attack.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military alliance in Eurasia consisting of six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, formed in 2002.
The Collective Security Treaty has its origins in the Soviet Armed Forces, which was replaced in 1992 by the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and was then itself replaced by the successor armed forces of the respective independent states.
Similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) establishes that an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all.
The 2002 CSTO charter reaffirmed the desire of all participating states to abstain from the use or threat of force. Signatories are prohibited from joining other military alliances.
The CSTO holds yearly military command exercises for the CSTO nations to have an opportunity to improve inter-organizational cooperation. The largest of such exercises was held in Southern Russia and central Asia in 2011, consisting of more than 10,000 troops and 70 combat aircraft.
On 4 February 2009, an agreement to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) was reached by five of the seven members, with plans finalized on 14 June. The force is intended to be used to repulse military aggression, conduct anti-terrorist operations, fight transnational crime and drug trafficking, and neutralize the effects of natural disasters.
Belarus and Uzbekistan initially refrained from signing on to the agreement. Belarus did so because of a trade dispute with Russia, and Uzbekistan due to general concerns. Belarus signed the agreement the following October, while Uzbekistan has never done so.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) maintains a peacekeeping force that has been deployed to areas of conflict, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The force is composed of troops from member states and is designed to provide stability and security in the region.
On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under a United Nations mandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.
2/8 Next 👉 A potted history of Putin squeezing Armenia
👉 Potted History of Russia and Putin squeezing Armenia.
Back in 2003, Armenia was pressed to settle its accumulating debt to Russia by Putin, Armenia decided on transferring state-owned strategic assets to Russia. A series of equity-for-debt deals, placed virtually the entire Armenian energy sector under Russian control. The swaps would provide Moscow with additional political leverage over its chief ally in the South Caucasus.
Opposition politicians in Yerevan are raising the alarm, accusing President Robert Kocharian's administration of compromising the country's sovereignty. Their concerns are shared by some local analysts who believe that Russia's tightening grip on the struggling Armenian economy will postpone prosperity indefinitely.
Many also complain that Russian officials have been more lenient toward other, less pro-Russian ex-Soviet debtors. Kocharian and his allies, argued that the Russian-Armenian military alliance needs to be reinforced by closer economic ties.
The largest swap deal was signed during Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's visit to Yerevan. Under that deal, Russia wrote off Armenia's $100 million debt in return for obtaining control of five state-run Armenian enterprises. Among them was Armenia's largest thermal power plant located in the town of Hrazdan.
Armenia was already heavily dependent on Russia for its two main energy resources: natural gas and nuclear fuel. That dependence deepened when Moscow and Yerevan agreed to transfer the financial management of Armenia's Metsamor nuclear power station and the ownership of six hydro-electric plants to Russia's state-run Unified Energy Systems (UES) power utility.
For its part, UES agreed to repay $32 million in Metsamor's outstanding debts to Russian nuclear fuel suppliers. UES would also come up with an additional $8 million for fresh deliveries this summer.
3/8 Next 👉 Lukashenko predicts the downfall of the CTSO
👉 Lukashenko predicts the downfall of the CTSO in 2022.
On the occasion of the CTSO meeting and in the midst of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that many in their countries had started to discuss the possibility that the CSTO may cease to exist if Russia loses its war in Ukraine.
He later expanded on his opinion on the matter, stating that the CSTO will continue on and nobody will fall, if there is unity.
In a tweet from the Belarusian dictator, he said “The Collective Security Treaty Organization will continue to exist and nobody anywhere is going to fall”.
Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko made the statement as he presented priorities of Belarus' forthcoming presidency over the CSTO in Yerevan, Armenia on 23 November, BelTA has learned. Aleksandr Lukashenko remarked that mass media have been recently speculating that the life and the fate of the Collective Security Treaty Organization depend on the outcome of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine.
"If Russia wins, then the CSTO will live. If, god forbid, it doesn't win, then the CSTO will not survive either. And many hotheads in our countries have also started discussing this problem," he stated.
"I feel that we now share the opinion that if, god forbid, Russia falls, then our place is under these broken pieces," the Belarusian head of state said.
"This is why we should not only defend but understand each other (as we always used to say in normal times): 'Russia this, Russia that, the key role of Russia...' So, such talks have to stop. We are not going to leave the military and political arena.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization will continue to exist and nobody anywhere is going to fall. But we need unity," the Belarus president added.
In February 2024, Armenia joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) which has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin over his actions in Ukraine.
Putin has avoided visiting ICC member states since then.
4/8 Next 👉 Armenia exiting the CTSO - it’s complicated!
👉 Exiting the CTSO:
Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have deteriorated since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The latter has refused to recognise the Donetsk and the Luhansk People's Republics.
After the start of renewed fighting between Armenia and former member Azerbaijan on 13 September 2022, Armenia triggered Article 4 of the treaty, and a CSTO mission including CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas and Anatoly Sidorov was sent to monitor the situation along the border.
Russia had acted as guarantor of a peace deal that ended a 44-day war with Azerbaijan over the disputed territory three years ago however Azerbaijan's larger army was able to capture the disputed territory.
After the CSTO mission took a rather uncommitted position in the conflict, criticism towards CSTO membership inside Armenian political circles increased, with the secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan, even stating that he saw no more hope for the CSTO.
"We will leave the CTSO," Pashinyan said. "We will decide when to leave. We won't come back, there is no other way." The Armenian leader denounced the CSTO for failing to provide protection, during an address to lawmakers.
Pashinyan accused members of the alliance of siding with Azerbaijan which launched a military campaign in September to seize control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, ending decades of ethnic Armenian separatist rule.
👉 Armenia’s practical realities of leaving the CTSO.
In the past, Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Alen Simonyan has branded the alliance a “gun that does not shoot”. Armenia is now following the path Azerbaijan and Georgia were on two decades ago when they left the CSTO in 1999. If Yerevan follows through with this decision, the number of members will be reduced to five—Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.
The decision to freeze Armenian participation will leed to the closure and withdrawal of Russian forces from the two military bases in Yerevan and Gyumri. When Armenia officially leaves, the CSTO will lose control over the South Caucasus, and Russia will not have any other military bases in the region outside of the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Pashinyan government also seems to be trying to end Armenia’s geopolitical and economic isolation by normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. From the point of view of the Pashinyan government, this normalization could allow Armenia to further reduce its economic dependence on Russia by creating routes for transit and energy transfer with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, as well as open up opportunities for joint economic projects with both countries.
In these circumstances, gas imported from Azerbaijan and Iran could replace a portion of the gas exported from Russia to Armenia.
Pashinyan still needs to overcome internal political challenges in officially leaving the CSTO. However, if successful, it is unclear which partners Yerevan would go to as alternatives to Russia.
The current options arrange from France and the United States to Iran and India.
France seems to be the most willing to play such a role, which has support in the United States. Recent defense and military agreements between Armenia and France could be a sign of Yerevan reorienting the country’s foreign policy to the West.
In these circumstances, if Armenia withdraws from the CSTO, Iran will try to maintain close relations with its only Christian neighbor. Maintaining the 40 kilometer (25 miles) border with Armenia is a strategic priority for Iran, which clear opposition to the Zangezur corridor is a clear example in recent years.
During the last three decades, the Russian border guards were responsible for the security of this border. If these forces are withdrawn from Armenia, Iran would prefer they not be replaced by another foreign force and that Armenian border guard were stationed this border.
5/8 Next 👉 Exiting the CTSO continued..
India and Armenia have expanded military and defense cooperation in recent years. India, however, is unlikely to be a suitable alternative for Russia, as New Delhi maintains close relations with Moscow. India also participates in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia, and New Delhi hopes to take a relatively more balanced approach to the South Caucasus.
Furthermore, the tripartite cooperation between Armenia, Iran, and India focuses efforts on “soft balancing” (economic transit) instead of “hard balancing” (military-security) against the tripartite ties of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan in the region
For now, Yerevan has only frozen participation in the CSTO, with the intention to officially leave the body in the near future. When Armenia does, the organization will lose its influence over the South Caucasus, and Russia will no longer have as strong of a foothold in the region.
Armenia’s strategic shift away from Russia signifies a transformation in its geopolitical stance, seeking greater autonomy, alignment, and cooperation with Western and regional powers.
If Armenia wants to separate completely from Russia, it will have numerous obstacles concerning economic independence. Important sectors of the Armenian economy, such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, and railway transport, were handed over to Russia in 2003 in payment for Yerevan’s accumulated $100 million debt to Moscow.
In the years since, Armenia grew increasingly dependent on Russia for its economic needs, which gave Moscow increased political influence. For example, in September 2013, due to Russian pressure, including threats to cancel security guarantees and an increase in gas prices, then-Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan decided to join the EAEU instead of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union.
Economic cooperation with Russia has been one of the least transparent areas of the Armenian government's work, political observers say. The debt arrangements have been personally negotiated by powerful Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian, Kocharian's closest political associate, with other top government officials, including Prime Minister Andranik Markarian, having little say on the issue.
All of the controversial agreements have been announced after Sarkisian's frequent trips to Moscow, without prior public discussion.
Armenia is not the only ex-Soviet state that has incurred multimillion-dollar debts to Russia over the past decade. But Armenia is the only state to have so far given up such a large share of its economic infrastructure to Russia.
Pro-Western Ukraine and Georgia, which both owe the Russians more than Armenia, have managed to reschedule repayment of their debts.
6/8 Next 👉 Recent events chronology
Recent chronology
👉 September 2023
Pashinyan accuses Russia of not sending the CSTO mission mandate on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border. Even, in an interview with Italian TV, he emphasized that relying on Russia was a strategic mistake. Besides, withdrawal from CSTO has been voiced by Armenian statespersons and public figures.
👉 November 2023
A regular Collective Security Council meeting took place on 23 November 2022 with the leaders of all CSTO members present to discuss matters of international and regional security. After Pashinyan refused to sign the joint declaration because it did not "reach a decision on a CSTO response to Azerbaijan's aggression against Armenia", speculation arose regarding the continuation of the CSTO.
👉 June 12, 2024
Euro news reported “Armenia's prime minister declared his intention on Wednesday to pull out of a Russian-led security alliance of six ex-Soviet states.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told parliament that his government will decide later when to leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a grouping that includes Russia, Belarus and the former Soviet Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Amid the widening rift with Russia, Armenia earlier froze its participation in the alliance, cancelled its involvement in joint military drills and snubbed CSTO summits”.
Pashinyan said for the first time that Armenia will leave CSTO altogether during a question-and-answer session in parliament, saying that the government will decide later when to make the final move. There was no immediate comment from Russian authorities.
Armenia’s ties with Russia, its long-time sponsor and ally, have grown increasingly strained after Azerbaijan waged a lightning military campaign in September to take the Karabakh region, ending three decades of ethnic Armenian separatist rule there.
7/8 Next 👉 July 2024 - to the reported coup plotters in September 2024.
👉 July, 2024
July 12: Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia plans to withdraw from the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization. This confirmation follows agreements for Russian border guards to leave Armenia, further moving Yerevan away from Russian influence.
July 31st: Russian border guards completed their withdrawal from Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport, where they had been stationed since Armenia gained independence in 1991.
Russian border guards have for decades been stationed at Zvartnots as well as along Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran in a show of the close military ties between Russia and Armenia.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian announced in March that his government had given Moscow until August 1 to remove them from the airport. Armenia has the capacity to carry out border controls there “without the help of the Russian side,” he said.
The Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the move, saying that Yerevan risks inflicting “irreparable damage” to Russian-Armenian relations and jeopardizing Armenia’s security and economic development. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pashinian agreed on the withdrawal when they met in Moscow in May.
The process was completed with a farewell ceremony held for the few dozen officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) at Zvartnots. The newly appointed commander of Armenian border troops, Edgar Hunanian, thanked them for their service in a speech at the ceremony.
He said the Armenian side will use the “experience and skills of Russian border guards passed on during more than 32 years of joint service.”
At his May meeting with Pashinian, Putin also agreed to pull back Russia troops and border guards from Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. They had been deployed there at Yerevan’s request during and after the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The border guards will continue to protect Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey.
Russia also has a military base in the South Caucasus country. In March, a senior Russian lawmaker said he "would not recommend that the Armenian authorities even think about" demanding an end to the Russian military presence.
Pashinian has signaled no such plans so far, but he has frozen his country’s membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and not ruled out a bid to join the European Union.
👉 18 September, 2024
Russia is implicated in an attempted coup in Armenia.
Next reports: “The Investigative Committee of Armenia stated that an "attempt to usurp power through a coup" had been prevented in the country.
The security agency claims that members of the group of conspirators traveled to Rostov-on-Don, where they allegedly underwent training at the base "Arbat". During the training, they allegedly received 200 thousand rubles in allowances.
There are seven defendants in the criminal case. Three of them have been arrested, four are wanted.
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Russia has eaten up two-thirds of its National Welfare Fund in the last three years
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The world supports this initiative - get on with it!
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It’s time to suspend Hungarian membership rights for serious and persistent breaches of the principles of the European Union.
In this video, we explain the European Union Article 7 process, specifically in relation to Hungary.
You can watch the YouTube presentation of this thread here 👇
Back in January 2024, The European Commission announced that it would will not push forward Article 7, the so-called nuclear option, against Hungary over breaches of fundamental rights until there is a strong majority in favour among member states.
Article 7 has in fact already been invoked against Hungary, back in 2018. Breaches of EU Principles were defined and agreed upon with Hungary, with specific remedies for these breaches agreed to - together with a grading of the breaches and timelines for the remedies were agreed with Hungary as a pathway to the resumption of EU funding.
The problem is that while Victor Orban and his regime has not only failed to remedy the breaches, he has in fact doubled down on some of the breaches in areas such as the judiciary and immigration rules, with a limited number of breaches being remedied and partly remedied. It is the European Commission that is responsible for progressing the Article 7 to the sanction phase, with clear grounds to do so as Hungary has failed to remedy a substantial number of breaches agreed with Orban and his right wing regime in 2018.
The Commission’s position is one of ambivalence and inaction, they claim there is insufficient member state support to progress the Article 7 sanctions which could or should result in Hungary being muted and denied a vote in EU affairs. In January 2024, after notifying Hungary of their failure to remedy breaches - the Commission put out this statement:
"It's not possible for the Commission to take a decision in the process," Didier Reynders, the European Commissioner for Justice As recognised by Transparency International, “the past decade has seen sustained attacks on the EU’s fundamental values by one of its own member states.
For the past 13 years, Hungary’s government has launched a barrage of laws aimed to erode its democracy, all while continuing to benefit from EU funds, as well as enriching its cronies through widespread corruption.
There is well-documented evidence that it has privileged granting public contracts to its supporters, diverted EU funds to its associates, subdued the country’s judicial system, undermined media freedom and pluralism, demonised non-governmental groups and criminalised some of their activities, eroded academic freedoms, violated the rights of women, refugees, asylum seekers, LGBTQI+ people and other minorities.
In a scathing resolution voted in January, the European Parliament demanded Article 7 shift to second gear and conclude the "existence of a serious and persistent breach" of fundamental rights inside Hungary. But this new step, which has never been activated, requires a written proposal by the European Commission or one-third of member states.
Attacks on the rule of law in Hungary are systemic and deeply rooted. Not only do they threaten to unravel decades of democratic progress, but they also pose a direct threat to the European Union’s democratic legitimacy and access to the European Single Market. The EU cannot claim to be democratic if one of its own member states persists in violating the democratic values upon which the EU was founded.
1/6 Next 👉 The EU’s response
The EU’s response to these developments has so far failed to deter Hungary from continuing to slide backwards into authoritarianism. Hungary has faced numerous Article 7(1) hearings in the Council of the EU and debates in the European Parliament, which have sought to establish that there is a risk of a “serious and persistent breach” of EU values in Hungary.
Yet no recommendation on this has been issued by the Council for five years and the process remains stuck. Hungary has also been the subject of multiple European Parliament resolutions and been harshly criticised by the European Commission in its various assessments and reports.
The repeated and systemic attacks of the Hungarian government on EU values have led to EU funds being frozen and to Hungary being subject to the EU’s rule of law conditionality mechanism.
In total, Hungary’s actions are under scrutiny by three separate instruments: the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enables access to Cohesion Policy funding; 27 super milestones under the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Fund, which include measures such as combating corruption and rule of law reforms; and the rule of law conditionality mechanism, which imposes measures to protect the EU budget against breaches of the rule of law.
While Hungary may have undertaken some cosmetic reforms to unblock its EU funds, analysis by our partners in Hungary shows that these fail to address the remedial measures and reforms required.
In fact, the Commission’s own latest assessment is that “despite regular exchanges with Hungary, the Commission considers that Hungary has not addressed the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that led to the adoption of measures by the Council in December 2022 under the budget conditionality mechanism.”
The Commission also determined that Hungary had failed to fulfil the conditions it had proposed and committed to remedy. These breaches are related to public procurement, public interest trusts, prosecutorial action, conflicts of interest and the fight against corruption.
The Commission itself, then, has tacitly recognised that Hungary has undertaken multiple breaches of the principles of the rule of law, and failed to address these adequately. This goes beyond the risk of a “serious and persistent breach” of EU values, as stipulated by Article 7(1).
This is why Article 7(2) proceedings must be initiated. Article 7(2) would mark the first step to determining the existence of such a serious and persistent breach of EU values, as opposed to the mere risk outlined in Article 7(1). Upon confirming such a breach, which has been evident to the European Parliament since at least 2018 —when the Article 7(1) procedure against Hungary was launched—the Member States would be able to proceed to the second step under Article 7(3), potentially resulting in the suspension of specific membership rights to Hungary, including voting rights in the Council.
The last European Council meeting in December once again showcased Hungary’s obstructionist behaviour, including blackmailing the institutions and threatening to veto decisions on key policies. A strong response from Member States, as well as the EU Institutions, to these actions that deliberately undermine the Union’s functioning is now more critical than ever.”
Again in June 2024, EU M E P’s voted overwhelmingly on a resolution calling for Article 7 to be completed against Hungary.
There were the obvious detractors from this vote, primarily from Spain
From Italy and Germany
And other mostly right wing parties, who have sought to rally on russian narratives around the illegal and genocidal war being conducted by Russia in Ukraine.
2/6 Next 👉 What is Article 7 you ask..
What is Article 7 and why is it so important?
Firstly let’s have a quick run through on the ARTICLE 7 process.
‼️ Article 7.1 The preventative mechanism ‼️
In the event of a clear risk of serious breach of EU values, a proposal is made by either the European Parliament, the European Commission, or one-third of EU countries (not including the accused country).
👉 Next - the accused country can respond to the Council of the EU, which can issue recommendations to the country
👉 Next, the EU Parliament approves the recommendations by a two-thirds majority
👉 Next the EU Council votes, four-fifths of the council must decide there is a "clear risk of a serious breach" by the accused country
👉 Next, The Council will "regularly verify" country is still in breach.
👉 The next step is set out in Article 7.2, where a serious and persistent breach of EU values is evident.
👉 Next, a proposal is made by either one-third of EU countries or the European Commission
👉 Next a response is made by the accused country, "submitting its observations"
👉 Next, the EU Parliament must approve by a two-thirds majority
👉 Next, the EU Council must vote unanimously* that there is a "serious and persistent breach" by the accused country
👉 The final step is found under Article 7.3, known as the sanctioning mechanism
👉 THE COUNCIL VOTES (again) by a "qualified majority" to suspend rights of the accused country, including voting rights.
‼️ Next, The accused country remains bound to the principles of the European Union and still has to fulfill all its other duties. They are effectively muted from voting and a say in EU policy and actions. ‼️
Sanctioning Hungary for severe breaches of the principles of the European Union by Hungary under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, allows for the possibility of suspending European Union (EU) membership rights (such as voting rights in the Council of the European Union).
If a country seriously and persistently breaches the principles on which the EU is founded as defined in Article2 of the Treaty on #EuropeanUnion (respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities). Nevertheless, that country’s membership obligations remain binding.
In accordance with Article 7, on the proposal of one third of EU Member States, or of the European Parliament or of the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members, having obtained the Parliament’s consent, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of these fundamental principles by a Member State, and address appropriate recommendations to it.
Article354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union lays down the voting procedures to be used by the main EU institutions when a Member State faces the application of Article 7. The country in question does not take part in the vote. It is not included in the calculation of the one third of countries required for the proposal or the four fifths required for the majority. Parliament’s consent requires a two-thirds majority.