A week ago, Russian 🇷🇺 armed forces launched a large counter-offensive to take back the territory they lost in #Kursk oblast.
At the same time, Ukrainian 🇺🇦 armed forces tried to trap these russian forces, launching their own offensive.
🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️
This week has seen many fightings in the western part of ukrainian presence of Kursk oblast. Russian offensive had initial successes, and broke through the defenses of the 103rd territorial defense brigade south of Korenevo, taking some prisonners.
Two main units were engaged in the counter-offensive : VDV of the 51st Airborne Regiment and Marines of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.
In two days, they took back Snagost and small villages near the Seym river. Ukrainian 501st Marine batallion of 36th Marine had to withdraw.
The days after, VDV launched new attacks toward Liubimovka, while 155th Marines managed to enter Gordeevka, Veznapnoe, Apanasovka and Obukhovka.
Here is a video of the assault on Liubimovka and a BMD of the VDV getting hit by a FPV drone.
Ukrainian command was unable to keep its positions, which were in fact strategic. The Glushkovo district (on the west) was nearly encircled (only pontoon bridges on the Seym river were allowing supply).
Russian army amassed thousands of men there to avoid losing it.
Ukrainian command decided to mobilize 21st mecanized brigade, 225th Assault Batallion and 95th Air Assault brigade to launch an attack directly on Glushkovo.
Here is a good thread by @Danspiun including all the geolocated footages of this area.
Here is a map of the Ukrainian assault on Veseloe south of Glushkovo. They may be a little more in the north, but I don"t have proofs for now.
Today, we spotted this ground drone attacking the western flank of this attack. The use of unmanned systems like this one allows Ukraine to keep its men safe.
During this assault, we saw Swedish CV 9040 and STRV 122 (Leopard 2). Some CV 9040 and STRV 122 were lost during the assault.
Russia tried to counter-attack multiple times there but failed to take back territory lost. The Glushkovo pocket is now at a high risk of being encircled.
I said multiple times russia has to hold there, because if they loose the pocket, it will be very difficult to take it back.
On the other side of Kursk frontline, Russian forces took back Borki. Sudja is still far from Russian forces.
The ukrainian presence in Kursk has decreased recently, however, russian army is still on a difficult position on the western part.
Pourquoi la contre-offensive ukrainienne 🇺🇦 de 2023 a-t-elle échoué ? Qui est le responsable de cet échec, Zelensky ou Zaloujny ?
Cette offensive qui n'a rien achevé porte une responsabilité partagée, ses stigmates sont aujourd'hui encore visibles.
🧵THREAD🧵1/17 ⬇️
L'échec de l'offensive du sud en 2023 est avant tout l'échec de Volodimir Zelensky.
C'est lui et le pouvoir politique qui portent une grande part de responsabilité, en ayant voulu contredire ce que prévoyait le commandement militaire.
Le plan Zelensky :
▫️Contre-attaquer à Bakhmout
▫️Répartir ses troupes sur la ligne de front
▫️Attaquer à plusieurs endroits en même temps pour espérer un effondrement russe
I now mapped 350 (!) ukrainian 🇺🇦 long range drone strikes into russian 🇷🇺 occupied territory
🔹19 strikes against air-defense
🔹25 strikes against radar
🔹21 strikes against planes
🔹10 strikes against trains
🔹9 strikes against rocket/missile launchers
🧵THREAD🧵1/8 ⬇️
Thanks to the very good job done by @UAControlMap and @UkraineDailyUpd gathering data from geolocators like @99Dominik_ @moklasen @giK1893 and others...
I gathered all those long range strikes into occupied territory since the year started :
In total, 350 strikes, of which 260 strikes against warehouse, antennas, electric transformers and various unknown targets, a lot of which are houses and buildings that can eventually be filled with high value targets.
Dams and bridge targeted, drone recon, airstrike campaign, mechanized assault, Russia 🇷🇺 is slowly starting its Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive
I mapped more than 4 000 airstrikes from the Donets river to Hulialpole this winter and analysed the troops movements :
🧵THREAD🧵1/20⬇️
For now more than 3 years, Russia has been preparing the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk battle.
It was the objective on defeating the Bakhmut-Soledar-Siversk line in 2023, it was the objective during the Donetsk suburbs battle (2024) and the Pokrovsk battle (2025).
For 2026, Russia hopes to make strategic advances to the twin cities, from the north (which implies securing Lyman), the south (implies securing Kostiantynivka, Drujkivka and Dobropilla) and the east.
This is exactly what the data I collected is showing :
Since the start of the year, Ukraine 🇺🇦 dug more than 1 250 km of defenses in the rear areas of the frontline
The "kill zone grid" around the New Donbas Line is quickly expanding. Here is what you need to know and a detailed geographic analysis :
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️
This is the small town of Shakhtarske in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
You can see one line 5km east of the town, a second one 1km east, which is a ring, going all around, protecting it on all flanks, which will allow it to be a strongpoint.
In the south first, you can see here the new fortifications built this year in red. Ukrainian counter-attacks near Pokrovsk'e allowed them to reorganize the defenses of Pokrovsk'e and Novomykolaivka, both of which are now fortified strongholds.
Le mois de mars 2026 pourrait être le pire mois de progression russe 🇷🇺 en Ukraine 🇺🇦 depuis le printemps 2024.
L'accélération promise par beaucoup d'analystes depuis 3 ans n'a toujours pas eu lieu et l'armée ukrainienne tient sans l'aide américaine.
🧵THREAD🧵1/22 ⬇️
Alors que le lancement des offensives de printemps de l'armée russe se fait attendre (Ocheretyne au printemps 2024 et la route Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka en 2025), l'armée russe ne montre aucun signe d'une accélération de sa progression.
Source des données : @Pouletvolant3 ⬇️
La Russie 🇷🇺 occupe :
🔹19.5% du territoire ukrainien (contre 18.12% en janvier 2023)
🔸100% de la Crimée
🔸99.67% de l’oblast de Louhansk (98.39%)
🔸79.48% de l’oblast de Donetsk (57.16%)
🔸75.45% de l'oblast de Zaporijjia (72.52%)
🔸72.11% de l’oblast de Kherson (72.08%)