A week ago, Russian 🇷🇺 armed forces launched a large counter-offensive to take back the territory they lost in #Kursk oblast.
At the same time, Ukrainian 🇺🇦 armed forces tried to trap these russian forces, launching their own offensive.
🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️
This week has seen many fightings in the western part of ukrainian presence of Kursk oblast. Russian offensive had initial successes, and broke through the defenses of the 103rd territorial defense brigade south of Korenevo, taking some prisonners.
Two main units were engaged in the counter-offensive : VDV of the 51st Airborne Regiment and Marines of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.
In two days, they took back Snagost and small villages near the Seym river. Ukrainian 501st Marine batallion of 36th Marine had to withdraw.
The days after, VDV launched new attacks toward Liubimovka, while 155th Marines managed to enter Gordeevka, Veznapnoe, Apanasovka and Obukhovka.
Here is a video of the assault on Liubimovka and a BMD of the VDV getting hit by a FPV drone.
Ukrainian command was unable to keep its positions, which were in fact strategic. The Glushkovo district (on the west) was nearly encircled (only pontoon bridges on the Seym river were allowing supply).
Russian army amassed thousands of men there to avoid losing it.
Ukrainian command decided to mobilize 21st mecanized brigade, 225th Assault Batallion and 95th Air Assault brigade to launch an attack directly on Glushkovo.
Here is a good thread by @Danspiun including all the geolocated footages of this area.
Here is a map of the Ukrainian assault on Veseloe south of Glushkovo. They may be a little more in the north, but I don"t have proofs for now.
Today, we spotted this ground drone attacking the western flank of this attack. The use of unmanned systems like this one allows Ukraine to keep its men safe.
During this assault, we saw Swedish CV 9040 and STRV 122 (Leopard 2). Some CV 9040 and STRV 122 were lost during the assault.
Russia tried to counter-attack multiple times there but failed to take back territory lost. The Glushkovo pocket is now at a high risk of being encircled.
I said multiple times russia has to hold there, because if they loose the pocket, it will be very difficult to take it back.
On the other side of Kursk frontline, Russian forces took back Borki. Sudja is still far from Russian forces.
The ukrainian presence in Kursk has decreased recently, however, russian army is still on a difficult position on the western part.
Vers un accord de paix entre la RDC 🇨🇩 et le Rwanda 🇷🇼 sous l'égide des Etats-Unis 🇺🇸?
Alors que le conflit meurtrier entre le M23 soutenu par le Rwanda et la RDC se poursuit dans l'est du Congo, les Etats-Unis font une entrée en scène inattendue.
🧵THREAD🧵1/9 ⬇️
Le ministre des affaires étrangères rwandais a dévoilé le 6 mai un calendrier pour le processus de paix avec la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), ajoutant que l’accord final devrait être signé à la mi-juin à Washington.
Pour autant, difficile d'évaluer l'impact sur le M23
Un accord sur les minerais devrait être signé entre les Etats-Unis et les deux belligérants, prévoyant des facilités d'investissement d'entreprises américaines dans les mines congolaises et des projets d’infrastructure pour soutenir l’exploitation minière dans les deux pays, y compris la transformation des minerais au Rwanda.
I already visited this particular region, which is home to Ruthenes, Ukrainians, Romanians, Poles and Hungarians. It is very diverse and isolated from the main part of Ukraine.
However, i could still see numerous ukrainian flags.
La visite du président syrien Ahmed Al Charaa est instrumentalisée. L'on y dénonce, à des fins politiques, l'accueil d'un ancien djihadiste à l'Elysée.
Mais du point de vue diplomatique, qu'est-ce qui justifie cet accueil ?
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️
C'est une constance, la France a rejeté depuis 2011, le régime sanguinaire de Bachar Al Assad, soutenant une société civile et une opposition en exil et refusant la compromission avec Al Assad.
Pour beaucoup, Assad fut le protecteur des minorités, ce qui en réalité est faux.
Des personnalités politiques françaises, qui n'ont pas sourcillées pendant les 14 ans d'envoi des jeunes alaouites, chrétiens, druzes et autres au front pour massacrer des sunnites (rebelles ou djihadistes) dans la guerre civile se réveillent finalement quand le régime tombe.
Russian 🇷🇺 forces managed to breakthrough the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka line and start fightings inside the trenches of the line.
For the first time, russian forces can hope reaching Kostiantynivka from the south after pushing back ukrainians 🇺🇦 from Toretsk.
🧵THREAD🧵1/17 ⬇️
On this long video, a ukrainian VAB 🇫🇷🇺🇦 is targeted at the entrance of a large trench network with few dugouts.
Ukrainian soldiers jump in and start fighting against russian soldiers who took control of the fortified position, they also face constant drone attacks.
As I already said many times, those kinds of positions are not suitable for defense, in the open with not enough dugout positions, despite stong fondations (woods).
Russian observation drones can see everything and FPV drones can strike soldiers in the open.
Dans l'est de l'Ukraine 🇺🇦, après 2 ans et demi de présence ukrainienne à l'est de l'Oskil, l'armée russe tente d'isoler le dispositif ukrainien.
Analyse d'un objectif stratégique pour Moscou.
🧵THREAD🧵1/17 ⬇️
Sur le front de Dvorichna, l'armée russe est parvenue à traverser l'Oskil en plusieurs points et tente d'agrandir la tête de pont (infanterie uniquement) vers l'ouest et le nord, pour la connecter à la frontière russe.
Une zone qui présente un danger de plus en plus important.
Au sud, la capture de Dvorichna permettra un point de franchissement sur l'Oskil.
De manière générale, l'armée russe pousse vers le sud est, avec comme objectif final l'encerclement de Koupiansk, point clé de la région libéré en septembre 2022.
The war 🇺🇦/🇷🇺 of 2025 has nothing to do anymore with the war of 2022.
The tactics used in 2022 and 2023 are now completely obsolete on the Ukrainian front and new lessons have been learnt.
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️
2022 have been the year of large mechanized assaults on big cities, on roads or in the countryside.
After that, the strategy changed to large infantry or mechanized assaults on big trench networks, especially in 2023.
But today, this entire strategy is obsolete. Major defensive systems are being abandoned one after the other.
The immense trench networks have become untenable if they are not properly equipped with covered trenches and dugouts.