1/7 The Ukrainian strike on Toropets may have been one of the most successful attacks on an ammunition depot since the start of the war. The reasons behind this success are still under scrutiny. Many are discussing the potential use of the Storm Shadow missile or the large number of drones, possibly up to 100. It's clear there also has been incompetence within the Russian army.
2/7 First of all, while everyone is rushing to see the ashes, I spent some time examining how this site was built. The initial information we have gathered from 2013 to 2018 indicates that the forest ground has not been excavated. Soil has been moved, and construction started in a big rush. This is a problem because to offer more protection, you would dig a few meters into the ground and then build your concrete shell.
3/7 This is a 30 by 40-meter ECM. You can see the construction phases: first, the perimeter walls are erected, then the roof. You can appreciate the complete lack of excavation, as the construction is done on the ground. The last phase is the construction of the flat roof, which looks like a flat reinforced concrete roof with a rough estimate of 2.5 meters. It's very peculiar that there are eight venting ports.
4/7 In this diagram, I present the schematics of ECM components and their designs in NATO countries. Regardless of whether it is an arch or box design, it is essential, particularly for non-buried ECM, to have a minimum of 600 mm of soil cover. Additionally, blast doors should be utilized, along with sturdy pillars, and vents should be located at the front. You can now view a picture of one of the ECMs in Toropets. These do not have blast doors, and from the next diagram, you can observe that due to the design, there will be minimal soil on the roof.
5/7 The more recent images of Toropets showcase this point vividly. There is hardly any trace of soil on the roof, just stained concrete. This is significant because ECMs are categorised based on their protective capabilities, and these features are crucial. The absence of excavation, significantly thick walls, and adequate soil cover makes these ECMs more vulnerable than intended, but certainly cheaper for the construction company.
6/7 The interesting thing about this situation is that it is not an isolated design flaw. Not far from Toropets, there is another recently finished ammunition depot, called Kotovo, in Novgorodskaya oblast. To be brief, the construction process is the same - there is inadequate excavation, poor use of embankment to protect other ECMs, and nearly absence of roof soil, which ultimately fails to deter penetrating warheads from doing their job.
7/7 This is just a preliminary study on this topic, which I plan to delve deeper into in the coming weeks. For now, it can be concluded that Russia may have tried to protect its critical assets through this approach, possibly to cut costs or due to corruption. However, dishonesty and corruption cannot defy the laws of physics, and eventually, they will have consequences.
A big thanks to the entire team @tochnyi we are working on this and many other important topics so do not lose one by going on our website. tochnyi.info
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1/n There have been reports of ZSU push at Korenevo, following a successful targeting of bridges and pontoon bridges along the Seym River. Two newly constructed bridges have become targets for the Ukrainian Air Force. (@AndrewPerpetua Map)
2/n The offensive itself, taking many international observers by surprise, saw successful advances made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the first few hours and days of the operation. Operations in the Kursk area have been intensifying and were likely already taking shape by early June. During the lead-up to the offensive, there was an escalation in activity overall, but particularly in terms of drone strikes - which Andrew and his team documented at the time.
3/n Seven strikes were carried out using FPV drones on substations of various sizes, or logistics points for electrical grid maintenance. These attacks occurred between the end of June and a few days before the start of the offensive on Kursk.
A new🧵 factories fueling Russia's war machine.
This is part of a long investigation we started at @tochnyi months ago to uncover the network of industries supporting military production beyond the commonly known defence manufacturers. Today we will explore the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical plant in Volgograd.
1/n Since 2009, Russia has invested a large amount of resources into improving its metallurgical production facilities, an industry which stagnated after the fall of the Soviet Union. For the detailed research, here is the article’s link: tochnyi.info/2024/08/on-the…
2/n Krasny Oktyabr was destroyed during the siege of Stalingrad. It was rebuilt and became a major installation during the Cold War, producing millions of tons of steel annually. By 1986, the plant was responsible for 12% of the USSR's high-quality steel output, including 14% of its stainless steel. The plant is capable of producing over 500 different grades of steel.
I have been reading a lot about wire-guided FPV drones, and despite I share my concern about their increased effectiveness due to their physical strength I am also quite optimistic about their future. Let’s try to see how.
2/n David detailed in his article on Forbes, he covered this twice, such methodology, which was discover already many months ago. It created a mixture of emotions among experts and commentators, but it can be seen as a natural response to a problem, EW.
3/n As we have consistently reported until March, FPV drones have played a significant role in fire missions on both sides, largely due to the work of Andrew Perpetua. However, both sides have expressed dissatisfaction while simultaneously deploying new EW solutions, yielding different results. From the data we have observed, the Russians, who were theoretically more capable, suffered primarily due to the way their FPV drones were acquired. This left little chance to upgrade their hardware, making them more vulnerable to Ukrainian EW.
1/n Since the start of the war in 2022, Russia has been strengthening its military industry and increasing its military budget. An investigation on Russia’s “hidden” factories, places not secret but somehow not advertised by the propaganda. @tochnyi tochnyi.info/2024/07/russia…
@tochnyi 2/n The current level of attrition is consistently high, also thanks to the use of relatively inexpensive but effective drones such as FPV heavy bombers and kamikaze. A staggering number of observed strikes on vehicles, with a peak of 1126 observed in April.
@tochnyi 3/n An article from The Economist expresses doubt about Russia's ability to produce enough barrels, estimating that only 100-200 are produced annually. However, this assessment is based on the assumption that Russia has technical and logistical issues.
1/7 Cotton is crucial for textiles and producing nitrocellulose, a key ingredient in military propellants. Let’s explore the largest cotton producers and how this links to nitrocellulose production for defence.
2/7 🇨🇳China leads the world in cotton production with a production peak in 2022 of 6000 (1000 tonnes), followed by 🇮🇳India and 🇺🇸 the USA. There are also other important producers like Australia, Turkey and Brazil. Check out this chart for a visual comparison of their production volumes.
3/7 🧪 But cotton is a critical precursor for producing nitrocellulose, a key component in smokeless powder, and is also crucial for military explosives and propellants. Used in firearms, artillery, rockets, and pyrotechnics, it offers high energy density, controlled combustion, and stability, making it essential for defence and industry
My latest work is now on @tochnyi website, it wouldn't be possible without the support of the entire team, a special mention to @wendy_dyers for his proofreading, and to @clockworkChris for his marvellous graphics.
1/n Introduction
Understanding the impact of FPV drones on tanks in the Ukrainian war is complex due to several factors. Reliable and comprehensive data is essential but currently limited, with most data coming from Andrew Perpetua and his OSINT team, providing valuable but not exhaustive insights.
The evolving FPV drone technology and tactics by Ukrainian and Russian forces add complexity. Each side continuously develops and refines these drones, making it challenging to assess their impact accurately. Different drone models with various capabilities influence their effectiveness against tanks, leading to constant adaptation of strategies in response to drone threats.
Moreover, the quality of visual data, often from video footage, affects the accurate identification and counting of damaged or destroyed tanks. Poor video quality can lead to misidentification or underreporting, further complicating the assessment.
2/n Toll on Russian tank fleet
The totals amounted to 582 tanks damaged, making this the largest category and indicating that most FPV strikes result in damage rather than destruction or abandonment; 86 tanks were found to be abandoned, a smaller but notable portion, and 148 tanks destroyed; showing that while destruction is less common than damage, it is still a significant result.
The general trend indicates an increase in the number of FPV strikes over time, especially from January to March 2024. Damaged tanks consistently represent the majority of strikes each month. The number of destroyed tanks remains relatively steady, while abandoned tanks vary but also show an increase towards the later months.