Thread by @evacool_

#Thread #Israel #Lebanon #IDF #Hezbollah #Iran #USA #IRGC #Syria #Yemen #Iraq
While waiting for the official statement from Hezbollah militia regarding the names of the leaders who were killed in the meeting chaired by Ibrahim Aqil in the southern suburb of Beirut, a quick reading of the escalating Lebanese-Israeli scene.
1 🧵

About 5 hours ago, Israeli F-35 warplanes attacked a tunnel under a building in the southern suburb of #Beirut with four heavy shells targeting a security meeting of military and security leaders of the #Hezbollah militia, headed by Ibrahim Aqil, the militia’s special operations officer and commander of the Radwan unit, who may have assumed the position of chief of staff of the militia after Fouad Shukr. According to information so far, there are more than 12 dead and more than 60 wounded, and rescue operations are still ongoing.
2/

This development today came less than 24 hours after a speech by the leader of the Hezbollah militia, Hassan #Nasrallah, which I analyzed this morning and personally considered its content to be a message of weakness and much less than what was expected after the bombings of the pagers and the walkie-talkies on Tuesday and Wednesday. It can be said that #Israel has read the military, political and regional reality of the militia well and the decision was to direct a new punch at the military head of the militia.
3/

https://x.com/evacool_/status/1837085926872215829

While there is clear Israeli popular, political, military and partisan consensus on the necessity of ending the danger of #Hezbollah militia to northern Israel, even if the path is a comprehensive war (not a regional one), and the Israeli army is ready with its air and ground forces and a huge bank of targets and information, in Hezbollah it seems that the scene is more complicated in several aspects.
4/

In #Hezbollah, it can be said that the events and developments during the last four days have exposed the militia to damage that has clearly affected the flexibility of the militia and its defensive and offensive capabilities. It can be said that in just two days, the #IDF removed about 4,000 fighters and leaders in the militia from the battlefield.
5/

The militia’s wireless communications network was destroyed, then a meeting of the leaders of the most important units of the militia, “the Radwan Unit,” was struck, while missile launch pads and important infrastructure of the militia were severely damaged through more than 100 raids yesterday. All of this damage puts the militia in its weakest days and puts Nasrallah in a critical position that is the most complicated since he assumed his position as leader of the militia. So, what is his next step?
6/

It can be said that #Nasrallah is today in a dilemma between his unwillingness to engage in an open war with #Israel that could lead to significant damage to the militia’s influence in Lebanon and the region, which Iran also does not want (and in Tehran they see that an open war between Hezbollah and Israel could serve #Trump’s interests, whom do not want him to return to the White House). On the other hand, Nasrallah believes that stopping the support front for Hamas and stopping attacks on northern Israel will not stop the Israeli escalation against the militia.
7/

The current Israeli demand is for the militia’s fighters to withdraw from the Lebanese-Israeli border to the north of the Litani River, which would be a painful blow to the militia’s reputation in #Lebanon and the Arab world and could affect its political influence in Lebanon. Israel may later demand the full implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and for the militia to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state.
8/

In conclusion, #Nasrallah does not have enough Iranian cover to escalate with #Israel, which could lead to an open war. Nasrallah also does not want to make political concessions, which could appear as surrender. Therefore, Nasrallah has a decisive decision to make: either he continues to move within the rules of engagement and α response limited in impact, which will be met with more qualitative Israeli escalation and painful strikes, or he will deviate from Iranian orientations and respond with a move that crosses the Israeli red lines, which could lead to the opening of a conflict facing all possibilities, most notably a ground war.
9 🧵