Video of an armored column with at least 8 tanks and armored vehicles from the Russian VDV's 51st Airborne Regiment assaulting Snagost in Kursk oblast. It appears Russia was able to get the armored force across the Seym River, despite Ukrainian strikes on the bridges. @Deepstate_UA says the situation has worsened on Ukraine's left flank in Kursk oblast.
"Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, a move that will give Moscow another potent military tool to use in the war against Ukraine and follows stern Western warnings not to provide those arms to Moscow, according to U.S. and European officials." @wstrobel @mgordonwsj @laurnorman wsj.com/world/u-s-tell…
"A U.S. official confirmed the missiles 'have finally been delivered'...
The shipment involves a couple of hundred short-range ballistic missiles, according to Western officials. Iran has a variety of such weapons, with a range stretching up to around 500 miles.
'This is not the end,' a senior European official said, noting that Iran is expected to keep weapons flowing into Russia"
.@AlbertoNardelli and @nat_droz also report that Iran has sent ballistic missiles to Russia. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
I think Biddle is right that authorizing the use of longer-range strikes into Russia wouldn't be decisive on its own, but I also think this is an unfair burden to apply to the delivery of weapons or restrictions. People often say sanctions are ineffective if they fail to deter or stop a war, but they can still make it more difficult for the target to wage that war.
Most of Russia's Su-34 glide bomb carriers are no longer operated from airbases within ATACMS or Storm Shadow range; however, the S-300/S-400 that struck Kharkiv yesterday would be within range of ATACMS, and air defenses have a priority ATACMS target in occupied areas. One of the main benefits of allowing HIMARS' GMLRS strikes into Russian territory after the Kharkiv offensive began was that Kharkiv gained a reprieve from S-300/S-400 strikes. It seems that is no longer the case.
Of course, allowing these strikes would help Ukraine hold the buffer zone in Kursk, which could become more difficult this winter. It's also worth noting that Ukraine's campaign of targeting Russian infrastructure is being accomplished with Ukrainian-built UAVs and missiles.
Video from the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces of the first hours of the Kursk operation on August 6 with MICLICs breaching Russian fortifications, Strykers and tanks, and artillery and aviation support. The video also shows an armored bridge layer and other engineering vehicles. t.me/AFUStratCom/25…
Some early thoughts about this operation. The most important factor in the war right now is Russia's manpower and force availability advantage, in particular with infantry. That is the primary reason why Ukraine is struggling to hold back Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. Russia's Kharkiv offensive further stretched Ukraine's reserves, which means Ukrainian commanders have limited forces to reinforce units that are under pressure or to stop breakthroughs.
The situation on the Pokrovsk and Toretsk fronts is serious. The war has not seen large swings of the front line since 2022, but Russia's advances on the Pokrovsk front over the past three weeks have been relatively rapid for the 2023-2024 period. So the question is how this operation will affect the fighting elsewhere and whether these forces could have been employed more effectively in Donetsk oblast. 2/
Compared to previous crossborder operations, this one is notable in that it appears to involve Ukrainian conventional forces and not just from GUR. Ukraine likely also is not able to employ HIMARS in support of the operation because the US only authorized strikes in Belgorod oblast relevant to Russia's Kharkiv offensive. 3/