Russia has lost approximately 40,000 metric tonnes of ammunition in five days, and logistics disruptions will add to the impact.
What is the longer-term impact?
A hot take.
1️⃣ One of the arguments against authorizing Ukraine to use allied-provided weapons, such as ATACMS, Storm Shadow, and SCALP-E, is Kyiv's inability to conduct ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) for mission planning. Primarily, that successful targeting requires outside assistance which means the allies become a defacto combatant. The hits on Toropets and Tikhoretsk were timed with the arrival of ammunition trains. That takes near real-time ISR. Ukraine has proven they have developed the capability. Further, static sites like ammunition depots don't move. Anyone with Google Earth Pro can see it is a target-rich environment to the degree, minute, and second. There is some validity to the argument in the sense that Ukraine does not have the same capabilities as London, Paris, Berlin, or Washington. But they've proven they have plenty of capability. I promise you, Hollywood did you dirty in portraying how spy satellites work and their capabilities.
2️⃣ Can we learn from the past? Yes. In the late summer of 2022, when Ukraine started hitting Russia's open-air ammo depots with rockets launched by GMLRS (HIMARS), Russia's combat capabilities were impacted, forcing a change in tactics. First, the amount of artillery used dropped and never recovered. That's more than just ammunition being destroyed, and others have done amazing work outlining barrel wear and attrition. Russia was forced to use armor for indirect fire as an artillery substitute. They increasingly relied on large attacks of light infantry (human wave, which doesn't mean what you think it means) without artillery support - and the switch to the light infantry assaults goes deeper than ammunition shortages. There was "shell hunger" that spilled over into a very public political fight between PMC Wagner and Prigozhin, and military units within the Russian Federation Armed Forces.
3️⃣ Does this slow Russian offensive operations now? Sort of. My hot take is it is back to the future. Ammunition that is already in occupied Ukraine will be consumed as usual. The ripple won't hit the front for days or weeks, but it will hit. We'll likely see a repeat of early 2023. Less artillery, more reliance on light infantry only with minimal condition setting and artillery support, and an increase of armor used for indirect fire. The last one is the most problematic issue for Russia. They have far less armor to use this way than they did 2 years ago. I would argue there is growing evidence that Russian commanders are becoming increasingly reluctant to use medium-duty (T-54/55/62) and main battle tanks (T-72/80/90) as they were intended - direct fire and support of light infantry - on a large scale. No, I didn't forget the T-64; Russia is barely using them.
4️⃣ Any other impacts? Yes. The loss of Tikhoretsk goes beyond up to 12,000 metric tonnes of ammunition. It was a critical logistics hub. With the amount of unstable unexploded ordnance (UXO) left behind, even by Russian "shit and sticks" standards, there is no easy fix here. Russia is extremely good at rail logistics. They aren't so good at the "last mile." The reset will take time and slow deliveries of not just ammunition but other consumables needed by troops. Russian troops on the front are going to summer shortages of more than ammunition. The ammo depot at Toropets is uncoverable.
5️⃣ Ukraine should have done this sooner. I've been quietly frustrated with Ukraine launching 50, 60, or 80 drones into six or seven Russian regions and hoping something was hit. Saturation attacks are much harder to deal with. The other issue for Russia is they are still stuck in Soviet-era thinking from a military logistics standpoint. Some of that is good - railroad - top 3 in the world you could argue the best. Some of it is bad, like huge piles of ammunition stored in the open air that anyone with a web browser can see on Google, Bing, Yandex, etc. There are literally dozens of these sites within the range of Ukrainian drones - or allied-provided missiles. Finally, Russia's vastness works against its air defenses. There isn't a country on the planet that has the monetary, military, and industrial resources to protect every critical site in the Russian Federation. It's impossible.
6️⃣ Anything else? Yes. The pro-Russian disinformation campaign has started, which is landing on the message that 40,000+ metric tonnes of ammunition is nothing and can be replaced in days. That's a fantasy. A 152mm artillery shell weighs between 42 and 51 kilograms, depending on the type of shell (92 to 114 pounds); that's hundreds of thousands of rounds - an extremely conservative estimate of around 45 days of consumption. That takes into consideration that not everything blown up was artillery rounds. 122mm Grad rockets, 300mm Smerch rockets, S-300/S-400 air defense missiles, and Iskander-K will take longer to replace.
7️⃣ There are Russian claims that the hit on Toropets South (Oktyabrskii) was a location where Russian nuclear weapons delivery capabilities were stored. There is no way this can be proven through OSINT. However, Moscow has repeatedly stated that the strikes Ukraine conducted would lead to World War III - nuclear retaliation - right to defend. It's a bluff. It's always been a bluff. If 30 NATO Brigades were rolling on Moscow, no, it wouldn't be a bluff. Lift restrictions, arm Ukraine, permit the NATO Alliance members on Ukraine's border to defend their own airspace, and establish a shallow air-defense-only no-fly zone in Western Ukraine in the name of European security. Autocrat Vladimir Putin will pull out his watercolor paints and draw a new redline that will wash away like all the rest.
What is the longer-term impact?
A hot take.
1️⃣ One of the arguments against authorizing Ukraine to use allied-provided weapons, such as ATACMS, Storm Shadow, and SCALP-E, is Kyiv's inability to conduct ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) for mission planning. Primarily, that successful targeting requires outside assistance which means the allies become a defacto combatant. The hits on Toropets and Tikhoretsk were timed with the arrival of ammunition trains. That takes near real-time ISR. Ukraine has proven they have developed the capability. Further, static sites like ammunition depots don't move. Anyone with Google Earth Pro can see it is a target-rich environment to the degree, minute, and second. There is some validity to the argument in the sense that Ukraine does not have the same capabilities as London, Paris, Berlin, or Washington. But they've proven they have plenty of capability. I promise you, Hollywood did you dirty in portraying how spy satellites work and their capabilities.
2️⃣ Can we learn from the past? Yes. In the late summer of 2022, when Ukraine started hitting Russia's open-air ammo depots with rockets launched by GMLRS (HIMARS), Russia's combat capabilities were impacted, forcing a change in tactics. First, the amount of artillery used dropped and never recovered. That's more than just ammunition being destroyed, and others have done amazing work outlining barrel wear and attrition. Russia was forced to use armor for indirect fire as an artillery substitute. They increasingly relied on large attacks of light infantry (human wave, which doesn't mean what you think it means) without artillery support - and the switch to the light infantry assaults goes deeper than ammunition shortages. There was "shell hunger" that spilled over into a very public political fight between PMC Wagner and Prigozhin, and military units within the Russian Federation Armed Forces.
3️⃣ Does this slow Russian offensive operations now? Sort of. My hot take is it is back to the future. Ammunition that is already in occupied Ukraine will be consumed as usual. The ripple won't hit the front for days or weeks, but it will hit. We'll likely see a repeat of early 2023. Less artillery, more reliance on light infantry only with minimal condition setting and artillery support, and an increase of armor used for indirect fire. The last one is the most problematic issue for Russia. They have far less armor to use this way than they did 2 years ago. I would argue there is growing evidence that Russian commanders are becoming increasingly reluctant to use medium-duty (T-54/55/62) and main battle tanks (T-72/80/90) as they were intended - direct fire and support of light infantry - on a large scale. No, I didn't forget the T-64; Russia is barely using them.
4️⃣ Any other impacts? Yes. The loss of Tikhoretsk goes beyond up to 12,000 metric tonnes of ammunition. It was a critical logistics hub. With the amount of unstable unexploded ordnance (UXO) left behind, even by Russian "shit and sticks" standards, there is no easy fix here. Russia is extremely good at rail logistics. They aren't so good at the "last mile." The reset will take time and slow deliveries of not just ammunition but other consumables needed by troops. Russian troops on the front are going to summer shortages of more than ammunition. The ammo depot at Toropets is uncoverable.
5️⃣ Ukraine should have done this sooner. I've been quietly frustrated with Ukraine launching 50, 60, or 80 drones into six or seven Russian regions and hoping something was hit. Saturation attacks are much harder to deal with. The other issue for Russia is they are still stuck in Soviet-era thinking from a military logistics standpoint. Some of that is good - railroad - top 3 in the world you could argue the best. Some of it is bad, like huge piles of ammunition stored in the open air that anyone with a web browser can see on Google, Bing, Yandex, etc. There are literally dozens of these sites within the range of Ukrainian drones - or allied-provided missiles. Finally, Russia's vastness works against its air defenses. There isn't a country on the planet that has the monetary, military, and industrial resources to protect every critical site in the Russian Federation. It's impossible.
6️⃣ Anything else? Yes. The pro-Russian disinformation campaign has started, which is landing on the message that 40,000+ metric tonnes of ammunition is nothing and can be replaced in days. That's a fantasy. A 152mm artillery shell weighs between 42 and 51 kilograms, depending on the type of shell (92 to 114 pounds); that's hundreds of thousands of rounds - an extremely conservative estimate of around 45 days of consumption. That takes into consideration that not everything blown up was artillery rounds. 122mm Grad rockets, 300mm Smerch rockets, S-300/S-400 air defense missiles, and Iskander-K will take longer to replace.
7️⃣ There are Russian claims that the hit on Toropets South (Oktyabrskii) was a location where Russian nuclear weapons delivery capabilities were stored. There is no way this can be proven through OSINT. However, Moscow has repeatedly stated that the strikes Ukraine conducted would lead to World War III - nuclear retaliation - right to defend. It's a bluff. It's always been a bluff. If 30 NATO Brigades were rolling on Moscow, no, it wouldn't be a bluff. Lift restrictions, arm Ukraine, permit the NATO Alliance members on Ukraine's border to defend their own airspace, and establish a shallow air-defense-only no-fly zone in Western Ukraine in the name of European security. Autocrat Vladimir Putin will pull out his watercolor paints and draw a new redline that will wash away like all the rest.
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