Thread by @TrentTelenko

Given the latest failure of the Russian Sarmat ICBM...

...it is time to ask some hard questions about the combat readiness of the RU nuclear triad.

Extraordinary claims of Russian nuclear readiness now require extraordinary evidence🧵
1/

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1317940838274600961

This is the 4th failed test attempt of the "combat operational" RS-28 Sarmat Heavy ICBM.

The RS-28 is a derivative of the original R-36M / SS-18 which was Ukrainian built and maintained until 2014.

2/

https://x.com/MeNMyRC1/status/1837611953734537377

The RS-28 Sarmat was to replace the Ukrainian built/maintained SS-18 SATAN.

Russia had to reverse engineer SATAN's Ukrainian missile technology to make Russian knock-off tech and supposedly uprated engines for 3 Avangard​ HGV or a FOBS payload.
3/
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RS-28_Sar…

The fourth RS-28 Sarmat explosion is interesting.

These are not fuelled in the silo like Titans were.

They are stored propellant fuelled at the factory, with each missile in a cold launch catapult equipped launcher / container / capsule.


4/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sarm…

This was devised for rapid silo reloads in combat.

The capsule is loaded into the silo. The missile ejected & motor ignited once missile is maybe at 50 ft above the silo.

A giant truck removes empty capsule.

5/

Then a new capsule loaded into silo & the silo ready to shoot again.

The silo crater post bottom looks a whole lot like the Damascus Arkansas Titan II crater just below.

As the RS-28 fuel & motor are a "capsule sealed round."

6/

https://x.com/igorsushko/status/1837918924215930985

This most likely means something bad happened at the factory, which has huge fleet sevicability implications.

The nominal Russian 48 x heavy ICBM force were R-36M2 Voevoda SS-18 SATANs designed by Yangel and built by Yuzhmash in Dnipro city Ukraine.

7/ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PA_Pivden…

SS-18's were maintained until 2014 by Ukrainian technicians & spare parts.

From 2014 onwards, Russian technicians were supposedly using cannibalised parts from stored by treaty decommissioned SS-18s to keep the ICBM force operational.

Supposedly...😱
8/

The Russian MoD plan was to replace all of the SS-18s SATAN with RS-28 Sarmats by 2021.

The big question is...how many of the legacy SS-18s are still operational?

Especially given that the Sarmats are evidently (4 x test failures) not combat ready?

9/

We are at the point where we need to have "extraordinary evidence" that the Russian liquid fueled heavy ICBM nuclear delivery system fleet _IS_ operational.

Nor does it stop there.


10/en.defence-ua.com/events/rs_28_s…

The first of four Borei Class SSBN's to replace the Delta IV SSBN began in 1996 and took 17 years to complete...during Putin's Kleptocracy.

The solid fuel Bulava SLBM has suffered as many failures as the RS-28 Sarmat.

11/
strategypage.com/htmw/hticbm/ar…

The Russian strategic bomber force is being used hard...

12/

https://x.com/Tendar/status/1781226583845478557

...and put away wet.

I really don't want to think about the corrosion & cracking problems stacking tires on an empty wing like that can cause.

13/

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1698302027552436366

Given how badly Western intelligence engaged in delusions on Russian non-mechanized logistics for 80 years.

Getting a solid baseline on how many Russian nuclear warheads are unserviceable vs. operational will be tricky.

The intel self-licking ice cream cone is strong.

14/

A better question to be publicly asking is whether Russian nuclear fuzes can be considered a reliable military capability in the Russian Kleptocracy.

It isn't a given.

15/

Nuclear War 101 - Missile warheads have a high terminal velocity due to an exceptionally streamlined shape, which is intended to minimize horizontal wind vectors.

These warheads have three different fuzes using different principles for this harsh environment.

16/

To effectively detonate, nuclear weapons usually have these three fuses;
1. A radar altimeter/proximity fuse,
2. A timer-barometric altimeter, and
3. An impact fuse.

Radar altimeters/proximity fuses are exceptionally vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse (EMP).

17/

US "military nuclear experts" who deny that fact also pretend that the "Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Volume. 1: Executive Report (Washington DC: EMP Commission, 2004)," doesn't exist either.😱

18/

Late Cold War design impact fuses for nuclear weapons are quite unreliable because the deceleration of a hypersonic/supersonic impact will marginally but effectively deform the shock wave lenses from the high explosives of a nuclear weapon's trigger, thereby causing the fissile material to shoot out to one side rather than imploding into a critical mass.**

Thus, only if a warhead is lowered by parachute will an impact fuse work reliably.

18/

**Yes, there were a lot of really bitter ex-SAC bomber pilots dishing dirt in the 1990's post-Cold War demobilization budget fights.

There is no such thing as a secret in DC when the defense budget is on the line.

It is a strategic weakness of the American republic.🤦‍♂️

19/

Most nuclear weapons fused for ground bursts are intended to detonate 100 - 300 feet above the ground because of those impact fuze issues.

This means that the only reliable fuse is the time-barometric altimeter, which is not as accurate as the other two.

20/

If only because other preceding nuclear blast waves might toggle the barometric altimeter in the fuze.

Since no one has ever fired an operational missile from a operational silo over the North Pole.

SAC bomber pilots had a low opinion of US ICBM accuracy & reliability, let alone the USSR.

21/

They believed it was likely that many ICBM's will impact so far from their targets that a substantial proportion of those time-barometric fuzed for ground bursts will impact short, before their time-trigger operates the barometer, and dud.

22/

The so-called "Nuclear overkill" in the Cold War...wasn't.

"Overkill" was working through reliability mathematical formulas for how many nuclear warheads were required for 95%(+) probability to destroy a target given all the sequential reliability issues involved.

23/

If we in the USA can't trust our ballistic delivered nukes to work in combat.

The those nations are much less likely to try to use theirs, because they know US military technology is more reliable.

27/27 End

If we in the USA can't trust our ballistic delivered nukes to work in combat.

The those nations are much less likely to try to use theirs, because they know US military technology is more reliable.

27/27 End

If we in the USA can't trust our ballistic delivered nukes to work in combat.

The those nations are much less likely to try to use theirs, because they know US military technology is more reliable.

27/27 End

If we in the USA can't trust our ballistic delivered nukes to work in combat.

The those nations are much less likely to try to use theirs, because they know US military technology is more reliable.

27/27 End

If we in the USA can't trust our ballistic delivered nukes to work in combat.

The those nations are much less likely to try to use theirs, because they know US military technology is more reliable.

27/27 End

PS. I haven't a clue how 27/27 end got repeated

X seems to have filled it in when I posted the second half of the thread.

@threadreaderapp unroll please.