After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
4/ All the aforementioned components are produced abroad and supplied by various Russian companies that acquire and deliver this equipment. But why do we care and what exactly is the MPPU-50?
5/ An official correspondence letter between the Almaz-Antei affiliate "Red Banner" and Mikropribor reveals that MPPU-50 modules are integral to the production of the Su-57. The letter states that challenges in MPPU-50 production could jeopardize the production of Su-57
6/ Additionally, we know that the "Mikropribor" research institute and production facility were working on at least three automated stations for testing and calibrating the MPPU-50, used in its latest generation of jets - Su-57 production, which heavily relied on Western parts.
7/ The list of specific parts provides clearer insight into the Western components used in production, in this particular example from Pulsar Microwave Corporation. Notably, the purchase offer for these components was made in July 2022, nearly six months into the war.
8/ The supplied parts extend beyond smaller components, as shown in the deal between the Mikropribor factory and a company called KMT, where KMT agreed to supply at least one Siemens lathe (model KLE 360) in July 2022
9/ While it's hard to determine from the documents whether these components came from the existing Russian stockpiles or were deliberately sold via third countries, it's clear that Russia's military industry heavily depends on Western components, particularly in electronics
10/ Considering that Russian military production continued to expand in 2023 and 2024, it's clear that they find ways to smuggle key components or purchase Chinese replacements to maintain production. While we can't eliminate these deliveries, we should aim to minimize them
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For many in developing countries, Russia offers a chance to earn blood money they might never otherwise see. Hundreds of Cubans have taken that path, and our team Frontelligence Insight used them as a case study to find out how many foreigners are now fighting for Russia.🧵Thread
2/ In 2023, a major data leak exposed records of hundreds of Cuban mercenaries, later investigated by @InformNapalm. We analyzed 176 personal files and found that most recruits were between 30 and 39 years old, followed by those aged 40 to 49 - with a few even over 60.
3/ With their full names in hand, tracing their whereabouts on Russian social media was relatively easy. One mercenary in particular, Enriquez Linares Livan Michel, proved especially useful. His social media profile contained both photographs and geodata.
Ukrainian drone strikes in Izhevsk: Russia’s arms heart, and Luhansk using rocket-drone "Peklo" demonstrates Kyiv’s growing technological abilities. The message to Putin is clear: Ukraine’s strike range and warhead size will only continue to expand as the war continues:
2/ Air defense drones are emerging as a promising counter to Russia’s expanding Shahed (Geran) drone output - no longer just a concept, but an increasingly likely solution that could help offset Moscow’s production surge with scalable and relatively cheap response
3/ Russia’s consistent failure to break Ukrainian front, despite a manpower edge, and mounting economic issues, admitted even by Putin, nullify their bravado shown during the latest Istanbul. Achieving Moscow’s stated goals would require far more resources than it's deploying
Our team has been tracking Russia’s recruitment efforts abroad, with a focus on West Africa and Cuba. Some revealing insights follow in this short thread🧵:
1. While some foreign POWs claim they were misled, documents suggest they joined Russia’s military knowingly
2. The reality is quite prosaic: Moscow offers steady pay that far surpasses local wages, along with the lure of adventure - an exciting offer for young men in economically strained countries. In some cases, recruits receive upfront bonuses as high as $20,000 and more
3. The contracts - often written in languages such as Spanish or French - clearly outline terms, including compensation for injury or death, and explicitly mention “Special Military Operation” zone. This makes claims of recruits being unaware highly implausible
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts.
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets