After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
4/ All the aforementioned components are produced abroad and supplied by various Russian companies that acquire and deliver this equipment. But why do we care and what exactly is the MPPU-50?
5/ An official correspondence letter between the Almaz-Antei affiliate "Red Banner" and Mikropribor reveals that MPPU-50 modules are integral to the production of the Su-57. The letter states that challenges in MPPU-50 production could jeopardize the production of Su-57
6/ Additionally, we know that the "Mikropribor" research institute and production facility were working on at least three automated stations for testing and calibrating the MPPU-50, used in its latest generation of jets - Su-57 production, which heavily relied on Western parts.
7/ The list of specific parts provides clearer insight into the Western components used in production, in this particular example from Pulsar Microwave Corporation. Notably, the purchase offer for these components was made in July 2022, nearly six months into the war.
8/ The supplied parts extend beyond smaller components, as shown in the deal between the Mikropribor factory and a company called KMT, where KMT agreed to supply at least one Siemens lathe (model KLE 360) in July 2022
9/ While it's hard to determine from the documents whether these components came from the existing Russian stockpiles or were deliberately sold via third countries, it's clear that Russia's military industry heavily depends on Western components, particularly in electronics
10/ Considering that Russian military production continued to expand in 2023 and 2024, it's clear that they find ways to smuggle key components or purchase Chinese replacements to maintain production. While we can't eliminate these deliveries, we should aim to minimize them
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Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.
The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550
2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA
3/ This is very close to our earlier estimates published in July and August, which pointed to 8,400–10,500 KIA per month. These estimates have proven to be quite accurate, demonstrating that our methodology is precise and reliable