After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
4/ All the aforementioned components are produced abroad and supplied by various Russian companies that acquire and deliver this equipment. But why do we care and what exactly is the MPPU-50?
5/ An official correspondence letter between the Almaz-Antei affiliate "Red Banner" and Mikropribor reveals that MPPU-50 modules are integral to the production of the Su-57. The letter states that challenges in MPPU-50 production could jeopardize the production of Su-57
6/ Additionally, we know that the "Mikropribor" research institute and production facility were working on at least three automated stations for testing and calibrating the MPPU-50, used in its latest generation of jets - Su-57 production, which heavily relied on Western parts.
7/ The list of specific parts provides clearer insight into the Western components used in production, in this particular example from Pulsar Microwave Corporation. Notably, the purchase offer for these components was made in July 2022, nearly six months into the war.
8/ The supplied parts extend beyond smaller components, as shown in the deal between the Mikropribor factory and a company called KMT, where KMT agreed to supply at least one Siemens lathe (model KLE 360) in July 2022
9/ While it's hard to determine from the documents whether these components came from the existing Russian stockpiles or were deliberately sold via third countries, it's clear that Russia's military industry heavily depends on Western components, particularly in electronics
10/ Considering that Russian military production continued to expand in 2023 and 2024, it's clear that they find ways to smuggle key components or purchase Chinese replacements to maintain production. While we can't eliminate these deliveries, we should aim to minimize them
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Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms:
2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production
3/ None of this would be possible without your continued financial support and donations. Some of our earlier investigations have already helped several governments pursue their own inquiries into sanctions evasion
So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread:
2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast
3/ That does not mean Russia will stop advancing. But if the political goal remains the takeover of Donbas, achieving it by the end of this year appears impossible.
Drones, ISR, communications, battlefield awareness, electronic warfare, and mobile anti-tank systems: North Korea appears to have taken notes from the battlefields of Kursk. Its latest propaganda video offers clues, Frontelligence Insight finds in its newest analysis. 🧵Thread:
2/ When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments: countermeasures, offensive drone tactics, and battlefield surveillance.
3/ In a 19-minute video released by Korean Central Television, an FPV drone team, a pilot and a co-pilot, is shown striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kursk Oblast. The wiring setup suggests a reconnaissance unit with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building.
Russian investigative outlet The Insider spoke with numerous volunteers supplying troops with equipment and donations and discovered an eye-opening situation: in recent months, the volunteer movement has plunged into crisis, with rising signs of fatigue and frustration. 🧵Thread:
2/ A significant share of supplies for the Russian army, from uniforms to thermal imagers and drones, has come from volunteers since the start of the full-scale invasion. One of them, Natalia from the Bryansk region, says that people used to donate an average of 500 to 1,000 rubles
3/ Now she must seek funding from businesses and the government, but gets no response. Another volunteer from Belgorod, Ruslan, said he quit the movement, noting that more and more people have no motivation to support the army.
China is reportedly ready to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, according to Welt am Sonntag, citing European diplomats. Meanwhile, Frontelligence Insight is releasing a list of Chinese companies involved in scaling Russia’s Shahed drone program. Here is the list:
/2 Despite its efforts to present itself as a geopolitical actor capable of peacemaking, Chinese companies help to scale Russia's military production. As the data show, most of these companies are either not sanctioned or face restrictions from only a limited number of countries
3/ There are serious inconsistencies in sanctions, undermining their effectiveness. To maximize impact, sanctions should be coordinated across multiple states with leverage over China, including the United States, the European Union, the Commonwealth realms, Japan, and others.
iStories recently reported that Russian recruitment was falling, citing federal budget data on sign-up bonuses. In reality, enlistment still runs above 30,000 a month, and the dip reflects changes in published data, not an actual slowdown 🧵There are a few nuances, though:
2/ They reported that several regions, including Irkutsk and Vladimir, are struggling with recruitment. That is true, and has been an issue in many areas, which helps explain the steady rise in sign-up bonuses. Some recruits even register in other regions to secure higher payouts
3/ Still, despite ever-higher bonuses, Russia has found ways to offset shortfalls by drawing from the freshly detained and pre-trial prisoners, while increasingly pressuring illegal migrants and conscripts into signing contracts.