After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
4/ All the aforementioned components are produced abroad and supplied by various Russian companies that acquire and deliver this equipment. But why do we care and what exactly is the MPPU-50?
5/ An official correspondence letter between the Almaz-Antei affiliate "Red Banner" and Mikropribor reveals that MPPU-50 modules are integral to the production of the Su-57. The letter states that challenges in MPPU-50 production could jeopardize the production of Su-57
6/ Additionally, we know that the "Mikropribor" research institute and production facility were working on at least three automated stations for testing and calibrating the MPPU-50, used in its latest generation of jets - Su-57 production, which heavily relied on Western parts.
7/ The list of specific parts provides clearer insight into the Western components used in production, in this particular example from Pulsar Microwave Corporation. Notably, the purchase offer for these components was made in July 2022, nearly six months into the war.
8/ The supplied parts extend beyond smaller components, as shown in the deal between the Mikropribor factory and a company called KMT, where KMT agreed to supply at least one Siemens lathe (model KLE 360) in July 2022
9/ While it's hard to determine from the documents whether these components came from the existing Russian stockpiles or were deliberately sold via third countries, it's clear that Russia's military industry heavily depends on Western components, particularly in electronics
10/ Considering that Russian military production continued to expand in 2023 and 2024, it's clear that they find ways to smuggle key components or purchase Chinese replacements to maintain production. While we can't eliminate these deliveries, we should aim to minimize them
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Russians plan to produce 79,000 Shahed-type drones in 2025, including 40,000 Geran-2; 5,700 Garpiya-1; and ~ 34,000 “Gerbera” and other decoys, according to Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine. More key data in the thread🧵:
2/ Around 11,000 North Koreans remain in the Kursk region and, more broadly, across the European part of Russia. They are stationed at the training grounds where four brigades were initially formed. An additional 1,200 North Koreans are expected to arrive in the Kursk region.
3/ Russia and North Korea have reached a preliminary agreement to deploy 6,000 personnel for demining, engineering, infrastructure projects, and medical services, with 1,200 forming the first batch.
Good commentary on the situation from Michael Kofman: I agree with his vision. He notes, “The next few days will prove telling,” and I’d like to expand from here. This may be Russia’s most favorable moment, meaning we are already seeing, or will soon see,its peak effort.🧵Thread:
2/ The main reason is the upcoming Aug. 15 talks between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Putin will almost certainly try to create the worst possible conditions for Ukrainian forces to strengthen his hand at the table.
3/ Given recent Russian gains near Pokrovsk, Putin may try to show Trump that Russia is close to trapping Ukraine’s army. Earlier this year, Trump wrote that Russians encircled Ukrainian troops in Kursk after early discussions with Putin, likely echoing arguments presented to him
Please refer to my note from four days ago - this is critical. In both 2014 and 2015, Russia launched major offensives ahead of negotiations to gain leverage. The current situation is serious, but far from the collapse some suggest. So, what is actually happening on the ground?
2/ A collapse, in military terms, means a loss of command and control, a breakdown in battlefield awareness, and an inability to regroup, withdraw in an organized fashion, or coordinate with units. To the best of my knowledge, none of these conditions are currently present.
3/ The situation more closely resembles events of May 2024, when Russian forces slipped through unprepared Ukrainian defenses along the border and advanced nearly 10 kilometers. That incursion was eventually contained and remained a localized pocket.
A few more notes on Pokrovsk. Penetrations and developing envelopments rarely begin with a local commander’s decision. They stem from deeper problems on strategic level - starting with a shortage of manpower, itself the result of ineffective recruitment and a lack of trust:
2/ If units are only 25% manned but spread out as if they were fully staffed, and if there aren’t enough drones or trained pilots, then blaming a battalion or brigade commander is nothing more than scapegoating.
3/ Holding drills near the border or front lines under enemy drone surveillance, resulting in missile strikes, digging trenches in open fields, and similar acts of negligence all erode trust in leadership and, ultimately, weaken mobilization.
Desertions, AWOLs, manpower shortages, and recruitment struggles are often linked to the Ukrainian army. And rightly so - I’ve spoken about these issues at length. But the situation on the Russian side is also worsening. This issue deserves wider attention, so here’s a 🧵thread:
2/ First, while Russia continues to receive a steady flow of recruits, only a part of them can be considered true volunteers. What’s actually happening is a form of hidden mobilization that has not only persisted but accelerated in recent months. Let's talk about it in detail
3/ In the past, Russia resorted to recruiting prisoners to get more people. That approach has shifted. Now, individuals arrested on suspicion of various crimes are offered the chance to sign a contract with the MoD on the spot - often as a way to avoid criminal investigation.
As Moscow tries to spotlight Ukraine’s recruitment issues, the Kremlin is taking unprecedented steps to fill its own ranks. Here are key developments from the past two weeks:
1/ Russia’s electronic draft registry and Unified Military Register are now live and ramping up activity
2/ The Ministry of Defense has begun notifying residents of Perm of their inclusion in the Unified Military Register. Similar notices had previously been reported by residents of Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Chuvashia and the Kaluga region.
3/ According to the “Idite Lesom” project, a Tver region resident eligible for conscription received two notifications: a draft notice to show up at the military enlistment office, and message confirming a deadline and restrictions, including a travel ban.