Earlier this month, Italian cities saw a pro-Russian billboard campaign: “Russia is not our enemy” was written on billboards that also depicted an Italy-Russia handshake. The billboards also called on stopping to provide money for “weapons for Ukraine and Israel”. 1/15
Ukraine’s Embassy in Italy responded quickly to the campaign saying that it was “deeply concerned by the arrogance of Russian propaganda” in Rome and asking the Rome authorities “to reconsider granting permits for such posters that have a clear purpose of rehabilitating the image of the aggressor state” 2/15
CNN alleged that an Italian group called “Sovranità Popolare” (Popular Sovereignty) was behind the campaign (), but the group itself – although avowedly pro-Russian – denied it was responsible for the campaign: 3/15edition.cnn.com/2024/09/13/eur… sovranitapopolare.org/2024/09/25/gue…
An investigation by Massimiliano Coccia @maxcoccia revealed that it was an Italian antivaxx, anti-5G and pro-Putin activist Domenico Aglioti who coordinated the campaign . Aglioti himself claimed that the campaign was crowd-funded. 4/15linkiesta.it/2024/09/manife…
That may be – unless there is evidence suggesting otherwise – but the September campaign was an echo of a similar campaign in summer this year, and that campaign can be traced to actual Russian operatives. 5/15
The summer campaign also involved numerous posters across Italy (starting in northern Italy, a bastion of Matteo Salvini’s far-right Lega party), and was coordinated by the Veneto-Russia Cultural Association presided by Palmarino Zoccatelli. 6/15
It was also Zoccatelli’s Association that was responsible for opening a “centre of representation” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR) in Verona in 2019. 7/15
In addition to Zoccatelli, the board of the Association features two prominent figures of the Italian pro-Russian milieu: Stefano Valdegamberi and Eliseo Bertolasi. 8/15
Valdegamberi is a long-time Russian asset who was, until 2023, linked to the Lega party. One of Valdegamberi’s Russian handlers was Sargis Mirzakhanian (see more on him here: ), and Valdegamberi was known for taking pleasure in entertaining his Russian colleagues with his rather horrible singing. 9/15icct.nl/sites/default/…
Bertolasi is yet another Russian asset, but a more interesting one. He was an associate researcher of Tiberio Graziani’s pro-Russian Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences, and used to be – perhaps still is – an Italian correspondent of a number of Russian state-controlled media including Rossiya Segodnya and Sputnik. Bertolasi also contributed to the development of the Lombardy-Russia Cultural Association founded by the Lega party. Bertolasi is in the centre on this picture 10/15
It was probably Bertolasi’s work as a correspondent for Russian state-controlled media that determined the name “Writer” as his field alias in the Russian services. One of Bertolasi’s Russian handlers was – and perhaps still is – Russian FSB officer Aleksey Stovbun (codename “Erudite”) whose cover story is “a journalist”. 11/15
In addition to Bertolasi, Stovbun handled several assets in other countries. As an investigation by the Latvia Public Media showed, in Latvia Stovbun (right) handled Igors Bobirs (left), who died in custody in 2023 12/15 lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/l…
The Latvian investigation also identified Serbian pro-Kremlin activist Dragana Trifković as yet another Russian asset handled by Stovbun. I noticed her already in 2014, when she was an “observer” at some fake election in the DNR and hung out with Russian neo-Nazis: (1) (2) 13/15
Dragana Trifković worked with Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s African network in 2018 (I wrote about AFRIC here: ), and also developed contacts with the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the biggest pro-Kremlin party in Western Europe today. 14/15 epde.org/reports/fake-e…
But Stovbun has also handled assets in the Czech Republic (codename “Lawyer”) and Uzbekistan (codename “Doctor”), and who knows where else. One can only hope that more identities will be revealed in some not-so-distant future. 15/15
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Just before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI) shipped over €9 billion in cash to Russia. At least 10 shipments arrived on or after 24 February, boosting liquidity as Russian forces attacked Kyiv. 1/5
Recipients included TBSS, a firm linked to Russian government agencies. Experts say the influx of foreign cash likely supported Putin’s war effort, even if RBI insists it only dealt with banks. Cash can buy loyalty – and fund war operations. 2/5
RBI, unlike most Western banks, remained in Russia post-invasion. It earns a third of its profits there and continues to pay millions in taxes to the Russian state, indirectly fuelling the Kremlin’s war machine. 3/5
It is a legitimate point that the idiocy of Steve Witkoff’s recent comments on Ukraine stems from his complete lack of knowledge about Ukraine, or Russia, or politics in general. 1/9
After all, Witkoff has spent his entire life in real estate investment — he is simply unqualified for the role Trump has assigned to him. 2/9
“The future of Europe should not be decided in Washington or Moscow”. President Emmanuel Macron delivered his address to the French people today, here's a thread summarising his speech. 1/11
His address has outlined a strategic vision for France and Europe in response to mounting global instability, particularly the ongoing war in Ukraine and the broader Russian threat. 2/11
Macron says that supporting Ukraine is essential not only for its sovereignty but for European security. A failure to counter Russia’s aggression would embolden further territorial ambitions, leading to a breakdown of international order. 3/11
Have you noticed a recent uptick in "expert analyses" arguing that Russia remains a strong economy able to wage its war against Ukraine for many years? This uptick is hardly a coincidence, and a new insider report from VCHK-OGPU suggests it's part of Russian information warfare and provides even more details on what is going on inside the Kremlin regime. 1/7
In the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin tasked an informal group of loyal economists (Anton Siluanov, Maxim Oreshkin, Elvira Nabiullina, etc.) with managing economic and financial issues, as well as providing him with reports on real assessment of Russian economy. 2/7
Internationally, however, the Putin regime has aimed at convincing US administrations (first Biden, then Trump) of Russia’s economic resilience and its ability to sustain the conflict, thereby pushing for favourable agreements. This approach - demonstrating strength while masking vulnerabilities - has been more or less successful even with the people close to Trump in autumn last year. 3/7
As Ukrainian forces continue to annihilate North Korean troops and occasionally take them prisoner, some intriguing details have come to light. A short thread 🧵 1/9
Capturing POWs has proven challenging as North Koreans and Russians alike are apparently instructed to kill wounded NK soldiers to prevent them from falling into Ukrainian hands. Yet recently Ukrainians have successfully captured two NK soldiers alive. 2/9
Both individuals carried Russian military service cards alleging they were born in the Tuva Republic, a region included in the Russian Federation. Russian non-regime media also report that the Russian authorities transferred identities of actual Tuvans to drafted NK soldiers. 3/9
With the holiday quiet filling my inbox, I took the opportunity to explore Russia’s potential to disrupt Western underwater cables. Here’s what I uncovered – it’s a deep dive, so buckle up! 1/21
There are three main methods to interfere with underwater cables. The first involves deploying trained professionals to manually cut the cables. This can be done using scuba divers for shallow waters up to 50 metres deep, typically near shorelines, or saturation divers for depths reaching 300 metres. However, the primary drawback of this approach is the risk of divers being caught, which significantly reduces plausible deniability of the responsible party. 2/21
The second method involves using either a fishing net or an anchor to tamper with the cable. One approach is to hook the cable with a fishing net, lift it onto a “fishing vessel”, and cut it there. Alternatively, an anchor can be used to drag the cable and cut it underwater. 3/21