Highmarsed Profile picture
Sep 27 19 tweets 6 min read Read on X
1/ Getting reliable data regarding attrition of the Russian artillery forces is very hard, but there are some trends that can be observed based on what is being removed from the storage bases, which I will present in this thread.⬇️ https://ukr.warspotting.net/view/19057/155050/
2/ Here are the equipment numbers visible on satelite images. Almost 11000 towed artillery units, self-propelled guns and towed mortars have been removed from visible storage since the start of the invasion. Image
3/ A large inital drop in the number of stored artillery systems can be observed. These were likely needed for the force expansion after the mobilization, since towed guns can be reactivated faster than SPGs, which have been removed at a more linear rate of roughly 900 per year. Image
4/ Sadly the most important discovery is that the last two and a half years of attrition have so far not caused a general shortage in artillery systems for the Russian army. In my opinion the limiting factor is likely still ammunition, but at some point likely also barrels.
5/ It is not really possible to get open source and reliable data on the real attrition rate of artillery systems, ammunition stockpiles or barrel production, which makes any calculation or prediction very inaccurate, but some trends can be drawn from the numbers above.
6/ The first observation is unsurprisingly, that the stocks of more capable and longer range systems have often been depleted at higher rates compared to other systems. This will lead to a slow decline in average range, across the active fleet of russian artillery systems.
7/ One example are the Giatsint guns: the towed Giatsint-B 2A36 and its self-propelled version the Giatsint-S (2S5). They have initially been removed at a high rate, but there has been very little change since mid 2023. Image
8/ Both systems are very capable and have a long range. In my opinion the reason for the reduced removal rate is likely that they use different ammunition than other 152mm systems, limiting the number of active systems.
9/ Another interesting, but also obvious observation is that the average age of Russian artillery systems is rising. One example was the introduction of the D-20, which entered production in 1955 or more recently the M-46, that entered production in 1951.
10/ The 130mm M-46 was not in service before the war started and it is unclear if they were reactivated, because of a lack of long range guns or some other reason, such as a new source of 130mm ammunition (North Korea or Iran). Roughly 380 have been removed from storage. Image
11/ Furthermore all of the stored SPG types have seen at least some cannibalization. Making an accurate assesment of this from satelite footage is really hard, but I would suggest an average cannibalization rate of 25% (SPGs). I also found these 15 2A36 without a barrel. Image
12/ The most cannibalized system is likely the 2S7. Only 72 of 218 systems remain in storage and most of the remaing units had their guns or other parts removed, which can be seen in these images from the 94th Arsenal in Omsk.
Image
Image
13/ Additionally I have to add that a large fraction of the remaining towed artillery in storage is made up of older systems that are currently not in service in larger numbers such as the D-1, M-30 and D-44.
14/ My guess would be that they make up at least half of the remaining units and are mostly D-1 and M-30. I have identified at least 1300 M-30s in satelite images from 2021, but there could definetly be even more of them.
15/ It is still unclear how useful many of these system will be, but some are probably completely useless such as remaining ZiS-2/3, but others such as the D-44 might be more useful. Ukraine has even used the D-44 and there is one entry for a gun of this type on Oryx.
16/ I have previously speculated if Russia does have access to the appropriate ammunition for some older systems, but I think they can likely solve those issues, because the russian allies often operate these older systems or chinese copies (f.x. Type-54).
17/ There are likely a lot less useful units remaining at the storage bases than the total numbers from the beginning of the thread would suggest, but Russia clearly still has some reserves to draw on including some capable system.
18/ In my opinion a sign for a true shortage of more modern artillery systems would be, if we start seeing a large number of D-1 and M-30 being used at the front, since they are both clearly inferior to the systems that replaced them (D-20 and D-30).
19/ I know there is a video of Wagner soldiers firing a D-1 and a damaged M-30 is listed on Oryx, but this is not enough evidence to suggest that these systems are used in significant numbers.

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More from @HighMarsed

Sep 19
1/ Since the start of the invasion Russia has removed at least 8300 units of towed artillery and mortars from their storage bases. I will provide some additional information to the count we published recently. Image
2/ First of all I would like to explain the new ID system. I tried to make more use of measuring the guns to put them into categories. I would like to thank @bentanmy , for looking into which systems might be in storage based on guns removed for exhibits.
3/ I have also linked all of his threads about the individual systems below. Interestingly there were even ZiS-2 and ZiS-3 removed from storage for exhibits.
Read 9 tweets
Aug 18
1/ Here is our updated count of self propelled guns at Russian storage sites, with data points for 2022, 2023 and 2024. With @CovertCabal ⬇️
Image
2/ As usual here is the data. Russia has so far removed roughly 1700 SPGs from storage and 60% of of their stocks remain at the bases in various conditions. Image
3/ Interstingly some systems have been removed at a roughly linear rate: ~220 per year for the 2S1, ~160 for the 2S3 and ~140 for the 2S9. Image
Read 6 tweets
Jul 31
1/ Someone should update the "List of equipment of the Russian ground forces" on Wikipedia with Military Balance 2024 numbers. ⬇️
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_e…
Image
2/ Many bad assesments of Russian equipment are based on numbers from , which in turn seems to be at least partially relying on the Wikipedia article I mentioned above:globalfirepower.com
3/ The main problem with this article is that it is using some outdated numbers from The Military Balance 2022 that were corrected in 2023 and 2024.
Read 12 tweets
Jul 30
1/ This thread aims to provide some open-source and reproducible facts about Russian pre-war tank storage. ⬇️ Image
2/ The main reason I am writing this thread is that the only other source (except our previous counts) is The Military Balance 2022 (10200 tanks: 7000 T-72, 3000 T-80 and 200 T-90), which they have later corrected in TMB2023 and TMB2024.
3/ The IISS lists 5000 tanks of all types in storage for 2023 and 4000 for 2024, which are both very reasonable numbers. This is cleary not only an adjustment of the numbers caused by the war, but also a re-evaluation. Sadly these numbers are only quoted rarely.
Read 20 tweets
Jul 10
1/ If you are interested in how the Russian tank fleet might look over the coming years here are some of my predictions for what will likely happen, if the war continues at the same intensity. ⬇️ Image
2/ First of all here are the numbers of tanks of each type removed from storage, which will be relevant for this thread. Keep in mind that there are a lot of uncertainties with these numbers and this is only the storage visible on satelite images. Image
3/ Additionally I will assume that number of tanks at the front is constant and the share of losses for each type accurately reflects the share of the tank type among the active tank fleet. Both of these assumptions are probably not true.
Read 25 tweets
Jul 6
1/ Here is how many tanks are left at Russian storage bases in mid 2024, as usual done together with @CovertCabal. We have made some changes to our methodology which I will explain in this thread together with some further analysis.⬇️
2/ First of all here are the numbers by type and base. As you can see Russia has removed about 2500 tanks from visible storage, but the removal rate has declined from 115 tanks per month in the first 16 months to roughly 60 tanks per month over the last year.
Image
Image
3/ Initially Russia had a lot of reserve tanks in good condition which were taken out of storage quickly and the rate was likely even higher than 115 per month since they had some tanks stored in garages. They could likely compensate their high initial losses. Image
Read 14 tweets

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