Like I promised earlier this week. I will deal with the current state of Aerospace Forces PVO Reserves.
Most of these inactive systems are stored in private companies repair factories, others in Technical Bases.
1/20
Installations hosting inactive units are:
In Private Companies:
- 502 Factory for Repair of Military-Technical Property.
- 1015 Factory for Repair of Military-Technical Property.
- 1019 Military Repair Plant.
- Khabarovsk Radio Engineering Factory.
2/20
In Military Units:
Complex Storage Base (Omsk) - 1062nd Logistical Center
1488th Technical Base
1494th Technical Base
2227th Technical Base
Only the first truly hosts systems, the other ones are technical support units for active duty Moscow AD.
3/20
502 Factory.
@AS_22im already did checked this Factory. Most of the systems were already gone by Sept 2023.
This is the current count for Observed reserves. There is about 202 TEL's in store for 22 batteries, along with their radars and command and control equipment.
14/20
So what does it tells us ? That Russian Defence Industry
cannot put back into service seamingly operational equipment (especially S-300PS/PM).
Reasons might be diverse, lacks of spare, lack of qualified personnel, competing objectives with export market.
15/20
As of 2020, Russia had 57 S-400 batteries (with 456 TEL's) in operational service. Current needs far outweigh what is available in reserves.
The deficit have been ever growing as Russia has to defend against increasingly long range attacks.
16/20
Defence Intelligence of UK have been forecasting this back in November 2023.
From currently available Ukraine MoD claims, at least 17 S-400 batteries have been affected by Ukrainian strikes, raids or other actions. It involves either radars, TEL's or both.
This is a conservative estimate as a higher number could be impacted.
Finally what does it means ? That Ukraine can severely impact Russian Air Defence Forces and open up an Air Campaign once the degradation level met a critical point.
19/20
Special thanks to @AS_22im for its critical work in tracking AD site status. Thanks to @hizzo_jay for updated satellite imagery.
And thanks to @HighMarsed, @Jonpy99, @waffentraeger and @BAAService for all the support !
20/20
@james21245 @watcher02671700 @AS_22im @hizzo_jay @HighMarsed @Jonpy99 @waffentraeger @BAAService So 50 destroyed radars would be very painful.
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Radio-Technical Regiment Statistics of the Russian Aerospace Forces (non-strategic).
In this thread, I will present you statistics about the composition of Radio-Technical Regiments tasked with Air Space Surveillance and Combat Training.
1/11
There are 948 Radars in both Radio Technical-Regiments, Test Centers, Training Centers and waiting delivery in Factories.
20 different radar systems are in operation in those units facilities. A good share are from the 1970's although modernised.
2/11
Here is the list of systems found :
-Nebo-U/UM/T
-Nebo-SV/SVU
-5N84A/AM
-P-18/M
-Kasta-2E1/2E2
-ST-68U/UM
-5N87/M
-22Zh6M/MM
-Gamma-D
-1L117M
-Gamma-S1
-Protivnik-GE
-Sopka-2
-96L6
-Nebo-M RLM-M
-Nebo-M RLM-D
-Nebo-M PU-RLK
-Podlet-K1
-PRV-13/14/15/16/17
-Resonans-N
In a previous thread, we talked about the 75th Arsenal being mainstay of PVO Reserves.
Other installations, GRAU Arsenals and Artillery Reserve Bases are also storing AD Systems.
1/17
Those Installations are:
- 8th Arsenal
- 40th Arsenal
- 80th Arsenal
- 94th Arsenal
- Arsenal of MU 59313-46
- 216th Storage and Repair Base
- Artillery Storage Base of MU 55472
2/17
8th Arsenal (58° 1'13.61"N; 38°52'43.73"E)
Count Date : 17/05/2023
A bit of every tier : S-300V, BUK and OSA
Note : S-300V seems have been scavenged for parts.
Pourquoi les russes ont-ils mis des réflecteurs radars sur le pont Antonovsky à Kherson ? Pour se protéger des missiles de fabrication américaine. Mais il y a un hic. A Thread
Le hic majeur est que ce dispositif est adapté uniquement pour un certain type de missiles, les missiles fournis actuellement par les américains (GMLRS) sont principalement guidés par GPS.
Alors dans ce cas, pourquoi leurrer dans le spectre radar ? La réponse nécessite de revenir dans le passé. Et fruit du hasard, une menace perçue comme existentielle par les Soviétiques se manifesta sous la forme d'un missile à guidage terminal radar : le Pershing II.