A brief round up of what we do actually know thus far about Iran's ballistic missile raid against Israel, named "Operation True Promise 2" by the IRGC.
Starting with the missiles, Iran employed 180-200 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), including Ghadr, Emad, and Kheibarshekan or Fattah-1.
A derivative of the Shahab-3, Ghadr is a liquid-fueled MRBM that ordinarily carries a single separable reentry vehicle (RV). These specfic missiles have been upgraded with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs).
Ghadr is one of the primary missiles Iran employed against Israel in April during "Operation True Promise."
A further development of Ghadr, Emad is a liquid-fueled MRBM that carries a single separable MaRV. Alongside Ghadr, is one of the primary missiles previously employed against Israel in April.
Kheibarshekan and Fattah-1 are two of Iran's most recently developed MRBMs. Both missiles share a common or closely related propulsion stack and are likely derived from the Fateh family of short-range ballistic missiles.
It is unclear which missile (or both) was employed against Israel.
Kheibarshekan is a solid-fueled MRBM that carries a single separable MaRV. It was previously employed against Israel in April.
Fattah-1 is a further evolution of Kheibarshekan which replaces the traditional MaRV with a unusual impulsive MaRV.
In exchange for reduced payload, it has a solid-fuel sustainer motor to provide midcourse divert capability while exoatmospheric. This is presumably intended to enhance its survivability against Arrow and THAAD.
The IRGC has claimed Fattah-1 was employed, but this cannot currently be verified based on the available debris.
The areas affected by this raid include Nevatim Airbase, Tel Nof Airbase, the headquarters of Mossad, and civilian infrastructure in central Israel.
Nevatim Airbase was struck by a dozen or so missiles with unclear effects. The RVs have notably depressed entry angles with widely dispersed points of impact. Nevatim was previously struck by 7-8 missiles in April to minimal effect.
Nevatim houses 116, 117, and 140 Squadrons, which operate F-35I Adir.
Tel Nof Airbase was struck by multiple ballistic missiles, with a least one impact appearing to cause secondary detonations.
Tel Nof houses 210 and 5601 Squadrons, the former operates Eitan UCAVs and the latter is the IAF's test squadron. Tel Nof is widely historically suspected to likely house Israel's nuclear gravity bombs.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Hi Lesya, as you may know I was a volunteer on Walter Report, later Mriya Report, from May 2022 to January 2023.
I have Mriya Report internal communications that detail continuous coordination between MR and the MA board from the creation of MR in July 2022 through January 2023.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Given the turnover in the MA since then, I’m inclined to assume you may be unaware of that prior history.
The assertion there was no coordination between MA and MR is, from my perspective, demonstrably false. I’m happy to provide excerpted communications to that effect.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid “Joe” refers to Joseph “Yehuda” Friedberg and “B” is Alexander Bakus, then MA’s Director of Treasury.
MR forked off from WR on July 17. Alex was intimately involved in the planning of this split and coordinated it with MA alongside Yehuda.
Although defense articles designated as Significant Military Equipment were exported to China without authorization, that SME does not appear to be classified.
The unauthorized hand-carry of defense articles, specifically technical data, to Russia, Iran, and Lebanon by RTX employees on personal travel with company-issued electronic devices likely only concerns unclassified defense articles.
Neither an Antenna Mast Group nor Communications Relay Group and Electric Power Unit are visible.
The CRG acting as the RLG's Launcher Control Station plus AMG and EPU are emplaced at a different site. RL1 enables the CRG/LCS to communicate with LS up to 10 km away via VHF.
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Remote launchers optimize PATRIOT's defended area against tactical ballistic missiles but create dead zones for airbreathing threats.
Remoting launchers in this instance is unusual as the RLG does not have Dnipro within its defended area for TBMs with PAC-3 or PAC-3 MSE.
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I won't detail the complete program history of S-300P/F/V as @ChungTzuW has already written excellent threads about them which I strongly recommend reading for context.
In short, all three systems emerged from a joint VKS/VMF/SV procurement program.
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VKS/VMF requirements were focused on ABTs (air-breathing threats) while SV requirements were focused on TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles). This led to a divergence into S-300P/F and S-300V using radically different missiles and radars.
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GLSDB has a range of >150 km while SDB has a range of ~110 km from a ~12 km release altitude and ~270 m/s release airspeed.
Position error due to accumulated inertial measurement unit drift is quadratically proportional to time of flight and range by extension.
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Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
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I'd point out the Stunner interceptor used by David's Sling lacks an Attitude Control System like PAC-3 (CRI/MSE). It relies solely on aerodynamic control surfaces, which reduces its engagement ceiling.
Against ballistic threats, this translates to a smaller defended footprint.
Stunner is certified to defeat 300 km TBM threats while PAC-3 MSE is certified to defeat 1,500+ km MRBM threats out to ~60 km. Should Iran directly attack Israel with ballistic missiles, David's Sling will likely be very stressed defeating 1,500-2,000 km ranged MRBMs.
Israel will be relying on Arrow 2/3 for midcourse defense as the lynchpin of their defense against an Iranian ballistic missile raid.
David's Sling may be able to provide terminal defense in a small area to the most critical assets such as the Jericho IRBM base at Sdot HaElah.