The book by @CharlotteCavai1 that Marc mentions in his thread is required reading imo for anyone interested in comparative political economy. I'm not qualified to review the book, but would like to draw your attention to some especially interesting cambridge.org/gb/universityp…x.com/MarcHvidkjaer/…
points.
Cavaillé defines "fairness reasoning as the thought process through which individuals reason as if a third-party judge ruling on the fairness of a given situation" (p. 32)
She then discusses 3 questions
1⃣ When does fairness matter relative to self-interest?
I try to summarise her argument in the figure below.
2⃣ How does fairness matter (in the cross section)?
She distinguishes between two fairness norms: proportionality and reciprocity.
proportionality = Are people's rewards proportional to their effort? ('redistribution from')
-> Prop. is what many/most conventional measure ('The gov't should redistribute income from the better off to the worse off') of redistribution preferences capture.
reciprocity = Do people generally cooperate or not and thus deserve benefits? ('redistribution to')
Classic survey items like the one mentioned above lump together the 'redistribution to' and 'redistribution from' dimensions of our redistributive preferences.
See also her @The_JOP piece with K. Trump journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.108…
The "preference space" then looks sth like the figure below.
Two further points are worth noting. First, Cavaillé argues that we choose proportionality belief in a self-interested manner, i.e. our beliefs about from whom it is just to take reflect, to a significant
extent, our material self-interest. Put somewhat crudely: everyone with income just above our own should be a net contributor and vice versa.
Second, the higher the material stakes, the greater the relative importance of material self-interest, partly because only then does
it pay to acquire the information necessary to assess the distributional consequences of policies.
How do fairness reasoning and self-interest interact? She conceptualises this interac. via 2-step procedure. 1. If a policy is perceived as fair, then support it. Otherwise,
oppose it. 2. Depending on material self-interest and info, adjust preferences.
The figure below reproduces the one in her book (apologies -- don't have a pdf copy at the moment).
There is much more in this part of the book, but let me turn to the second part, which
bring us to third question she poses:
3⃣ How does fairness matter for changes in redistributive preferences over time?
Given her conceptual framework, there are 3 types of shocks:
▶️increase in relative importance of self-interest (see figure below)
▶️change in fairness norm ppl rely on (prop vs recip)
▶️change in fairness beliefs (they change their beliefs about from whom it is just to take and to whom it is just to give)
Then, she maintains that there are three triggering factors:
▶️fiscal stress (austerity)
Austerity reduces support for 'redustribution to' policies among high-reciprocity rich/net contributors.
Mechanism: Austerity raises takes -> reduces relative importance of fairness reasoning and increases pocketbook considerations -> lower redis. to
Test case: France (read the
book :))
▶️priming/framing
We can change ppl's attitudes by changing the fairness norm they employ to arrive at their preferences (reciprocity vs proportionality).
Empirical application: She exploits the ordering of prop- and recip-related questions in a British (not sure)
survey to test this prediction.
▶️party competition and elite cues (on the final one, see my thread)
Both the book and the literature are much, much richer than I can convey in this thread, though I hope it will pique your interest.
For those who are too busy to peruse academic books, I'd recommend listening to @scopeconditions episode with @CharlotteCavai1, which I found inspiring. scopeconditionspodcast.com/episodes/episo…
I genuinely think many of these arguments can be fruitfully applied to other fields, such as climate policy (e.g. carbon pricing aversion, revenue recylcing, redistribition to/from). I am agog to see what other innovations @CharlotteCavai1's book will spawn.
Addendum: See here for somewhat more detailed introduction to the literature on preferences for redistribution.
Den Tag der deutschen Einheit verstehe ich als Aufforderung,
- die historisch nahezu singuläre Leistung der ProtagonistInnen (in Ost u. West) der friedlichen Revolution zu würdigen,
- mir die durch die Wiedervereinigung gerissenen Wunden sowie deren Persistenz zu
vergegenwärtigen, und
- indes nicht die Integrationserfolge aus den Augen zu verlieren.
Mein komparativer Kostenvorteil besteht in der (leider zu oberflaechlichen) Kenntnis von Teilen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur. Ich hoffe dennoch, dass diese Arbeiten zu einer
nuancierteren Debatte beitragen. 1. @essobecker, @LukasMergele, @Woessmann zeigen, dass es auch schon vor der Teilung erheblich Unterschiede zwischen Ost- und West-Deutschland gab. Das wird meist uebersehen und ist relevant, weil es bedeutet, dass wir
Immigration is back on the German political agenda. Here are some of my favourite academic works on the political and economic dynamics of immigration in Germany. 1. The book by @dhdannychoi, @MathiasPoertner, and Nicholas Sambanis is mightily press.princeton.edu/books/paperbac…
impressive, both empirically and substantively. Key lesson: It's the norms, stupid. See also the @scopeconditions episode with @dhdannychoi.
In light of the debate about the extent of inequality in the US, I thought it might be helpful to summarise how political scientists think about the demand for and supply of redistribution. The literature is vast -- so this 🧵is intended only a bare-bones introduction. /1
For some empirical background, see this thread by @MortenStostad (though not every graph is uncontested). In general, inequality has risen in most advanced industrialised democracies since roughly the 1980s -- though the extent is debated.
Should we ... /2
be surprised by this?
Yes, at least if we follow the logic set out by Meltzer and Richard (1981). The MR model makes two kind of assumptions: economic (drives demand for redistribution) and political (drives supply). Let's examine these. /3 jstor.org/stable/1830813
Ich möchte diesen Tweet von @kuhnmo – dem ich en gros zustimme – als Anlass nehmen, um einen kurzen Überblick über relevante Arbeiten aus der Ökonomie und Politikwissenschaft zu diesem Thema zu geben. Die Literatur zeigt, dass mehr Gesetze dann gut sein können, wenn sie ... /1
dabei helfen, die unvollständigen Verträge, die Gesetze darstellen, zu vervollständigen. Was damit gemeint ist, fasse ich auf dieser Folie (👇) zusammen.
Wenn durch weitere Gesetze bzw. Novellen bestehender Gesetze Doppeldeutigkeiten beseitigt werden, wird die durch unvolls. /2
Verträge entstehende Unsicherheit reduziert. @ellliottt et al zeigen dies empirisch in ihrem @JPolEcon Papier. Nebenbei: Die hier verwendete Identifikationsstrategie ist sehr clever. /3 elliottash.com/wp-content/upl…
Seems like a good time to re-read some polsci classics. 1. This @JPolEcon piece by Barry Weingast and William Marshall. journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/26…
2. Diermeier, Daniel, and @rbmyerson. 1999. ‘Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures’. American Economic Review 89(5): 1182–96. aeaweb.org/articles?id=10…
The climate policy sequencing literature has spent much of the past five years or so rediscovering the insights by Dewatripont and @gerardrolanducb. This doesn’t devalue the contributions of the sequencing crowd, but it’s still extraordinary. A true modern classic.
Here are some references for those interested in the climate-related sequencing literature.
@jonasmeckling, Thomas Sterner, and @GernotWagner . 2017. ‘Policy Sequencing toward Decarbonization’. Nature Energy 2(12): 918–22. nature.com/articles/s4156…
Pahle, Michael, Dallas Burtraw, @ChFlachsland, Nina Kelsey, Eric Biber, @jonasmeckling, Ottmar Edenhofer, and John Zysman. 2018. ‘Sequencing to Ratchet up Climate Policy Stringency’. @NatureClimate 8(10): 861–67. nature.com/articles/s4155…