1️⃣ First, we define the nameserver we're targeting. In this case, it's ns3.my-ndns[.]com. This is where Virtuospider might be lurking! 🕸️
2️⃣ Next, we fetch all domains associated with this nameserver using a simple curl command.
No fancy APIs or subscriptions—just pure OSS (Open Source Simplicity)! 🌐
3️⃣ Time to parse the data! We read the JSON response from coffee.txt and extract domain names using regular expressions. 📜🔍
4️⃣ We clean up the domain list by removing duplicates and any known domains (if you have a known.txt file). Clean data is happy data! 🧹😄
5️⃣ Let's process these domains! We use threading to speed things up because patience is a virtue we don't always have. 🚀
6️⃣ For each domain, we resolve its IP address using Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver.
This means we're only querying DNS records, not connecting to the domains themselves—keeping our investigation safe and stealthy! 🕵️♂️
By using 1.1.1.1, we're leveraging a fast and privacy-focused DNS service. We're simply asking, "What's the IP address for this domain?" Since DNS queries are public and don't interact with the domain's server, we're not making any direct connections that could expose us or alert the threat actors.
7️⃣ We handle possible errors gracefully. If a domain doesn't resolve or there's a DNS issue, we catch it and log the error without stopping the script. This ensures our automation keeps running smoothly! ⚙️
Error handling is crucial! If a domain doesn't exist or there's a timeout, we catch the exception and keep going. This way, one problematic domain won't derail the entire process. It's all about resilience! 💪
8️⃣ Without connecting to the domains, we perform an RDAP (Registration Data Access Protocol) lookup on the IP addresses. RDAP is like a modern version of WHOIS—it provides public info about who owns an IP address or domain. This helps us identify potential threats without risking direct contact. 🔎
RDAP allows us to retrieve registration details for IP addresses from public databases. We're still not connecting to the domains—just gathering publicly available info about who owns the IPs. It's like checking a phone book without making a call! 📖
9️⃣ We store the domain, IP, and AS Owner info. This gives us a neat summary of who's hosting what. 📄
🔟 Now, we generate an intelligence report in PDF format, focusing on specific AS Owners (e.g., 'DigitalOcean', 'Virtuo'). Time to catch those spiders! 🕷️📊
1️⃣1️⃣ The report includes the domain, IP, and AS Owner, making it easier to spot suspicious activity. Plus, PDFs are professional, right? 😉
1️⃣2️⃣ And that's it! You've automated your DNS hunt for potential Spider domains, making your cyber threat intelligence gathering faster. No manual checks, no expensive tools—just Python and some creativity! 🐍💡
Ready to dive in? Here's the full script for you to try out! 👉 pastebin.com/GVpQcxZw
Todays output .....
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Thread 1/🚨 Uncovering the Keys to the Kingdom: A Dive into Deep-State Espionage Entangled in a Ransomware Network for Cover! 🚨
Ever thought a simple SSH key could be the link to a sprawling espionage network? After months of research, I’ve traced exposed public SSH keys that reveal connections far deeper than initially believed.
Once suspected as the work of a ransomware affiliate, these keys hint at something much more sinister possible nation-state involvement.
💥March 2023: Talos published a bombshell report on #YoroTrooper, exposing an #espionage campaign targeting EU Governing Entities in CIS countries, embassies, and the EU healthcare sector.
💥Buried in the details was an IP 46.161.40.164 with an SSH key (fingerprint_sha256: f95812cbb46f0a664a8f2200592369b105d17dfe8255054963aac4e2df53df51) that set off alarms. 🕵️♂️
And here’s why, this key has reappeared on over 120 servers, forming clusters with alarming patterns of activity.
💥October 26, 2023: Another #Talos report on YoroTrooper exposed another IOC tied to that same key, linking two IPs (46.161.40.164, 46.161.27.151) to espionage activity.
My analysis shows even deeper connections here it’s where we start seeing links to ransomware: the Shadow Syndicate, a ransomware affiliate potentially linked to espionage.
July 2024: A #Mandiant report flags the same IP, 46.161.27.151, connected to the notorious #BlackBasta ransomware group. But as we dig deeper, it’s clear the server may be controlled by a much bigger player.
Could this SSH key be the thread tying espionage and ransomware together? Are these ransomware affiliates merely proxies for nation-states, muddying their tracks?
🕵️♂️ Buckle up for what’s next—this thriller is just getting started.
Thread 2/ Keys to the Kingdom: A Deepening Threat in the #Energy Sector 🔍
💥 In March 2023, Talos highlighted the Energy sector as a specific target in an espionage campaign. Then, in August 2023, #Kaspersky reported on suspicious activity against an electric utility in Southern Africa, revealing #Cobalt Strike #beacons and a new #SystemBC payload variant, dubbed #DroxiDat. According to Kaspersky, this attack occurred in March 2023 and was likely the initial stage of a #ransomware operation.
💥Yet, there’s more to this than meets the eye. The SSH key fingerprint_sha256: f95812cbb46f0a664a8f2200592369b105d17dfe8255054963aac4e2df53df51 resurfaces here, linked to IP 179.60.146.6:22.
💥This aligns almost too well with Talos’s original indicators, connecting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) across both campaigns.
💥Notably, the attackers used bespoke, energy-themed domains, indicating a level of precision beyond typical ransomware affiliate activity.
💥The alignment with Talos’s intelligence and the calculated nature of these tactics hint at something far more sophisticated. Could this be a nation-state operation, using ransomware as a convenient cloak for their espionage efforts?
Thread 3/ 🔍 Keys to the Kingdom: Is APT28 Using Play Ransomware as a Smokescreen? 🔍
💥By May 2024, #TrendMicro’s report, Cybercriminals and Nation-States Sharing Compromised Networks, brought to light a shared infrastructure between cybercriminals and nation-state actors.
💥But as I dig deeper, a disturbing pattern emerges: the ShadowSyndicate SSH key fingerprint_sha256: bd613b3be57f18c3bceb0aaf86a28ad8b6df7f9bccacf58044f1068d1787f8a5, linked to multiple IPs, potentially links with APT28 activity.
💥More intriguing, one of these IPs also overlaps with #Play_ransomware indicators, hinting at a potential smokescreen operation.
Key questions are now taking shape:
🔒While Trend Micro observed that nation-states and cybercriminals might be “sharing” infrastructure, could APT28 be doing much more than that?
🔒My research suggests they might be controlling these routers outright, using them as a stealth layer for their espionage efforts.
🔒Trend Micro pointed out that #PawnStorm (#APT28) had access to a criminal-run botnet of compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters. But with the SSH key and IP overlaps pointing to APT28, could they be running this botnet rather than merely renting it?
Following the January 2024 disruption of this botnet by the FBI, the botnet’s rapid reassembly with new C&C infrastructure suggests a sophisticated and centralised approach, one likely orchestrated by APT28. This overlap between ransomware and nation-state TTPs hints that APT28 may be masking their operations behind a facade of criminal activity.
Could this be a glimpse into APT28’s playbook, leveraging cybercriminal groups as a smokescreen while they pursue far-reaching espionage goals?
Thread 1 / If you're gonna read one #CTI thread today, make it this one!! – How one IP unraveled an Access Broker's Ransomware Network! 🚨🧵
🚨 Unmasking Adversary Infrastructure – New Findings on 193.29.13.167! #ThreatIntel #Rustdoor #GateDoor
📌 My previous tweet spotlighted IP 193.29.13.167, tied to an Access Broker linked to #Rustdoor, sparking a cascade of findings across domains like datasmetric[.]com and historic indicators from maconlineoffice[.]com. Here’s how that single thread pulled open the ransomware landscape….....
2/ 🔎 Research Shift: Switched to FOFA, and it’s been a game-changer! #Fofa identified Port 22 (SSH) open on the IP, leading to a deep dive into public key fingerprints 🔑
Each fingerprint connected to the next, unveiling a network of related threats!
3/ 🚨 Clop Infrastructure Links:
Pivoting from fingerprint_sha256:bd613b3be57f18c3bceb0aaf86a28ad8b6df7f9bccacf58044f1068d1787f8a5
💥revealed IP 88.214.27.72 with domains:
💥he1p-me[.]com
💥goto-pay[.]com
#Clop payment infrastructure as noted by @AlvieriD on June 2024!
Another #Cl0p IP: 45.227.253.147 with the same ssh key, strengthening a Ransomware affiliate (or access broker) involved with Clop's malicious activity!
#ScatteredSpider #TheCom #Phishkit #CTI Next Steps.....
🧵 Thread 2 / Each day, a list of new domains will appear in dns[.]coffee. Here's what we're looking for when trying to find the needle in the haystack🪡:
🔒 Domains Hosted on DigitalOcean - check in VirusTotal
🔒 Registered via NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO - data in VirusTotal
🔒 Look for Domains spoofing OKTA or SSO
🧵 Thread 3 /Don't forget you can always pivot on the SSL cert - with wildcard searches using another free tool crt[.]sh