By the time this launcher type matured in mid 1960s there was a significant degree of convergence in design - large silo tops, sliding silo doors, hot launch, in silo maintenance.
2/15
But even at this point there was already a partial divergence, with Soviets introducing canisters, in depot maintenance, hybrid launch and so on with the 2nd gen of missile complexes.
3/15
Because Soviets were later to mass deploy ICBMs (esp in individual silos) and embraced iterative approach with launcher replacement this meant that Soviets continued to evolve the launcher design while US, largely, was limited by path dependence, its existing MM launchers.
4/15
This lead to the Soviets diverging from the mid 1960s classic form.
Cold launch out of canister for example allowed the removal of hot gas exhaust ducts, reducing the silo opening and thus the silo door.
This made designing silo doors against higher pressures easier.
5/15
Canisters also made shock suspension easier, by allowing the canister to act as a secure platform, with key systems and electronics moved onto canister.
This move in turn allowed reduction of the shaft top building, leading to a more uniform pressure vessel-like design.
6/15
With such design allowing for easier hardening against both over pressure and ground shock, particularly if a silo was constructed with a composite liner, including energy absorbent layer, not just the normal reinforced concrete.
Same can be done with refits.
7/15
All those design choices are not unknown to the US engineers either, when looking into the MX basing modes super hard silos were considered, with many of the same features - small silo door, pressure vessel-like silo without larger silo top building, etc.
8/15
Ofcourse there are also trade offs - such as the need to develop and maintain robust at depot repair and maintenance system, as maintenance in silo is difficult to do, due to the problems with human crew access (lack of space, canister being in the way, etc).
9/15
And it seems that those CONOPS trade offs are the primary reason why the US maintains it's path dependence on the Sentinel.
Those US MX basing mode studies could however in part explain why US over estimated the Soviet hardening efforts.
10/15
Chinese seem to be following in the Soviet/Russian footsteps, with their small swing out silo doors (two distinct types, one "R-36M-like", the other "UR-100N-like") designed to clear debris, likely cold canister launched ICBMs.
11/15
But the launcher itself is not the only mission critical element of a combat launch position (or LF in US terms).
12/15
There is also the NC3, with cable network (nowadays fiber optics for Russia and, soon, US), back up line of sight radio links (to satcom/airborne/ballistic relays), wide band MW/LW local back ups.
13/15
And, of-course, auxiliary equipment such as back up power generation, cooling for the in silo and co-located equipment, etc.
14/15
Security measures are also important, both against intruders/saboteurs (ie perimeter fencing, alarms, manned and remotely controlled turrets, etc) and against enemy weapons (obscurant launchers to disrupt terminal seekers, APSs to intercept munitions etc)
15/15
p.s. many of those features would also apply to other launchers, ie TELs in garrizons.
Below is an exercise of moving a missile army into full combat readiness and deploying CMS in response to a massed PGM/air attack.
(source for the layout of the silo position - warbolts t.me/warbolts/872)
One would have hoped for a literature review here, with specifics on the Russian pit (and warhead in general) manufacturing industries, tritium generation.
There are papers written on this topic, but maybe the language barrier is an issue.
2/9
If we apply the same criteria that Fabian has used ie for Sarmat to Sentinel then Sentinel would not be a novel design either.
Topol-M does not re-use Topol components (ie stages), moreover both Topol-M and YaRS are 5th generation missile complexes and not 4th generation.
The claim they make is that there is extensive construction for a new command post area in the western Beijing, including hardened protective structures to protect leadership, C2 in case of an attack.
1/7
While I may be missing something (I am no IMINT expert) and while FT may have other more conclusive imagery it seems to me that there are only shallow excavated areas present.
2/7
While such excavations can be used (and often are used) for hardened protective structures, including C2 centers, in my opinion those excavations are more likely to be related to the nature of terrain in the area and normal (basement, foundations) uses.
Russian EWS has several major components, I would classify 5 of them:
- BM EW radar network
- Space based BM EW and Comms component
- radar network for CM/ABT EW and BMD support
- C3
A short thread:
1/9
The primary BM EW radar network is based on Voronezh-M/VP, Voronezh-DM series radar and a rented Volga radar in Belarus.
It provides mostly overlapping coverage in VHF and UHF bands, with different operational sectors. 2/9
The space based system (EKS) is focused on BM EW and also offers a secure communications channel for the Russian deterrent, though the nature of that channel users is not entirely clear at the moment.
Currently there are 2 HEO orbits filled, with focus on NA and EA/Pacific. 3/9
Reconstructing the Oreshnik IRBM from available data is hard.
One of the challenges is that if it uses Rubezh TEL, then it will be limited in terms of mass and length by that chassis, probably insufficient to house lower YaRS stages.
1/3
Available imagery of the PBV debris appears to indicate that it has a small (1-1,5m) diameter, with the adjacent stage also likely sharing it.
This makes the re-use of Bulava or YaRS PBV unlikely.
2/3
Taken together it would appear that Oreshnik is likely to either use proprietary stages (like Rubezh) or adapted upper stages of YaRS, with a proprietary PBV.
3/3
While it likely is mostly related to more immediate needs of the ongoing armed conflict with Ukraine, with the heightened demand of SAM rounds, Iskander-M and Kinzhal BMs, MLR rounds and other such munitions, there may be other drivers.
2/5
This would be particularly true for say Votkinsk, with a known retooling program to support serial YaRS-M production, with it's novel third and second stages.
Previous thread on silos seemed to be popular, I hope this one provides a palette cleanser from the current events.
1/18
Early ICBM launchers were soft affairs, both due to the novelty of the weapons and difficulty of hitting targets deep in the enemy rear promptly.
They would also be liquid fueled, with non stored propellants, hot launched.
2/18
Quite soon however they were accepted as non survivable, with most nuclear powers deciding to invest into both mobility and hardening (typically silo launchers) to make them survivable, capable of responding even after a massed enemy attack.