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Oct 16 18 tweets 7 min read Read on X
A thread on missile silo design.

I hope you find it of interest.

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By the time this launcher type matured in mid 1960s there was a significant degree of convergence in design - large silo tops, sliding silo doors, hot launch, in silo maintenance.

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But even at this point there was already a partial divergence, with Soviets introducing canisters, in depot maintenance, hybrid launch and so on with the 2nd gen of missile complexes.

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Because Soviets were later to mass deploy ICBMs (esp in individual silos) and embraced iterative approach with launcher replacement this meant that Soviets continued to evolve the launcher design while US, largely, was limited by path dependence, its existing MM launchers.

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This lead to the Soviets diverging from the mid 1960s classic form.

Cold launch out of canister for example allowed the removal of hot gas exhaust ducts, reducing the silo opening and thus the silo door.
This made designing silo doors against higher pressures easier.

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Canisters also made shock suspension easier, by allowing the canister to act as a secure platform, with key systems and electronics moved onto canister.

This move in turn allowed reduction of the shaft top building, leading to a more uniform pressure vessel-like design.

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With such design allowing for easier hardening against both over pressure and ground shock, particularly if a silo was constructed with a composite liner, including energy absorbent layer, not just the normal reinforced concrete.

Same can be done with refits.

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All those design choices are not unknown to the US engineers either, when looking into the MX basing modes super hard silos were considered, with many of the same features - small silo door, pressure vessel-like silo without larger silo top building, etc.

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Ofcourse there are also trade offs - such as the need to develop and maintain robust at depot repair and maintenance system, as maintenance in silo is difficult to do, due to the problems with human crew access (lack of space, canister being in the way, etc).

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And it seems that those CONOPS trade offs are the primary reason why the US maintains it's path dependence on the Sentinel.

Those US MX basing mode studies could however in part explain why US over estimated the Soviet hardening efforts.

10/15
Chinese seem to be following in the Soviet/Russian footsteps, with their small swing out silo doors (two distinct types, one "R-36M-like", the other "UR-100N-like") designed to clear debris, likely cold canister launched ICBMs.

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But the launcher itself is not the only mission critical element of a combat launch position (or LF in US terms).

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There is also the NC3, with cable network (nowadays fiber optics for Russia and, soon, US), back up line of sight radio links (to satcom/airborne/ballistic relays), wide band MW/LW local back ups.

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And, of-course, auxiliary equipment such as back up power generation, cooling for the in silo and co-located equipment, etc.

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Security measures are also important, both against intruders/saboteurs (ie perimeter fencing, alarms, manned and remotely controlled turrets, etc) and against enemy weapons (obscurant launchers to disrupt terminal seekers, APSs to intercept munitions etc)

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p.s. many of those features would also apply to other launchers, ie TELs in garrizons.

Below is an exercise of moving a missile army into full combat readiness and deploying CMS in response to a massed PGM/air attack. Image
(source for the layout of the silo position - warbolts t.me/warbolts/872)

They also have a KMZ:

(t.me/warbolts/873)
(Source: for the Avangard position, including manned guard post, remote security gun turret, CMS launchers etc)t.me/warbolts/866

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More from @krakek1

Oct 17
A thread on mobile ICBM launchers.

Previous thread on silos seemed to be popular, I hope this one provides a palette cleanser from the current events.

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Early ICBM launchers were soft affairs, both due to the novelty of the weapons and difficulty of hitting targets deep in the enemy rear promptly.

They would also be liquid fueled, with non stored propellants, hot launched.

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Quite soon however they were accepted as non survivable, with most nuclear powers deciding to invest into both mobility and hardening (typically silo launchers) to make them survivable, capable of responding even after a massed enemy attack.

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Read 18 tweets
Oct 1
A short high level overview of the initial SMFs NC3 system - Signal

A thread.

Please feel free to ask questions in comments below.

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First of all some background

SMFs became an independent service in 1959 and quickly realized that it was hard to timely and properly C&C it's geographically dispersed forces, particularly with the massed deployment of 2nd gen missile complexes in stand alone silos.

2/17
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The central combat control means that were in use at this point were viewed as inadequate, as not sufficiently quick and reliable, particularly under the LoW

Yarunuch, a SMFs and GS veteran describes this notion in his book, but you can see the same in other accounts.

3/17
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Read 19 tweets
Jul 23
The mobile ICBM TELs have become quite iconic for the Russian SMFs, but this was not always the case.

Temp-2S had a limited success and deployment, with 4th gen Topol being the first system to enter wide spread service.

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However Topol development had issues and delays, leading to staggered deployment:
- 1985 first unit with fixed CP and interim launcher
- 1987 first unit with an interim mobile CP
- 1988 first unit with full structure and acceptance into service

2/7
While the use of the interim launcher (compare and contrast below) is somewhat known, the CP woes are less so.

3/7
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Read 7 tweets
Jul 18
Regarding NC3 and infrastructure.

Infrastructure is hard to build timely.

And while Russia did carry out significant nuclear modernisation in 2010s it ran into many issues.

While some of those were technological, ie developing and testing Bulava SLBM, there were others.

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Let’s focus on the SMFs, the premier Russian leg of the triad.

What were their main programs in the past 2 decades?

2/10
There are some more obvious ones - such as development and deployment of missile complexes (Topol-M, YaRS series, Avangard, Sarmat), but those weapon systems have their related infrastructure and supporting systems.

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Read 10 tweets
Jul 11
Regarding the recent news about the deployment of US INF-range weapons in Germany and other events, such as the bipartisan recommendations from a while back.

This is not a reflection of any Russian policy, but rather a thought I had.

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At the moment the trend appears to be to deploy long range PGMs, capable of holding at risk targets deep into Russia, leadership, military (including SNFs), value (critical infrastructure).

As such they are, de-facto, strategic offensive arms (SOAs)

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Those PGMs come in a wide variety of forms, from stealth ALCMs (ie JASSM-ER) to ground based hypersonics.

I won’t discuss the impacts of the later on the crisis stability, as many of my readers would be familiar with my opinions there.

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Read 9 tweets
May 24
I disagree.

Note the site’s location and sensor arcs.

While it does cover some Ukrainian launch areas it does so at range and the edge of the scan sector, with sidewise view.
So it is unlikely to provide much warning of ATACMS launch, even if launch area is covered.
Nor is there a C3 link presently between the EWS and the actual shooters - ie S-400 units.

The other issue is that Voronezh-DM is not focussed on tracking/discrimination mission, there are other variants for that, ie Voronezh-SM at Vorkuta. Image
Now there are complimentary sensors within the EWS that have theatre tasking (Container for early detection, 80P6 for tracking and discrimination) and which were probably integrated to some extent to the S-500 shooters in Moscow region, but they have their own issues.


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Read 8 tweets

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