When people talk about 'English culture', they often think of cricket, tea, or fish & chips 🏴
But culture isn't about what people eat and wear. It's about norms, habits, and systems of social organisation.
A 🧵 on the systems and norms which make England genuinely unique
National cultures aren't just defined by material culture - for example, what people eat and wear.
Those factors are mutable, and liable to change over time.
Nations are best identified by the habits, assumptions, and methods of social organisation.
In this sense, the English are genuinely unique - even when compared to other European countries.
Our methods of social organisation, approaches to family, attitudes to law, and philosophical norms are distinctive, with deep historical roots.
So what makes the English unique?
Let's start with family.
For centuries, the English have preferred nuclear families, with a low-level of obligation to extended family.
Emmanuel Todd's model of family systems identifies the English as nearly unique in their adherence to the 'absolute nuclear' family structure.
What does this mean?
Two parents, with their children, living on their own land, with few obligations to their extended kin.
Historians Alan Macfarlane and Peter Laslett argue that this has been the primary mode of family arrangement in England since at least the 13th century.
Laslett's argument is based on his analysis of records that stretch back to the medieval period.
In studying a 17th century Rector's Book from the Nottinghamshire village of Clayworth. Over a 12-year period, Laslett found little evidence of co-habiting extended families.
Even today, when high prices prevent many young people from getting onto the housing ladder, England has a lower-than-average level of intergenerational living.
Compared to our European counterparts, the English are far more likely to leave the family home as young adults.
England is also one of the strongest example of the Western European marriage pattern, a social system marked by comparatively late marriage, especially for women, and a generally small age difference between spouses.
Marriage at a very young age is not the norm in England.
From 1619 to 1660, 1,000 marriage certificates issued by the Archdiocese of Canterbury show that only 34 brides were younger than 19 years old.
The average age of marriage for women was 24, while it was 28 for men. The youngest brides were all aristocratic.
And unlike elsewhere in Europe, cousin marriage was never the norm.
In fact, it was banned in England until 1540 - and was only legalised in order to enable a royal cousin marriage.
George Darwin estimated that just 3.5% of middle class marriages were cousin marriages in 1875.
And finally, non-nobles in England have long since had a greater degree of choice over who they marry than their European counterparts.
For more on this in particular, I recommend Alan MacFarlane's "The Origins of English Individualism", which explores this trend in detail.
These relatively shallow kinship networks encouraged another long-standing feature of English social life - economic mobility.
For centuries, people in England have moved to where the jobs are. They have been far less rooted to the land than their European counterparts.
Back to Laslett's Clayworth analysis once again - Laslett found that 61 per cent of Clayworth's residents moved away from the village, from 1676 to 1688.
London, meanwhile grew from 50,000 people at the end of the 15th century to around 200,000 by 1603.
The vast majority of this migration was internal - almost all of these new residents were from other parts of the British Isles, particularly England.
By and large, they moved to London in search of improved prospects - a mobility enabled by loose kinship structures.
According to sociologist Brigitte Berger:
"The young nuclear family had to be flexible and mobile as it searched for opportunity and property. Forced to rely on their own ingenuity, its members also needed to plan for the future and develop bourgeois habits of work and saving."
But despite this remarkable internal flexibility, England saw relatively small numbers of migrants from outside of the British Isles.
Insulated from Europe by the English Channel, population movements were limited post-1066, save for some 50,000 Huguenots in the 16th century.
Given that the maturity of a nuclear family was often demonstrated through property ownership, the English have generally provided strong protections for property owners.
As far back as the Anglo-Saxons, the English have distinguished between common land and private land.
The importance of land to the Anglo-Saxons led to principles such as the transfer of land by enrolment - in other words, if land changed hands, that transfer had to be formally recorded.
And the roots of today's English property law developed during the early Norman period.
The individuated responsibility of nuclear families, and the ownership of property, birthed another of England's social norms - a relatively high level of individual responsibility and freedom.
Slavery was forbidden in England from 1066, and slave trading banned in 1102.
There has been no legally sanctioned torture in England since 1640 - Austria banned torture in 1776; France would ban torture in 1798.
Many of the liberties that took root in Europe during the Enlightenment were already the norm in England before 1700.
However, liberty did not mean anarchy.
The English state has long been more centralised than its European counterparts. Since, at the latest, the time of Henry II (1154-1189), a uniformly applied system of royal justice has been the norm.
Few laws, applied consistently.
And finally, the English have had a strong commercial instinct for centuries.
The English wool trade was the backbone of the English economy between 1250 and 1350, centuries before the commercial boom of the 16th and 17th centuries. Textile guilds emerged by the 12th century.
Unsurprisingly then, it was England - alongside the Netherlands - which embraced trade and commerce most enthusiastically in the 17th and 18th centuries.
Indeed, England has not been self-sufficient in food production since the 1750s.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of England's distinctive norms.
However, these examples demonstrate that England has a complex and unique system of social arrangement, shaped by its history, geography, and culture.
This system is worth understanding - and celebrating.
A failure to understand these norms has been the cause of many of the problems that we have faced over the last 50 years.
In many respects - homeownership, law & order, migration -, we have failed to make the system work on its own terms.
Time to embrace our system as it is! 🏴
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The Home Office has barred Renaud Camus, a controversial French philosopher, from entering the UK.
They claim that his presence is "not conducive to the public good".
But is that a consistent standard? Let's look at some of the people that they've allowed to come to the UK:
Syed Muzaffar Shah Qadri, who is banned from preaching in Pakistan, was allowed to travel to the UK in 2016.
Qadri has celebrated the murder of politicians in Pakistan, arguing that it is legitimate to kill people who oppose Pakistan's oppressive blasphemy laws.
Qadri was a key influence on Tanveer Ahmed, a Bradford taxi driver who was convicted of the murder of another Muslim man, who he deemed insufficiently pious.
During his visit, Qadri delivered sermons at several UK mosques, including venues in Leicester, Woking, and Bolton.
Wales has quietly become a hotbed of historical revisionism, anti-white discrimination, and DEI 🏴
For decades, the Labour-led Welsh Government has pushed dangerous ideas about race, culture, and history onto an unwilling population.
A 🧵 on the disaster unfolding in Wales
But first, some context.
Since 1999, Wales has had its own parliament - the Senedd - with devolved responsibility for a number of issues.
Over time, the Senedd has received more powers from Westminster, allowing them to make decisions on things like healthcare and education.
But despite this transfer of powers, the UK press is relatively disinterested in Welsh affairs.
This has allowed successive Welsh Governments to pursue radical agendas, without the kind of scrutiny which similar policies might face if they emanated from Westminster.
Riverway Law has launched a challenge against the UK's ban on Hamas.
They argue that the Islamic terror group should be legalised in the UK. This shouldn't come as a surprise, given some of the other cases that they've supported.
A 🧵 on some of Riverway Law's recent work
In January 2023, Riverway challenged the Home Office's decision to strip British citizenship from a British Pakistani man who travelled to Syria, in order to join Al-Qaeda.
They argued that this was 'arbitrary' and 'disproportionate'. Their challenge were unsuccessful.
In September 2021, Riverway challenged the Home Office's decision to bar an Afghan man from entering the UK on national security grounds - after he had spent months with the Taliban.
They argued that the man would be at risk if he stayed in Afghanistan. They were successful.
Last July, four independent MPs were elected in heavily-Muslim seats.
They capitalised on Muslim frustration with the Labour Party's position on Gaza. Their campaigns focused primarily on winning Muslim votes.
But what have they been up to since the General Election? A short 🧵
Adnan Hussain was elected in Blackburn - a seat held by the Labour Party since 1945.
The constituency is 47% Muslim.
Hussain won with a narrow majority of 132 seats - the Muslim vote was split between Hussain and a candidate representing George Galloway's Workers Party GB.
Hussain has spoken twenty-five times in Parliament since he was elected.
Eleven of his interventions have focused on Israel or Gaza.
He has campaigned for immediate recognition of a Palestinian state, and the immediate cessation of all arms sales to Israel.
52% of British adults are now reliant on the state for their livelihood - and YOU could be paying for it.
That's according to @ASI's inaugural State Reliance Index, which tracks the number of Britons who rely, directly or indirectly, on the state.
A 🧵 on our findings
So what does the State Reliance Index consider?
We looked at adults (1) receiving benefits or state pension, (2) employed by the public sector, (3) in higher education, or (4) who work in the private sector, but in fields which only exist because of public sector regulation.
This was a conservative estimate.
We didn't even look at every area of the private sector which receives state subsidy - and nor did we include the charitable sector, which relies heavily on state support.
In other words, the true figure could be even more than 52%.