Ukraine is likely approaching the final stages of the active phase of the war. I suggest taking a look at my assessment, which draws on General Budanov’s overlooked speech at the Yalta Conference, along with insights from other reports and assessments
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2/ Any war of attrition tests endurance, economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war continues, these issues intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point. Production and the capacity to replace losses are tangible factors that can be projected
3/ One notable point from Budanov’s speech was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024.
Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tank models from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is no longer in production.
4/ OSINT analyst @Highmarsed, who tracks open-air storage, provides a more detailed assessment. He reported that by 6 July 2024, Russia’s stock of T-55s had dropped by 31%, T-62s by 37%, and T-80Bs by 79%, but only 9% of T-72 removed from the storage
5/ OSINT analyst @naalsio26 estimates that by 4 October 2024, Russian forces had lost over 539 tanks and 1,830 vehicles in total in the Pokrovsk direction (formerly the Avdiivka direction) since 2023. Numbers that far surpass Russia’s current tank production capacity.
6/ Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost over 3,000 tanks - more than its entire prewar active-duty tank force - along with approximately ~30% of its most advanced self-propelled artillery and rocket launcher systems per data on Oryx and Warspotting
7/ A report from senior analyst @MassDara, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, further details that Russia is expected to exhaust its stockpile of multiple Soviet-era military equipment by 2026.
8/ There are also clear challenges in replacing Russia’s air force losses. Some older jet models are no longer in mass production, and the new jet production is less impressive. For example, Budanov noted that Russia plans to produce only 14 Su-57 fighters in 2024.
9/ That being said, it’s not all bad news for Russia: its Iskander missile production, particularly the Iskander-M, has ramped up significantly. While Budanov didn’t specify exact numbers, this aligns with reports from the ground about Russia’s frequent use of these missiles.
10/ According to the same Carnegie Endowment report, Russia’s military equipment production, excluding drones, had plateaued by early 2024. Further expansion seems unlikely without building new factories or taking significant risks
11/ Kyrylo Budanov stated that North Korea is Russia’s largest military partner, mainly due to its supply of artillery shells. He noted that after a North Korean shipment arrives, combat intensifies within 8-9 days, with the effect lasting up to two weeks
12/ As North Korea has been supplying Russia from its own stockpiles, it’s uncertain whether Pyongyang can significantly increase production to meet Russia’s demands. It’s also unclear to what extent North Korea is willing to deplete its own artillery reserves
13/ General Budanov emphasized the significance of Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes deep inside Russia, including in Moscow. These strikes have shaken public confidence, undermining the belief that Russia's leadership guarantees security and maintains military strength.
14/ As the war progresses, more Russians from various social backgrounds are questioning why the war is reaching their homes and whether their leadership can truly preserve Russia’s pre-war status as a formidable military power capable of protecting its citizens.
15/ The introduction of domestically developed sea drones has since become Ukraine’s surprise weapon, rapidly evolving into a core naval weapon, and despite having a largely non-functional fleet, Ukraine has managed to destroy a quarter of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
16/ More importantly, these drones have restricted Russia’s navy from operating freely. Ukrainian grain ships can now navigate more safely. This capability allows Ukraine to safeguard its maritime interests while deterring Russian actions in the region.
17/ Investing in Ukraine’s domestic drone production and pursuing joint projects with Western countries could be a path forward. It may reduce the political risks of seeking permission to strike with Western missiles - an objective Ukraine has already achieved independently
18/ As General Budanov notes, Russian internal calculations suggest that if Russia doesn’t exit the war by the anticipated time frame, it will be unable to claim “superpower” status in the foreseeable future - at least 30 years. The most it can hope for is regional leadership
19/ In September of 2024, Russia raised its key interest rate to 19%, with its inflation rates reaching over 7%.
An analyst Pierre-Marie Meunier, analyzing 2023 data from Russia’s Central Bank, highlights a sharp decline in Russian exports.
20/ These mounting challenges create potential grounds for future negotiations, which President Zelensky hopes to leverage in November 2024. However, in my opinion, General Budanov's suggested timeline may be more realistic, particularly regarding the situation in Kursk.
21/ If negotiations occur, Russia will not be entering from a position of strength if it is forced to negotiate over its own territory. Thus, Russia will likely try to enter talks from a better position, which may not happen until the end of their own Kursk offensive operation.
22/ While logical, this scenario carries serious risks for the Kremlin: failure to retake Kursk could further damage Putin’s image as a leader who not only failed to defend Russian territory but was also forced to negotiate over it
23/ However, the low number of vehicles and economic difficulties might not be enough to compel Putin to end the war. He can instead consolidate gains. By heavily mining the frontlines and maintaining missile strikes, he could keep Ukraine in a state of limbo
24/ And if the war does not come to an end, its intensity will likely decrease. This means Ukraine needs a long-term plan of action, whether that involves preparing for a potential second invasion or sustaining a low-intensity war.
After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
An alleged drone strike has targeted the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, according to early reports. The depot, closely monitored by Frontelligence Insight for its role in artillery ammo logistics, gained international attention in 2023 following the arrival of North Korean ammo.
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2/ Krasnodar Governor Veniamin Kondratyev reported that two UAVs targeting Tikhoretsk were "suppressed", with debris causing a fire and detonation of flammable materials. Videos on social media suggest a large denotation
Screenshot from the video posted by @war_monitor_ua
3/ The Tikhoretsk ammo depot was expanded in 2023 to store North Korean munitions. Most ammo arrived by train in containers, unloaded and stored in revetments - essentially pits in the ground under open sky. Civilian trucks then transported the munitions to frontlines
As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red
Ukrainian MFA stated that Belarusian armed forces are concentrating a significant number of personnel, weapons, and equipment near Ukraine's northern border under the guise of exercises
🧵It's still early to draw any definitive conclusions, but a few points should be considered:
2/ In February 2024, Frontelligence Insight and Rochan Consulting released an analysis of the Belarusian military's readiness, concluding that its combat units are typically manned at only 30-40% capacity, relying heavily on mobilization, with the rest filled during mobilization
3/ This suggests that if Belarus was seriously preparing for a major invasion, significant mobilization efforts would be seen. For fairness, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of an attack; it's more about the potential scale of attack if ever happens
Joe Lonsdale, founder of 8VC and employer of the son of sanctioned Russian oligarch Vadim Moshkovich, has brushed off allegations of Moshkovich's involvement in drone production. For clarity, let's focus on the facts, documents, and records.
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2/ First, let’s examine the rule issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Industry and Security. It clearly states that Assistagro and Geomiragro are contributing to the development of military-grade drones in Russia.
3/ Vadim Moshkovich is the founder of several companies, including AssistAgro. His role as both founder and investor in this company can be confirmed through various sources, including public company databases, official records, and media reports. Sources in the next tweet
Geospatial analysis from Frontelligence Insight reveals that Russian forces continue to build a defensive line in the Kursk region, located south and southwest of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant in Kurchatov
Before continuing, please like and share to aid with visibility
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2/ The initial stages of constructing a defensive line near the settlement of Dolgii, roughly 10 kilometers south of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, were visible in satellite imagery on August 14. By August 18, the trenches were in the process of being reinforced.
3/ After completing the initial trench digging within the first few days, Russian forces secured the necessary equipment and materials to reinforce the trenches with logs and wood. Satellite imagery shows multiple excavators in the area.