On Oct. 17, Xi visited PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) brigade (六十一基地611旅), in Chizhou, Anhui province. It was an important, symbolic meeting for Xi and the PLA, at a time when the PLARF is in the midst of one of the largest corruption purges in recent history. B-611 is home to nuclear-armed DF-26 IRBMs, which recently replaced the DF-21s, and of which Xi took several photos behind.
A long 🧵 on the significance of the visit, with full video of the visit and full text translation at the end.
First, Xi’s overall message to the PLARF was to “thoroughly implement the new era of strengthening the army, implement the new era of military strategic guidelines, grasp the characteristics and laws of strategic missile force construction and combat use, adhere to political guidance, strengthen mission responsibility, work hard and promote high-quality development of the force construction, enhance strategic deterrence and actual combat capabilities, and resolutely complete the tasks entrusted by the Party and the people.”
Not a lot new here. In essence, adhere to Xi’s guidance of new military strategic guidelines, of which “enhancing strategic deterrence” and “real combat effectiveness” (提升战略威慑和实战能力) has become Xi’s hallmark.
So why was this visit so important? One indicator is who was in attendance:
-GEN Zhang Youxia (Vice Chair of the CMC);
-GEN Wang Houbin (王厚斌), commander of the PLARF;
-GEN Xu Xisheng (徐西盛), political commissar of the PLARF;
-LTGEN Fang Yongxiang (方永祥), Political Commissar of its Southern Theater Command Ground Force;
-Li Jiliang (李继良), possibly senior technician of China Aviation Industry Corporation;
-MGEN Zhao Quanhong (赵全红), likely Political Commissar of 61 of Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) of which B-611 is a part; and
-Chen Fujiang (陈付刚), Director of the Political Work Department, likely of B-611.
These are the top leaders of the PLA and PLARF, and their presence suggests this was major visit for Xi and the PLARF. All the top brass were there.
Second reason is what is going on in the PLARF. When I say "purge," I mean most of the top leaders of PLARF have been removed or under investigation for corruption in the last year. That is MASSIVE for one service.
They are: GEN Wei Fenghe (previous commander of the PLARF and former Minister of National Defense); GEN Zhou Yaning and GEN Li Yuchao (two former PLARF commanders); MGEN Lu Hong (former Director of the equipment development department, PLARF); LTGEN Zhang Zhenzhong (former PLARF Deputy Commander); and LTGEN Li Chuanguang (former PLARF deputy commander).
So the visit comes at a time of significant turmoil and distrust between Xi and the PLARF. In that context, Xi’s visit was likely meant to boost morale but also to send a strong message that corruption will not be tolerated.
Third, Xi’s central message to the B-611 was clear and forceful. About half of his work report speech focused on “good work style” and adhering to the "absolute authority of the Party."
Here is the relevant content:
“He emphasized the need to promote the political work of the Central Military Commission. We must uphold the Party's absolute leadership over the army, deepen the Party's innovative theories, and carry out ideological and political work down to the launch pad to ensure that the troops resolutely obey the command of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at all times and under all circumstances. We must strictly implement democratic centralism and strictly observe political life within the Party. We must improve the leadership, organization, and execution capabilities of the brigade Party committees. We must strengthen the construction of grassroots Party organizations, enhance the ability to build and lead officers and soldiers to perform tasks according to the guidelines, and lay a solid foundation for the construction and combat effectiveness of the troops. We must focus on the root of ideological problems, strengthen discussion and analysis, and severely investigate and deal with corruption and unhealthy practices around officers and soldiers and Party committees and organs at all levels.”
Finally, some of Xi’s rhetoric on strategic deterrence were notable. Namely, the need to “strengthen the awareness of crisis, awareness of war, and comprehensively strengthen the training and preparation for war, make the combat capabilities of the troops solid and powerful, safeguard the country's strategic security and core interests” (强化忧患意识危机意识打仗意识全面加强练兵备战把部队作战能力搞扎实有力维护国家战略安全和核心利益).
Xi’s call for “preparation for war” is not new (and should not be misread as making active preparations for war, but rather, maintaining “readiness”). But the linking of “awareness of crisis and war” with “safeguarding the country's strategic security and core interests” was noteworthy.
Here is the full text (very rough) translation of the CCTV report on Xi’s visit to Brigade 611, with full video:
“Xi emphasized the need to thoroughly implement the new era of strengthening the army, implement the new era of military strategic guidelines, grasp the characteristics and laws of strategic missile force construction and combat use, adhere to political guidance, strengthen mission responsibility, work hard and promote high-quality development of the force construction, enhance strategic deterrence and actual combat capabilities, and resolutely complete the tasks entrusted by the Party and the people. At about 11 a.m., Xi Jinping arrived at a certain brigade of the Rocket Force and first visited the brigade's military history corridor. The brigade is a strategic missile force with a glorious history of more than 50 years. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the brigade has firmly raised the flag and forged the soul under the guidance of Xi Jinping's thinking on strengthening the army, and has carried out actual combat training and excellently completed a series of major exercises. In front of the exhibition board of the development process of the reaction force and the comprehensive construction in the new era, Xi Jinping learned in detail about the officers and soldiers' learning of the party's innovative theories, intensifying training and preparing for war, and carrying forward the fine traditions. A certain type of missile was neatly arranged on the training ground. This is the brigade's newly-replaced main combat weapon equipment. Xi Jinping came here to listen to the introduction of the technical and tactical performance of weapons and equipment, and to check the operation and training of officers and soldiers. Seeing that the officers and soldiers were skilled in operation, well-trained and high-spirited, Xi Jinping was very happy. Xi Jinping took a group photo with the officers and soldiers. He encouraged everyone to train hard, train scientifically, train safely, master and use the weapons in their hands, and live up to the trust of the party and the people. Afterwards, Xi Jinping listened to the brigade's work report and delivered an important speech. He emphasized the need to promote the political work of the Central Military Commission. The spirit of the work conference has been implemented and achieved outstanding results in the troops. The Party committees and leading cadres at this level have closely connected with the actual situation of the troops, continuously deepened political training, and solidly grasped all aspects of political army building. We must uphold the Party's absolute leadership over the army, deepen the Party's innovative theories, and carry out ideological and political work down to the launch pad to ensure that the troops resolutely obey the command of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at all times and under all circumstances. We must strictly implement democratic centralism and strictly observe political life within the Party. We must improve the leadership, organization, and execution capabilities of the brigade Party committees. We must strengthen the construction of grassroots Party organizations, enhance the ability to build and lead officers and soldiers to perform tasks according to the guidelines, and lay a solid foundation for the construction and combat effectiveness of the troops. We must focus on the root of ideological problems, strengthen discussion and analysis, and severely investigate and deal with corruption and unhealthy practices around officers and soldiers and Party committees and organs at all levels. We must improve work guidance, coordinate well, and continuously solve five problems to reduce the burden on the grassroots. We must be enthusiastic and solve the problems of officers and soldiers, and inspire the motivation and vitality of work and entrepreneurship. Xi Jinping emphasized that we must strengthen the awareness of crisis, awareness of war, and comprehensively strengthen the training and preparation for war, make the combat capabilities of the troops solid and powerful, safeguard the country's strategic security and core interests, adapt to the changes in the form and methods of modern warfare, keep close to the combat missions, combat opponents, and combat environment, strengthen the training of new equipment, new skills, and new tactics in a targeted manner, strengthen typical actions, specialize and refine, strengthen supporting construction, form a system, and form actual combat capabilities. We must be based on reality and take positive actions to explore and innovate the use of strategic forces and organizational models to give full play to the strategic functions of the weapons in our hands. Zhang Youxia and others participated in the event.
A 🧵 on this scoop from @PeterMartin_PCM and Jennifer Jacobs of @Bloomberg, which is a bombshell and changes my previous assessments of how much corruption in the PLA is affecting readiness. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
U.S. intel sources suggest corruption is so bad that Xi is less likely to contemplate major military action in the coming years than would otherwise have been the case.
Let that sink in....
Then there these two anecdotes from the IC:
- missiles filled with water instead of fuel
- vast fields of missile silos in western China with lids that don’t function in a way that would allow the missiles to launch effectively
🧵 on PLA personnel removals announced at 7th session of the 14th NPC (thanks to @NPC_Observer for flagging).
The NPC, in one fell swoop, quietly removed several senior leaders of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and CMC Equipment Development Department (EDD). Here they are, with my take on implications for the PLA.
1) Zhang Zhenzhong (张振中) deputy chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department and previous deputy commander of the PLARF.
2) Zhang Yulin (张育林) deputy minister of the EDD and member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the 14th National People's Congress.
3) Rao Wenmin (饶文敏), representative from the EDD to the 14th NPC
4) LtGen Ju Xinchun (鞠新春) naval commander of the Southern Theater Command; previous deputy minister of the EDD of the Central Military Commission, previous deputy commander-in-chief of China's manned space program, and deputy commander-in-chief of the space station phase mission general headquarters; previous director of the EDD of the South China Sea Fleet, and previous deputy commander of the South China Sea Fleet.
My first @AsiaPolicy article examines the new CMC leadership and what it tells us about Xi’s military and security strategy. A short 🧵on the main findings. asiasociety.org/policy-institu…
First, while PLA leadership dynamics is arcane and difficult to get information on, I was able to dig in a little into the biographies of the six new CMC members. What I found is not that surprising to China watchers, but bears emphasizing. /1
Most importantly, loyalty, political reliability, family ties & combat experience matter. Zhang Youxia’s father, Zhang Zongxun, was a founding member of the Red Army & served with Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun in the 1940s, making him one of Xi’s most trusted officers in the PLA. /2
A short 🧵 on how Taiwan was framed in Xi's 20th Party Congress Work Report (PCWR).
First, 100% agree with @BonnieGlaser that Xi’s overall approach to Taiwan has not changed, i.e. “peaceful reunification based on the One Country Two Systems” is the “best way to resolve the Taiwan Strait.” /1
If Xi shifted away from a goal of "peaceful" reunification, he would signal with tougher language, warnings, and/or removing “和平” from the “和平统一” phrase, for example. It would be quite clear. /2
Next 🧵 is on what Xi said in the 20th Party Congress about the military and the PLA. I see a lot of implications for the PLA here.
The most important was what Xi said (and didn’t say) about benchmarks for the PLA. First sentence of his section on the PLA read: “如期” (as scheduled) “achieve the PLA’s centennial goal (of struggle) (实现建军一百年奋斗目标).” /1
Xi left out the prior 2035 goal to achieve a “modern military,” and goes straight to the 2049 goal of “accerating the goal of developing the PLA into a 'world class military.'” So 2049 remains the ultimate long-term goal. /3
A lot to unpack in Xi’s 20th Party Congress Work Report (PCWR) on foreign policy. A 🧵 on my thoughts, with separate threads on Taiwan and the PLA coming shortly.
First, the biggest takeaway for me was dropping the conclusion that China was still in a "Period of Strategic Opportunity" (POSO) (我国发展仍处于重要战略机遇期), which Xi had stated early on in his 19th PC speech. /1
There is debate about whether the POSO had simply ended, based on Jiang’s speech at the 16th PCWR in which he said the “first 2 decades of the 21st century would be a ""POSO for China.” /2