The veil is being removed from the PLA’s military procurement system, giving tidbits behind one of the main drivers of corruption and the purges taking place within the PLA. A long 🧵 on what a recent procurement announcement about errors in defense industry SOE bids for the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) means for corruption in the PLA. scmp.com/news/china/mil… We’ve known for years that the CMC’s equipment development department (EDD) and the PLARF have been the target of China’s anti-corruption efforts. It seemed to start with Li Shangfu, who ran the EDD before becoming but expanded to include Li Yuchao and Xu Zhongbo – the commander and political commissar of the PLARF; former PLARF commander Zhou Yaning, head of the PLARF armaments department Lu Hong, and former PLARF deputy Li Chuanguang. Later, Wei Fenghe was investigated.

There were rumors of mismanagement of funds within the PLARF and EDD for years, but we are getting a clearer picture now of the sources of the corruption, thanks to this report by the @SCMPNews and additional reporting from the PRC.

As @Dimi reports, current CMC Vice Chairman, He Weidong (何卫东), was arrested over the last few weeks.
Demetri consulted with 5 people familiar with the situation, including current and former US officials, so I believe the authoritativeness of his reporting.

A long 🧵 on why this is a big deal for Party-army relations in China and a Taiwan contingency.
ft.com/content/8226e1… First, as @neilthomas123 said in @dimi’s report, He’s purge would be the first of a serving uniformed vice-chair of the CMC since General He Long in 1967.

Overall, since 2012, based on my own calculations, Xi has removed at least seventy-eight senior PLA officials at the 2-star (Lt. Gen/Rear Admiral) level and above. This includes eight serving and former members of the CMC. This is unprecedented in PRC history, and a sign of a major trust and corruption problem within the PLA.

The PLA Eastern Theater Command announced what appears to be a major exercise near Taiwan.

Full statement:
"The Eastern Theater Command spokesperson, Senior Colonel Shi Yi, said that starting from April 1, the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army organized the army, navy, air force, rocket force and other forces to organize ships and aircraft to approach Taiwan Island from multiple directions around the island, focusing on exercises in sea and air combat readiness patrols, seizing comprehensive control, sea and land strikes, and blocking key areas and roads, to test the actual combat capabilities of the theater's troops in joint operations. This is a serious warning and powerful containment of the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces, and is a legitimate and necessary action to defend national sovereignty and maintain national unity."

m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_for…
Elements of the announcement suggest this will be large exercise. Key phrases that stuck out to me: inclusion of PLARF"; "to approach Taiwan Island from multiple directions around the island"; and "seizing comprehensive control, sea and land strikes, and blocking key areas and roads." This sounds similar to the Joint Sword-type exercise. Buckle up.

The other shoe has dropped.

CMC member and director of the political work department, Admiral Miao Hua, has been "suspended from duty," suspected of "serious violation of discipline."

A 🧵 on what we know and implications for party-army relations.
eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114… Since the 6-member CMC was announced at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, 2 have been placed under investigation: Li Shangfu and Miao Hua. This alone constitutes a major failure for Xi's most trusted PLA leaders, who are thoroughly vetted beforehand.

Taiwan has quietly changed its air raid alert threshold from 70 to 24 nautical miles.

A short thread on why and implications. scmp.com/news/china/pol… The news came to light after @rwnews_tw reported that the shift could leave Taiwanese people with just three minutes to seek shelter in an air raid.

Asked about the decision, Taiwanese Defence Minister Wellington Koo Li-hsiung said the change reflected the "growing threats posed by PLA activities."

On Oct. 17, Xi visited PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) brigade (六十一基地611旅), in Chizhou, Anhui province. It was an important, symbolic meeting for Xi and the PLA, at a time when the PLARF is in the midst of one of the largest corruption purges in recent history. B-611 is home to nuclear-armed DF-26 IRBMs, which recently replaced the DF-21s, and of which Xi took several photos behind.

A long 🧵 on the significance of the visit, with full video of the visit and full text translation at the end. First, Xi’s overall message to the PLARF was to “thoroughly implement the new era of strengthening the army, implement the new era of military strategic guidelines, grasp the characteristics and laws of strategic missile force construction and combat use, adhere to political guidance, strengthen mission responsibility, work hard and promote high-quality development of the force construction, enhance strategic deterrence and actual combat capabilities, and resolutely complete the tasks entrusted by the Party and the people.”

A 🧵 on this scoop from @PeterMartin_PCM and Jennifer Jacobs of @Bloomberg, which is a bombshell and changes my previous assessments of how much corruption in the PLA is affecting readiness.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… U.S. intel sources suggest corruption is so bad that Xi is less likely to contemplate major military action in the coming years than would otherwise have been the case.

Let that sink in....

🧵 on PLA personnel removals announced at 7th session of the 14th NPC (thanks to @NPC_Observer for flagging).

The NPC, in one fell swoop, quietly removed several senior leaders of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and CMC Equipment Development Department (EDD). Here they are, with my take on implications for the PLA.

1) Zhang Zhenzhong (张振中) deputy chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department and previous deputy commander of the PLARF. 2) Zhang Yulin (张育林) deputy minister of the EDD and member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the 14th National People's Congress.

3) Rao Wenmin (饶文敏), representative from the EDD to the 14th NPC

My first @AsiaPolicy article examines the new CMC leadership and what it tells us about Xi’s military and security strategy. A short 🧵on the main findings.
asiasociety.org/policy-institu… First, while PLA leadership dynamics is arcane and difficult to get information on, I was able to dig in a little into the biographies of the six new CMC members. What I found is not that surprising to China watchers, but bears emphasizing. /1

A short 🧵 on how Taiwan was framed in Xi's 20th Party Congress Work Report (PCWR). First, 100% agree with @BonnieGlaser that Xi’s overall approach to Taiwan has not changed, i.e. “peaceful reunification based on the One Country Two Systems” is the “best way to resolve the Taiwan Strait.” /1

Next 🧵 is on what Xi said in the 20th Party Congress about the military and the PLA. I see a lot of implications for the PLA here. The most important was what Xi said (and didn’t say) about benchmarks for the PLA. First sentence of his section on the PLA read: “如期” (as scheduled) “achieve the PLA’s centennial goal (of struggle) (实现建军一百年奋斗目标).” /1

A lot to unpack in Xi’s 20th Party Congress Work Report (PCWR) on foreign policy. A 🧵 on my thoughts, with separate threads on Taiwan and the PLA coming shortly. First, the biggest takeaway for me was dropping the conclusion that China was still in a "Period of Strategic Opportunity" (POSO) (我国发展仍处于重要战略机遇期), which Xi had stated early on in his 19th PC speech. /1

On Sept 10, the Political Work Department of the CMC held a Q&A session on the "Regulations on CPC Party Building in the Armed Forces” (中国共产党军队党的建设条例). A long thread on noteworthy aspects of the Regulations, based on the Q&A (mod.gov.cn/topnews/2020-0…). First, on importance. 1) This is a rare document and the first Regulation (条例) issued under Xi; and 2) it’s one of the only times outside observers are offered a glimpse into the objectives and legal aspects of Party-building in the PLA, in lieu of full text of the Regulations.

Thread: There is much confusion about the new SCS policy shift. To clarify, the new policy is NOT rejecting ALL PRC territorial and maritime claims in the SCS, contrary to what is out there in the press. It simply supports the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Ruling, which a) rejected PRC 9-dash line and any maritime claims/EEZ its claims from individual features or groups of features in the Spratly Islands or Scarborough Shoal.