Thread by @shashj

This is a very good discussion with @liscovich, providing a clear picture of what the drone war in Ukraine currently looks like (rather than how it looked a year ago). A few points that stood out to me:

https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1848694786141655158

1. We're on to the third generation of First Person View (FPV) drones. "The overall trend has been toward using larger [air]frames that can carry more payload [with] frequency shifting." Bigger antennae—30W v 2W—to strengthen signal and counter impact of Russian jamming.

2. "The entire frontier is moving up ... for any given [flight] duration, they can do more weight. For any given weight, they can do more duration." Smaller airframes, 5-9 inches, can carry 600-900g. Larger 10-inch can do 4-8lb. Range routinely up to 20km, up to 40km w/ repeaters

3. "The other major development is scaling of so-called bombers." Larger, multi-rotor drones which can carry 70-100lb over 20-35 miles. Main role not deep strike but dropping 20-30lb mines on Ru supply roads. Can overcome basic anti-FPV nets/fences w/ larger explosive payload.

4. "Exponential expansion" in "mass-market EW". Not trucks but $100-ish brick-sized units w/ PRC components to jam drones in ltd (e.g. 50MhZ) range. Ever faster iteration to adapt frequencies: four months for 1st gen, 2nd-gen two months (900->700Mhz), in June just one month.

4a. Super fast iteration of EW design & manufacture: "they're reducing in half every duration cycle when it comes to moving frequency ranges by replacing antennas and slightly changing design... that's been happening in line with the enemy durations of radios on their drones"

5. Massive use of EW -> "wild west". Lot of friendly fire. Has also degraded the passive electronic sensors that were used at start of war. "A lot of the action now is at much lower frequencies", below 1Ghz. "These networks are no longer able to triangulate the relevant targets"

6. More drone experts but lower average quality. "The other big trend is...average personnel quality is dropping, and quality means both experience and motivation...at the same time, there's more and more very experienced pilots who have 1000s of hours of flight time"

7. Drones are acting as anti-air interceptors. Most interceptions from behind and you need higher speed than target. Effort now to shift weight from payload to battery to get higher speeds, maybe even kinetic intercept (v shrapnel). But needs to be cued by radar & hard to do IFF.

7a. "there was a lot of friendly fire episodes with people ... if they're not experienced and they cannot tell apart Russian ISR fixed wing [uncrewed] aircraft from Ukrainian they sometimes hit a Ukrainian one." Concerted effort to put markets on planes.

8. " One thing that everyone has been concerned about ... is Chinese export controls—a lot of FPVs & bombers & EW capabilities dependent on Chinese components." China announced ban but hasn't taken effect yet. "Ukraine kind of needs to have a plan B in case it does materialize."

9. Largest vendor of FPV drones reports 1,200 FPV & 1,000 [drone] bomber missions in Aug. Latter generated $19m in damage, approx $19,000 damage per trip. Exchange ratio could get much better with reusable 'motherships' that can host expensive optics and release cheaper drones.

10. " A lot of the [drone] pilots, when you talk to them, they often say, if somebody else describes their achievement, they generally require video proof, because there's a lot of well, embellishment of achievement and misattribution...you get street credit primarily"

11. "If you if you look at satellite collects of EW spectrum over Ukraine, the entire front line is burning in the frequency range from 100 megahertz to six gigahertz....a lot of spots there that are quite polluted." German spectrum analysers to cover 7-10km of front is $7,000.

12. "role of Starlink as an asymmetric capability...has really changed since 2022. This used to be something that only Ukr had...Now Russians are buying it in larger quantities. I'm even hearing [Ru] already have Starlink minis... latest Gen that the Ukrainians don't have yet."

13. " I would say the highest priority ... is covering the active front in Ukraine proper with reconnaissance capabilities in the radio spectrum. So that's the highest priority thing in terms of value per dollar spent"

14. On Russia's exploitation of Western satellite images: "between Feb 2022 & [2024], over 60,000 images were taken over Ukraine...they cover ...not just the front, but...border crossings...military installations in the rear that Ukraine would certainly not have ordered"

14a. "Two possible groups could have ordered these images. It's either allied intelligence, us or NATO or somebody else or the enemy...Regardless of who ...once they are taken with commercial...vendors, they end up in the archive that can be accessed by...a v wide group of ppl"

14b. "a lot of those [photographed] areas end up being hit after the fact with missiles." Ukr general staff "believe that there is a very strong likelihood that these [satellite] images are... ordered directly through intermediaries or by being accessed...by Russian agents"

14c. "I myself was able to find the location of a Patriot ...by simply looking at where the images are being taken. That's basically an intersection of a lot of interest. And I then asked Ukrainian Air Force, like, what is here?...And they say that it's where Patriot stands."

15. "the general perception among Silicon Valley companies... in defense is that what Ukraine needs is not what the DoD is going to want to order. This is why they're not pivoting the road maps... they're going to be able to sell it to the DOD & Ukraine doesn't have money."