After breaching Selydove and Hirnyk early in the week, the Russians started offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on Friday..
Due to these developments the situation on the South Donetsk frontline has turned very difficult.
Dark red = 20. OCT
1/
Vuhledar front:
On Friday the Russians began large scale attacks towards Shakhtarske and Bohoiavienka.
They gained ground quickly, advancing almost 7km towards Shakhtarske.
These attacks were supported by large scale artillery and air bombardments.
2/
In Bohoiavienka the Russians had managed to advance within 3km of the town before Friday.
Although the initial attacks may have been repelled, video footage from Bohovienka and reports from Shakhtarske indicate that Russians have a strong foothold in both villages.
3/
In addition to the success around Shakhtarske and Bohoiavienka, some Ukrainian milbloggers claim that Russia has entered Novoukrainka.
Either Ukraine is doing a coordinated withdrawal on the width of 30km or the initial defensive line here has essentially collapsed.
4/
It seems that this southern flank in Donetsk was held mostly by TDF units, with most regular brigades moved elsewhere.
The Russians continue to find parts of the frontline that Ukraine has to leave lightly defended, and apply sudden pressure, gaining success.
5/
In turn, this leaves the Ukrainians playing whack-a-mole with their dwindling reserves, moving them from one problem area of the front to another.
Due to this, Ukraine once again has at least two clear problem areas on the frontline, with arguably Kupyansk as the third one.
6/
It's too soon to talk about a catastrophe though. Behind the villages there is another line of fortifications, and fighting is still ongoing.
However, the Russians are bringing up reserves, if the Russians breach further, larger problems will arise.
More on that soon.
7/
Selydove:
Talking of another problem area. The Russians have captured most of the city of Selydove, and reports put most of Hirnyk in Russian hands as well.
Now the fighting is moving on to Kurakhivka, at the very bottom of a narrow salient.
8/
The Russians are also continuing their push westwards towards Novodmytrivka. Reports talk of movement towards Kreminna Balka and Novoselydivkaa as well.
More worryingly Ukrainians have said that Russian have positions SW of Hirnyk and are pushing southwards.
9/
In Selydove itself the Russians have captured Vyshnoe definitely blocking the road there. Most of southern Selydivka is likely in Russian hands.
Any remaining Ukrainian positions are likely in NW Selydivka and will soon need to withdraw.
We are not at a point where the Ukrainian defence has collapsed at an operational scale. As of writing this, the Russians do not have an operational breakthrough.
However, risks remain for large areas of Southern Donetsk in the long term.
11/
The Russians will likely try to build up on their success around Selydove and Vuhledar.
From Selydove they will attempt to move on Ukrainian defensive lines from the rear, and eventually cut the highway N15 and with it the main supply route to Kurakhove.
12/
From Vuhledar, the Russians will likely attempt to push forwards through the Ukrainian defensive lines, and attempt to approach N15 from the south, creating a salient around Kurakhove.
They will also likely attempt to turn westwards towards the rear of Velyka Novosilka.
13/
Russians are likely to keep up pressure on the eastern flank as well. These will most likely be fixing attacks to keep Ukrainians at the edge of the emerging salient, but it's likely that Russians will continue their slow advance here as well.
So far the Russians haven't been able to turn tactical success into operational one, so any larger developments here will likely emerge over the late autumn and winter.
As Ukrainians shift reinforcements into this sector, the Russians will ramp up pressure somewhere else.
15/
However, I keep thinking about the "gradually, then suddenly" of attritional fighting.
The Ukrainian recruitment has slowed down from its initial success, and it's attempting to put out fires with attritioned units.
We are constantly seeing lighter and badly led units, especially TDF, taking the brunt of Russian attacks and breaking under pressure.
In Shakhtarske the Russians jumped 7km forwards.
How many Shakhtarskes need to happen before it turns into operational success?
17/
On the other hand the Russians themselves are having troubles with recruitment and their economy as a whole.
There are rarely enough mechanized reserves available to exploit tactical success, but even a small amount of force can advance far if the enemy is depleted enough.
18/
In any case, the fall of Selydove and Hirnyk, as well as the recent advance on the Vuhledar front mean that the Ukrainian position in southern Donetsk is deteriorating.
Ukraine has yet to find a coherent answer to the shifting Russian pressure throughout the frontline.
19/
Once again our work here at @Black_BirdGroup is made possible by @wihurinrahasto and their grant that lets us keep @Inkvisiit on the payroll, and the operation running in general.
Over the past 10 days, a Russian offensive pushed Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk salient, ending a 7-month operation.
What happened? Why did Ukraine withdraw? What’s next? 🧵
You can read a longer version on our Substack
1/
In August a Ukrainian offensive captured over 1200 km² of Russia's Kursk oblast.
The claimed goals were to draw Russian forces from Pokrovsk, capture leverage for negotiations and spoil a Russian operation from Sumy. It was likely also meant to shift the discourse.
2/
However, the Ukrainians failed to expand & secure their flanks and over the next 6 months the Ukrainian perimeter in Kursk diminished steadily. By the beginning of March the Ukrainians only held a bit over 300 km² of terrain in a narrow salient around the town of Sudzha.
I think there is some flawed logic here. In general the article fail to compare and contrast the Ukrainians and the Russians on similar grounds.
To an outside observer it feels like picking and choosing talking points instead of a completely honest assessment of the situation.
For example, the authors engage with assessments of Russian casualty numbers, yet fail to mention how Ukrainian officials have multiple times now published UA casualty numbers that indicate, at best, a 1:2 overall casualty ratio.
Current ratios may, naturally, differ from that.
It also ignores the enduring Ukrainian manpower issue that Ukraine has seemingly been unable to solve, while Russian recruitment is, according to Ukrainian intelligence, able to replace the casualties it's taking in Ukraine.
One needs to consider that when talking of attrition.
After a few weeks of (relatively) lower intensity actions, the Russians have resumed offensive operations in the Selydove-Hirnyk area, south of Pokrovsk.
In the past few days, we've seen the Russians make tactical gains throughout the AO.
Selydove direction, a thread.
1/
As said, after an operational pause and transfer of reinforcements, the Russians have restarted offensive operations.
They are taking advantage of Ukrainian lack of manpower and using infiltration tactics, sending small infantry units through gaps in the Ukrainian line.
2/
The Russian advance here has been relatively rapid, over the past three days. Pictured is the confirmed change since monday.
According to unconfirmed reports, the Russians may control much of the grey area.
Confirmed advance is up to 2,6 kilometers, but likely further.
Just a reminder, at least a part of the 59th is in the salient north of Krasnohorivka.
We've repeatedly seen the willingness of the Ukrainians to spend lives over territory, but in recent months these sort of complaints from the front have become increasingly common
With the experienced brigades being drawn to Kursk and getting replaced with greener ones, and with increased pressure, it seems the UA high command is expecting to do more with less. If the line doesn't hold it seems the blame is pinned on the soldiers, not the orders.
Some have blamed the increase in these sort of orders and repercussions on Syrskyi, and I there may be some truth to it.
However, we also saw these style of stubborn static defense actions in Bakhmut and under Zalushnyi.
Many Ukrainians are justifiably angry due to the strike at the 179th training centre with more than 250 casualties
As has been the case lately, the anger is directed not just at the Russians but at their own leadership as well.
Many Ukrainians have pointed out that this isn't first time something like this happens. There have been multiple mass causalty events caused by the Ukrainians housing large numbers of soldiers in pre-war military facilities.
Yavoriv, Mykolaivka, Desna...
Some have also pointed to the strike on the 128th brigade from last november.
Time and time again negligent leadership leads to preventable Ukrainian casualties. Time and time again no-one is held responsible.
This also applies to many situations on the frontline itself.