Clément Molin Profile picture
Nov 4, 2024 • 20 tweets • 7 min read • Read on X
Kurakhove before 2025

Its been a few weeks Russia 🇷🇺 launched big offensives to take controll of the strategic town of Kurakhove 🇺🇦.

At the same time, Russia will try to achieve sucess on the axis south of Pokrovsk before the battle for the city

🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️ Image
Since Vuhledar -the main ukrainian stronghold in south Dontesk- fell in late september, russian forces havn't been stopped.

They captured 6 towns north east of Vuhledar (Prechystivka, Zolota Nyvca, Shakhtarske, Novoukrainka, Yasna Polyana, Bohoiavlenka and Maksymivka). Image
At the same time, ukrainian forces lost a few towns north of the Vovotcha lake, thus allowing russian army to threathen Kourakhove from the north and the west.

They took Ukrainsk, then Tsukuryne and finally Selydove, before entering Hirynk and Kurakhivka without much resistance. Image
Paradoxically the Pokrovsk city front havn't moved for nearly 3 months.

You can see here that russian artillery and air-strikes on the Myrnohrad direction has been increasing. The 3rd defensive line is still holding. Image
But why and how did they (🇺🇦) managed to stop the russians 8km from Pokrovsk ?

Firstly, we have to understand russian army concentrated their attacks southward, where the defensive lines were less powerful and less manned.
Secondly, the third line of defense was very solid and the ditches avoided mass tanks/BMPs assaults to Pokrovsk.

These 3 months gave time to prepare new defenses around Pokrovsk. 4th line and 5th lines are now being reinforced. Image
Thirdly, ukrainian forces managed to keep their positions on the only place where Russia could have advanced, the railway. They even counter-attacked.

These 3 reasons protected Pokrovsk, but on the other hand, condemned Kourakhove.
The situation of ukrainian controlled Donbass is not catastrophic.

In the north, Siversk is still holding despite numerous assaults, then russian army still have difficulties to advance to Tchasiv Yar. The town of Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmout, is still holding. Image
In Toretsk, ukrainian forces continue local counter-attacks, while the situation on the Pokrovsk-Niu York front is calm.

What's happening elsewhere is nothing compared to the critical situation of Kourakhove.
Since a few days, 79th air assault brigade is trying to push back russian assaults on the Novomykhailivka-Kostantynopil valley.

They are doing wuite well, today, they destroyed MRAP, MTLB and T-55, some quite surprising vehicles to assault positions...
Based on @UAControlMap data, this is how the frontline is manned.

79th, 33rd and 46th are destroying numerous russian assaults while 128th, 123rd and 113th are not doing great. Image
Russia is still sustaining losses on the eastern approch of Kourakhove. Here are some pictures from @OSINTua. Image
Image
Image
Image
However, if Kourakhove city is still very well defened, its flanks may force the ukrainian to flee the city before the end of the month.

Here, seen today, russian columns assaults Novooleksiivka, west of Selydove. This is whats happening daily.
Since I'm following the ukrainian defensive program, here are the last defensive lines.

The Slovianka-Mezhova line is now finished, there is now trench work near Pavlohrad in Dnipropetrovsk oblast and new ditches south of Pokrovsk. Image
I already said that, but fortifications are very important to stop and assault. Ukraine should focus now on building a solid line on the Solena-Mokri Yali line, between Velika Novosilka and Novopavlivka... Image
What will happen in the next weeks ?

It is not difficult to understand the path russian army will follow. It is more difficult to predict where it will be stop, if their will be reinforcments and how solid will the next lines be.
In red, this is what I believe they will try to achieve before 2025, with eventually the orange lines. This could happen in a month or two.

Then it will probably be the pink offensive, to the 2 rivers, I don't know yet when they will achieve this (maybe february ?) Image
And after that, they may try to focus north to take Pokrovsk. At the same time, they will prepare for the north-Donbass offensive to claim the complete capture of Donbass in 2025.

We are not here yet !
I'll continue to monitor the situation in Kurakhove in the next days, but without forgetting other directions, such as what's happening in Kursk or in Kupiansk.

A day before US presidential elections, Ukraine and its allies will now be looking at Washington.
To follow the US elections, you can follow @atummundi, we'll be following the results all the night.

We have great news, you can now follow @atummundi_world for English speaking people.

(You can also support my work ) Thank you !buymeacoffee.com/clement.molin

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Clément Molin

Clément Molin Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @clement_molin

Jun 15
La guerre en Ukraine 🇺🇦/🇷🇺 a désormais dépassé la durée de la Première Guerre mondiale et pourrait encore durer plusieurs années.

Voici ce qu’il faut savoir en juin 2026 de ce conflit généralisé aux portes de l’Europe 🇪🇺 qui n'en finit plus.

🧵THREAD🧵1/10 ⬇️ Image
Quel est l’objectif de guerre de la Russie, pays agresseur ?

Les objectifs de guerre de la Fédération de Russie ont beaucoup évolué depuis quatre ans. Outre les déclarations officielles, le principal objectif russe est resté territorial et politique. Moscou cherchait, le 24 février, à vassaliser l’Ukraine tout en annexant une large région, la « Novorossia », entre Kharkiv, le Donbass et Odessa. Cet objectif a largement évolué, notamment après l’échec des offensives sur Kyiv, Kharkiv et Odessa.

Aujourd’hui, l’objectif territorial principal reste l’occupation de toute la région du Donbass, en particulier sa capitale de facto, Kramatorsk. Il est très probable que l’armée russe dispose de deux objectifs territoriaux secondaires : l’occupation complète des deux autres oblasts annexés, Kherson (ce qui est quasi impossible à l’heure actuelle) et Zaporijjia, et l’harmonisation de la ligne de front sur la rivière Oskil dans l’oblast de Kharkiv.

L’objectif politique initial — redonner à la Russie sa puissance d’antan, l’ancrer dans l’Eurasie, retrouver les populations, les industries, les mines et l’accès à la mer des deux voisins slaves (l’Ukraine et la Biélorussie) — reste inchangé. Sans l’Ukraine, la Russie est condamnée à être une puissance secondaire et plus largement asiatique, sa dimension d’empire s’effaçant avec la montée en parallèle de la démographie non slave.

Les autres objectifs qui ont pu jouer un rôle auparavant sont caduques aujourd’hui : la démilitarisation de l’Ukraine semble impossible, quatre ans de guerre d’attrition n’ayant pas conduit à un effondrement ukrainien. La dénazification, étendard pour parler de l’effacement du nationalisme ukrainien, est également un échec. Les nationalistes ukrainiens sont plus forts et décomplexés que jamais, représentant près de 100 000 hommes dans l’armée ukrainienne. Les figures antirusses controversées d’Europe centrale et orientale ont par ailleurs été réhabilitées. Empêcher l’OTAN et l’UE de s’étendre à l’Est était aussi un mirage. Bien que la considération eût été réelle, la Suède et la Finlande ont rejoint l’Alliance, tandis que la Moldavie, le Caucase du Sud, les Balkans occidentaux et l’Ukraine ont accéléré leur rapprochement avec l’Europe, tous brandissant la menace russe.

L’objectif russe est donc désormais d’installer la confrontation dans la durée, jusqu’à un effondrement hypothétique de l’aide à l’Ukraine (qui semble compromise par la dernière aide de l’UE), l’essoufflement de la population ukrainienne (une considération bien réelle mais qui n’impactera probablement pas la situation au front) ou une victoire à la Pyrrhus, que ce soit la prise du Donbass suivie d’un cessez-le-feu ou une capitulation de l’Ukraine comme la Finlande en 1940.Image
Quel est l’objectif de l’Ukraine, pays agressé ?

L’objectif de Kyiv a lui aussi beaucoup évolué. L’armée ukrainienne a été surprise par l’ampleur de l’offensive du 24 février, qui lui a fait perdre des territoires stratégiques, comme le sud du pays. L’objectif initial de survivre en tant qu’État a été largement assuré par les victoires à Kyiv, Kharkiv et Mykolaïv en 2022. Le second objectif, retrouver les frontières d’avant-guerre, a échoué en 2023 après l’échec des offensives ukrainiennes. Depuis cette date, les Ukrainiens ont pour objectif de tenir dans la durée, jusqu’à un essoufflement ou un retrait hypothétique des Russes.

Kyiv refuse de se retirer des territoires sous son contrôle, mais a déjà accepté l’idée de concessions territoriales, de manière non officielle, sur la Crimée, le sud et l’est du pays. Pour Kyiv, il est hors de question de capituler et de céder des territoires sans combat à Moscou, d’autant que les garanties de bonne foi de la Russie ont historiquement montré qu’elles n’étaient pas tenues. Dès lors, l’Ukraine a développé ses propres moyens pour que chaque km2 de territoire conquis coûte plus cher à Moscou, tout en essayant de toucher au maximum l’économie russe. Une contre-offensive hypothétique reste possible, mais il est encore tôt pour savoir si les Ukrainiens ont les moyens de la réaliser.Image
Read 10 tweets
Jun 14
For months, Ukraine 🇺🇦 has been conducting a series of deep infiltrations on the Velika Novosilka front.

Some of Russia’s 2025 gains have already been reversed, with the February counter-attack expanding to a 40-kilometer front.

🧵THREAD🧵1/12 ⬇️ Image
As a reminder, in February, the Ukrainian army conducted a discreet offensive for several weeks, clearing infiltrated areas, securing Pokrovsk'e and infiltrating areas that were previously under Russian control. Image
This counter-attack notably secured Ternuvat and prevented the use of Uspenivka to launch assaults on the Zaporizhzhia front.

This significantly slowed the Russian advance, reducing its length from 42 km to 25 km (west of Hulialpole). Image
Read 12 tweets
Jun 13
The Ukrainian 🇺🇦 blocus of Crimea is starting 🇷🇺

After they repeatedly hit bridges connecting Crimea and occupied Kherson oblast, the Ukrainians started implementing a blocus of the peninsula.

Last night, trucks and a pontoon bridge were hit.

🧵THREAD🧵1/15 ⬇️ Image
Last night, the Code 9.2, Phalanx and the davinci units launched multiple strikes against targets in and around the key roads leading to Crimea.
As you can see on the map, only few bridges are connecting Crimea to mainland Ukraine. 6 of them have been reportedly hit including the main ones :

🔸Henichesk bridge
🔸Chonhar road bridge
🔸Chonhar rail bridge
🔸Armyansk bridge (on canal)
🔸Stavky and Myrne bridges (?) on canal Image
Read 15 tweets
Jun 11
Last night, multiple Ukrainian 🇺🇦 units hit the bridges leading to Crimea, further isolating the peninsula from the land bridge to Russia 🇷🇺

At the same time, strike campaign continues on multiple key roads, with over 375 vehicles and trucks hit since early May.

🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️Image
Crimea is connected with southern occupied Ukraine by multiple key bridges.

The one in Chonhar was hit few days ago by multiple drones, which forced the russians to put up a pontoon bridge for their road traffic.
At least 3 bridges have been recently hit. The one in Henichesk, the ones in Armyansk and in Stavky.

As we can see on the video, these strikes are putting holes in the middle of those key bridges. Any consolidation attempt will probably be hit. Image
Image
Read 13 tweets
Jun 7
Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues its massive mid-range strike campaign against russian 🇷🇺 logistics.

Since early May, more than 290 russian trucks and vehicles have been hit. I have now mapped 210 strikes since january.

🧵THREAD🧵1/14 ⬇️ Image
The strike campaign is guided by multiple units, using a large veriety of drones.

The backbone of it are the FP-1/2 strikes on key logistics hubs, mainly oil/fuel depots, trains, gas stations, electric substations and rear bases.

Those strikes are often guided with AI. Image
The latest video recently published showcased some strikes around Melitopol (few missed) with Hornet drones.

Interestlingly, everything is not blurred, which helps understanding how they are using those drones.
Read 16 tweets
Jun 5
In southern Ukraine 🇺🇦, Russian 🇷🇺 forces continue their offensive from Hulialpole to Orikhiv, a strategic town

I mapped more than 1 400 Russian airstrikes, supporting multiple offensive axes in May, while Ukraine nearly finished its fortifications.

🧵THREAD🧵1/16 ⬇️ Image
In May 2026, Russia conducted 7 486 airstrikes, I managed to locate 52% of those.

18% of those strikes are targeting ukrainian positions near Hulialpole. We can add as well 6% of related airstrikes in Novopavlivka and Zaporizhzhia areas. Image
These airstrikes have a very surprising precision (much more than elsewhere on the front), primarily targeting treelines and villages, where soldiers and drone teams are hiding. Image
Read 16 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(