1/ As stated by the media, only 30% of the shells Russia is currently using are manufactured domestically. If this is accurate, Russian Soviet-era ammo arsenals should be empty by now. To prove or refute this claim, I’ve reviewed Russian arsenals, and here are my observations. 
2/ Reported Russian shell usage ranged from 50,000 to 10,000 per day in Spring 2024. Given the numerous ammo dumps destroyed in 2022 following the deployment of HIMARS, the sheer number of shells used is enormous, which should have strained the Soviet-era ammunition supply.
3/ According to The Insider, Russia has been refurbishing and producing 1.7 million shells annually since 2014, totaling at least 13.6 million shells, along with an unknown quantity of older shells that needed refurbishing due to their age by 2022. theins.ru/politika/254514
4/ So, by 2024, Russian arsenals should theoretically be depleted, with the remaining shells or rockets likely used up by now. The best way to confirm this—yes, you guessed it—is via satellite imagery.
5/ We don’t have fresh imagery for every arsenal, but for the largest ones, the trend is visible. Let’s go through them.
6/ The first is the 1819th artillery munition base, which stores (obviously) artillery munitions. By September 2024, it’s nearly empty, with only junk piles scattered. Some ammo remains, but I’d estimate 90% is gone, and the rest is questionable.
7/ Some comments about the 1819th base.
8/ The 2719th Artillery Ammunition Base didn’t hold much to begin with, but by September 2024, it was completely empty.
9/ As shown in the pictures, this base was primarily used for ammo disposal.
10/ 1215th Central Artillery Ammunition Base. Same story here. I’m unsure what’s in those white boxes, but I doubt there’s anything usable at this stage (“What’s in the box?!”).
11/ MLRS ammo at the 1215th base.
12/ 73rd Arsenal GRAU: Primarily underground bunkers, but the outdoor storage sections are nearly empty by September 2024. It looks like they’re clearing the area, perhaps for more bunkers. A train there appears to be loaded with 3m slim boxes, likely MLRS rockets.
13/ Some comments about the 73rd arsenal.
14/ The 100th arsenal is almost empty, with large cleared areas around it.
15/ For the 7th arsenal, we don’t have recent satellite imagery, but by autumn 2022, significant depletion was already evident, with entire sections gone.
16/ The 51st arsenal, in September 2024, showed much less activity compared to October 2022. Sections near the train station are empty, likely due to either reduced shipments or an effort to keep everything inside bunkers for protection. It seems an incident occurred there.
17/ These observations from the arsenals storing ammo outside indicate little Soviet-era ammunition remains available.
18/ Arsenals closer to the Ukrainian border serve as logistics hubs for recently produced and North Korean-provided shells. Some were destroyed recently as you can't store ammunition 2000 km away from the front lines, so these logistics points must stay closer.
19/ Regarding artillery from storage, Highmarsed, Jompy, and Covet Cabal have reported that Russians have taken over 8K SPGs and towed guns (without mortars) from storage. If they average 20K shells used per day, Russia would have used over 18 million shells by mid-2024.
20/ Given a gun barrel loses accuracy after around 3,000 shells, it suggests that over 6,000 barrels may have worn out. However, some of these reported shells are mortar shells, and storage guns also replace destroyed ones. So, the estimate of 8,000 "used" artillery pieces fits.
21/ More about towed guns in storage here:
22/ Key points of this thread:
- Russia has indeed depleted its Soviet-era shell reserves.
- Russia has indeed depleted its Soviet-era shell reserves.
23/
- The role and contribution of North Korea are underestimated. According to media reports, Russia now produces between 3 and 4.3 million shells per year—8,000-12,000 per day, but it isn’t enough to maintain the 2022-2023 usage pace. North Korean support is crucial.
- The role and contribution of North Korea are underestimated. According to media reports, Russia now produces between 3 and 4.3 million shells per year—8,000-12,000 per day, but it isn’t enough to maintain the 2022-2023 usage pace. North Korean support is crucial.
24/
- Russia’s artillery reserves are still substantial, likely enough for another 2+ years. Training with North Korean artillery has already been reported though. You might disagree, but they’ve had more artillery guns in storage than tanks and BMPs combined.
- Russia’s artillery reserves are still substantial, likely enough for another 2+ years. Training with North Korean artillery has already been reported though. You might disagree, but they’ve had more artillery guns in storage than tanks and BMPs combined.
25/ That’s it for now! If you enjoyed my work, consider supporting me on Buy Me a Coffee, with Patreon and PayPal links in my bio.
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