I’ve seen several people argue that Trump might not be as bad on Ukraine as some suggest and cited his administration’s supply of arms to Kyiv as evidence for this. I understand why people are keen to find positives for Ukraine, but I think this is wrong.
On arms: the claim is often that Trump supplied them after Obama blocked them. This is only partly true. The Obama administration allowed the commercial export of weapons to Ukraine, but did not supply them directly.
The Trump administration did, but only after Trump was persuaded to change his mind on the grounds that it would be good for US business.
Trump then, infamously, suspended almost $400 million of Congressionally mandated military aid after he was reportedly persuaded to do so by Rudy Giuliani and others. Trump wrongly claimed that the Ukrainian government had acted to undermine him and to protect Joe Biden.
According to John Bolton, Trump declared that “Ukraine tried to take me down. I’m not fucking interested in helping them”. The “quid pro quo” call with Zelensky – restoration of aid in return for political favours – was the subject of Trump’s 1st impeachment.
The idea that Trump is more open to helping Ukraine than he appears is not correct, though as on many other things, his position wasn’t fixed because he was easily influenced by those who knew how to talk to him.
(This is one of many reasons 1st term Trump foreign policy was so incoherent – in the absence of knowledge or understanding of even the big picture of foreign policy, policy depended on who had his ear at any given moment.)
Trump is now surrounded by better organised people who are not likely to try to persuade him that continuing to arm Ukraine is good for US business. In any case, given his apparent decline since he last held office, it is not clear how involved he'd be in this kind of decision.
For whatever reason, one of the few absolutely consistent Trump positions since before his first election is the desire to have good relations with Russia - by which he seems to mean Putin.
Trump has refused to blame Putin for anything, ever, appears deferential to him, and behaved in a number of ways that raised serious questions about the extent of Putin's influence over him.
Since his 1st term, he's moved more strongly in this direction and is now closely aligned with Kremlin positions on Ukraine. Whatever the claims about getting both Russia and Ukraine to the table, it seems likely that he'll just try to coerce Ukraine to accept Russian demands.
However flawed the Biden admin approach has been – very – it is as good as Ukraine is likely to get from the US until at least 2029. Things are likely to get a lot worse very fast.
That has implications not just (though most importantly) for Ukraine, but for European security and for the global standing of the US. Europe needs to urgently address how it de-couples from Trump policy on Ukraine and on Russia - it's security depends on it.
Whatever the spin that his admin will push (and much of the US media will probably accept) about Trump as dealmaker, deferring to Russia on Ukraine will make the US look weak – and for good reason. That’s obviously very dangerous for the US in an unstable global environment.
One last thing for now: though predictions are always risky, if Republicans control the House, I expect that Trump will lift some/all of the sanctions against Russia.
He was blocked from trying this by CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) in 2017, much to his displeasure. But the check provided by Congress won't apply if a Trump-shaped GOP controls both Houses.
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The greatest error that the US has made in relation to Russia’s war against Ukraine is just the latest variant of the same error that US administrations have been making for nearly 30 years: not taking Russia seriously. An enormous 🧵
Immediately after the USSR collapsed, Bush 41 and Clinton took Russia seriously as a threat to international stability and security. The fate of the USSR’s nukes, the possibility of Russia disintegrating, or of a Red or Brown Russian president meant that the US prioritized Russia
By the 2nd half of the 90s, with the nukes issue resolved, the destruction of Chechnya ending the possibility of Russia splintering, and the re-election of Yeltsin in 1996, Russia dropped down the agenda.
One of the odd things about Putin’s statement that allowing Ukraine to use long range missiles inside Russia really is a red line – honest, not like all the other red lines – is that saying it so publicly makes it much harder for the US *not* to allow it.
Having indicated that it’s now maybe, possibly, open to saying yes soon-ish, if the Biden administration changes its mind in response to this, it will make the US look coercible by adversaries. That’s not a signal the US wants to send to Russia and certainly not to China.
It’s odd that Putin, a man so preoccupied with image and status and with projecting strength, doesn’t understand that threatening the US is more likely to hurt him than help.
Coming to this late, but *if* the Biden administration is imposing limits on Ukraine because “the US will eventually want to reset relations with Moscow”, then they are making an enormous mistake. 🧵 politico.com/news/2024/08/2…
The use of the term ‘reset’ is instructive (and perhaps not surprising given the personnel overlap between the Obama and Biden administrations). To understand just how impossible another reset with Russia is for the foreseeable future, it’s worth looking at the last one.
The Reset was the Obama administration’s first major foreign policy initiative. It was launched by then-Vice President Biden in early 2009. The aim was to improve the US-Russia relationship after a period of very bad relations which culminated in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.
Over the years, people have suggested lots of explanations for Trump's admiration for, even deference to, Putin: money, kompromat, manipulation by smarter people around him, a preference for dictators, a combination of some or all of these.
It's a fascinating question but it doesn't change anything except our understanding of Trump's psychology (admittedly, an important issue of its own). Whatever the cause, the outcome has been the same.
Not a fan of this simplistic form of Realism, but taking it on its own terms, this is not an accurate analysis. By Realist measures, we are not in a multipolar world, we are in a world with two great powers: the USA and China. Claims of multipolarity are Russian fantasy.
For about 20 years, the Russian govt and the Russian analytical elite have been announcing the arrival of a multipolar order, in which several great powers will dominate international affairs. Unsurprisingly, they claim Russia is one of the.
Clearly - to stick with the Realist framework (mis)used here - the international order is no longer unipolar. *If* there are poles then there are clearly two of them (the US and China), making the world bipolar.
Since Kremlin-friendly voices have once again dragged out the claim that NATO expansion provoked Russia into invading Ukraine, I thought it was worth explaining a couple of things in addition to this earlier thread. 🧵
To repeat: there was no chance at all of Ukraine joining either NATO or the EU in the years before Russia decided to start its latest colonial campaign of stealing Ukrainian land and torturing, raping, and murdering Ukrainians.
This is from February 2021. The language is diplomatic, but it means Ukraine are about as likely to join NATO at this point as Turkey is to join the EU (i.e. it’s not going to happen):