🧵I postponed this thread multiple times, but with Reuters' recent publication, it’s timely now:
Let's examine and compare reporting sources (GMO vs. Gaza MoH) and analyze fatalities identified by Gaza MoH.
TL;DR: Women and children account for 54.7% of fatalities, not 70%.
⬇️
² 𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐇𝐞𝐚𝐥𝐭𝐡 of Gaza (MoH): Publishes daily fatality and injury records, and every two months, releases a verified list with ID, age, and names. See attached examples of their reports.
³ 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐌𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐎𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐞 (GMO):
A Hamas-run office reports casualty and damage stats, partially aligning with MoH some totals but providing its own breakdowns.
Updates are via a dedicated Telegram channel, with unspecified sources. t.me/mediagovps
⁴ This analysis utilizes the most recent name list from the MoH (updated for the end of August)
The differences between MoH and GMO data will be explained, followed by further analysis of the published list, which contains 34,344 verified names out of 40,738 reported (84%)
⁵ On September 15, Gaza MoH released its latest updated list of 34,344 names with details including ID, source, full name, gender, age at death, and date of birth.
The file covers identified fatalities from 07-Oct-23 until 31-Aug-24.
Link to the PDF file t.me/MOHMediaGaza/5…
⁶ Let's compare data breakdown per MoH and GMO.
While the MoH data, based on a list of names and personal details, shows 55% women and children versus 45% men, the GMO's breakdown indicates 69% women+children and 31% men.
GMO doesn't publish men's count, but it's easy to calc.
⁷ The GMO reports cover all claimed 40,691 deaths, though it’s unclear where they sourced their breakdown, as the Ministry of Health has detailed records for only 34,344.
May be, the 70% women+children by Reuters somehow stems from GMO data, matching its 69%.
⁸ It can easily be proven that the information from the GMO is fabricated.
Out of all 40,691 reported deaths, they have 2,806 less reported men compared to the number of 𝐈𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐝 men in the 34,344 list by the Gaza Ministry of Health.
⁹ GMO, not only are underreporting men, but they also assert that the entire ~15% gap (40,691 - 34,344) from the Ministry of Health's count consists solely of women and children—a claim that is clearly implausible.
Now, let's proceed to analysis of the Ministry of Health file
¹⁰ Analysis of the MoH data by age and gender shows far more male than female casualties.
The vertical axis represents age, and the horizontal axis shows casualties per age.
A 2021 Gaza population chart, included for comparison, indicates an equal pre-war male-to-female ratio.
¹¹
Each record in the file has a verification source from the MoH. About 16% (6,897 entries) rely on family reports likely for Palestinians missing or not recovered from rubbles.
A special MoH form is used to report these cases.
Another 4% approved by special committee.
¹² Children (0-17): Analysis of child casualties shows a relatively balanced distribution of boys and girls up to age 11, aligning with their population average.
However, as age increases, the proportion of boys rises significantly, diverging from their pre-war population ratio.
¹³ It’s best left to war experts to explain the reasons behind this: but it could be that older boys face a higher risk of casualties in conflict situations, or perhaps it indicates children’s involvement in combat roles.
¹⁴ As someone who monitors events in Gaza daily, I observe that the high number of child casualties largely results from bombings. Often, these strikes not only impact the IDF’s intended target but also result in the deaths of close family members, including their children.
¹⁵ In analyzing family and clan losses, the Najjar clan has the highest number of casualties, though I lack enough data to normalize these numbers with clan/family sizes.
¹⁶ I don’t have sufficient information to validate the MoH file easily, as it requires access to the Gaza civil registry.
However, certain things can be briefly checked: ID values can be verified using a specific formula.
There are 304 invalid records, primarily for ages 0-5
¹⁷ I identified 103 records marked as female, though their first names are male (e.g., Mohammed). It's unclear where the discrepancy originates. There may be additional cases like this in the file, but a native Arabic speaker would likely perform this analysis more accurately.
¹⁸ I noticed that about 7% have likely incorrect birthdates, with a default date of January 1 assigned, mainly for those born in the 1950s and 1960s.
¹⁹ There are also a few duplicate entries, such as in the well-known Abu Al-Qumsan family case, where twin infants were killed days after birth appear twice in the MoH list with invalid IDs.
Such cases can not be automatically verified due to partial name matching in the file.
²⁰ For clarity, my brief check shows that verified combatants are included in the MoH list; on the other hand, there are killed Hamas members who are not found in the file.
I also checked a few names of those who died from non war accidents and did not find them in the file
²¹ Cross-referencing names in the file is likely a topic for a separate discussion.
With my limited resources and time, I’d hope that NGOs or major media would challenge organizations like the GMO and MoH a bit more.
Though it appears to be less of a priority for them.
The end.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
🧵 IDF Combat Fatality Cause
IDF Combat Losses During 21 Months of Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip
This thread presents an updated analysis (as of June 27, 2025) of the causes of death among 433 IDF soldiers killed during the ground operation in the Gaza Strip, which began in late October 2023.
For 421 of them, 97%, the cause of death was identified by me, based on publicly available sources.
This is a particularly challenging metric to track, as the IDF PR does not publish such details.
The data was carefully compiled from news reports, Telegram channels, podcasts, and interviews with families and relatives. >>
2/ When looking at the final breakdown, two primary causes of death stand out: IEDs and RPG/anti-tank fire.
Each accounts for around 30% of cases — together making up approximately 60% of all IDF fatalities in the ground campaign.
Another notable cause is accidents and friendly fire, responsible for roughly 11% of the deaths.
An additional 7% were killed by sniper fire.
P.S. There is only one case of fatal ATGM usage in this war. All other cases related to RPGs only.
3/ One of the more important insights is the change in the distribution of causes of death over time.
In the early months of the war, RPG/anti-tank fire led IEDs by nearly 20 percentage points (40% vs 20%).
Over time, that gap gradually closed, and as of today, the two are nearly equal.
What stands out even more is the sharp rise in IED-related deaths in recent months especially since the resumption of fighting on March 18, 2025.
Looking only at this recent period, over 70% of IDF fatalities were caused by IEDs.
Is this a tactical shift by Hamas? A shortage of anti-tank munitions?
Hard to say, but it's clear that IEDs have become the most lethal and effective weapon in guerrilla warfare inside Gaza.
25-APR-2025
Muhammad Baraka Ayish Al-Amur
Member of the Military Council in the Al-Mujahideen battalions.
In the strike, his wife, two sons, and five daughters were killed. Total 9
² 24-APR-2025
Imad Al-Baba "Abu Ashraf".
Leader of the Military Intelligence Service.
The Mujahideen Brigades.
Killed in a targeted tent in Al Zawaida (Central Camps)
Another family member (men) and child were killed.
³ 22-APR-2025, Al Shati Camp strike.
Combatants 3+4+5
Youssef Saleem Bakr is referred to as a leader (al-Qa'id) and a heroic martyr (al-Batal), along with his son and a relative, who are also described as heroic martyrs.
Their funeral was accompanied by gunshots, something that does not happen at the funeral of an ordinary civilian or even a regular combatant.
His wife and daughter killed also in the strike.
🧵Mourning Posts as a Clue: Identifying Combatants in the Gaza War:
This article aims to explain methods that can be used to identify combatants based on eulogies and mourning posts on social media
Operational security is a distinctive and fascinating aspect of the war in Gaza. Unlike Hezbollah or Palestinian counterparts in Judea and Samaria, residents of Gaza typically refrain from disclosing any affiliation with armed groups until after the fighting has ended.
There are several reasons for this phenomenon: blaming Israel exclusively for civilian deaths, hiding the fact that militants operate from within civilian areas, and avoiding revenge attacks against militants’ families. 1/
2. Platform Behavior Patterns
When trying to determine combatant affiliation through social media, different platforms serve different roles. The landscape typically breaks down as follows:
Facebook is where family members and close relatives post - and it's the primary platform to monitor.
This is where you'll find personal mourning posts not meant for external audiences, often shared within family or clan-specific groups.
These posts may include emotional tributes, photos, and sometimes indirect clues about the deceased’s role or background.
Twitter tends to feature posts from broader community members rather than immediate family.
Mentions of mujahid (مجاهد) are usually intentional and appear once the person’s identity is confirmed or if they were publicly known.
Telegram typically comes after identification has been shared on Facebook or Twitter.
3. Before diving into the indicators, it's important to clarify what is not evidence of combatant status—and that’s the word al-shaheed (الشهيد for male, الشهيدة for female).
The term is used broadly and honorifically for nearly all those killed in the context of the conflict, regardless of whether they were civilians, children, or armed fighters.
Because of this cultural usage, the presence of the word al-shaheed in a mourning post does not in itself indicate that the person was affiliated with an armed group or involved in combat.
You can often learn a lot from the personal social media profiles of the deceased.
Some accounts include images of armed fighters, weapons, propaganda posters, or photos from Hamas or Islamic Jihad events.
However, despite how tempting it may be, I personally avoid labeling someone a combatant based solely on this type of content.
Such material may reflect ideological support, a relative involved in an armed group, or simply local patriotism.
For me, this is not a sufficient indicator. At most, it serves as a reason to investigate further and look for clearer evidence regarding the person’s actual role.
🧵 When I saw this poster, I decided to revisit the day this Hamas member was killed. I wanted to thoroughly analyze the incident in which he died and determine how many uninvolved people lost their lives because of him (along with him). Follow the thread >>
2. Let's return to the event where Jihad Qazzar was eliminated on August 4th.
The following day, a list of casualties was published—23 names in total, including Jihad himself. As expected, he was not labeled as a Hamas member. Just a famous Quran teacher.
3. Jihad was even described as a member of the Egyptian aid organization Ayadi Masr, alongside other members who, as it later turned out, were also identified as militants. This organization still operates in Gaza—who knows how many of its other members are affiliated with Hamas
🧵 So, who are the 735 palestinian prisoners released in this exchange deal?
I analyzed a Ministry of Justice dataset containing their personal details, charges, and detention periods. While I lack time to investigate their individual cases, the data provides a broad overview
² The published information does not include details of specific terror events but contains convictions, detention period dates, organizational affiliation, and personal details.
Below is a brief explanation of relevant fields.
URL: gov.il/he/Departments…
³ Approximately 1,800 Palestinians are expected to be released, mostly captured during the Gaza war.
The Ministry of Justice list (735 names) includes West Bank and Gaza prisoners jailed before the war, with a small number arrested after October 7.