I've returned from a research trip to Ukraine, where I met many people in Kyiv and along the frontlines. They are brave and kind in ways that words fail to capture. The situation is serious and urgent for many reasons. I share my thoughts in the thread below. /1
As officials and others have already said publicly, Ukraine is facing a shortage of manpower - infantry in particular. Mobilization has not brought relief for many reasons. More impacts in the story below. /2 ft.com/content/adbef9…
Manpower and force employment issues are challenges right now, and manpower is stretched across the front. A shortage of western weapons was not the most critical issue during this particular snapshot in time, although it has been in the past. /3
The front has become unstable in a few areas. There are many factors complicating the Kursk operation and areas south of Pokrovsk. /4
When the Kursk operation began this summer, I worried about what could happen to the units sent there and impacts on a stretched front. Both issues are visible now. /5
Kursk resupply and egress routes are limited and under threat. Russians know where the chokepoints are. Ground has been lost to Russian attacks and the Russians seem to be trying to pinch this operation off at the neck. /6
There have been multiple videos of Russians executing wounded or surrendering AFU soldiers. The addition of DPRK soldiers in Kursk adds strain to an already strained situation there. /7
Russians are launching frequent small attacks interspersed with armored assaults along the front, with concentrations against Kursk, Kupiansk, and areas south of Pokrovsk. All year, Russian forces have been modifying tactics towards encirclements instead of direct assaults./8
Russians use motorcycles, cars, carts, and armored vehicles to insert assault teams and strain defending units. Ukrainian forces use what they have to try to hold assaults back, using drones and an overall good supply of artillery shells, to conserve manpower. /9
Ukrainian forces are highly attuned to modification in Russian tactics and are doing a good job to the best of their abilities to counter attacks, but cannot fully suppress and repel all attacks. Technology cannot offset the need for well-manned units. /10
Manpower issues are not universal, and some units are able to recruit directly to fill billets, but in general, the military, NG, and TDF are experiencing shortages to various degrees. Western training for Ukrainians abroad also needs modification. /11
Russia is taking its heaviest casualties since 2022 while on the offense. They continue to waste manpower and lose a great deal of equipment, but their rates of attack are not slowing. The Russians can rotate and regenerate forces better than Ukraine can right now /12.
On the current path, both Ukraine and Russia are headed for exhaustion in different ways. My concern is that Ukraine reaches it first if no changes are made. This is not for lack of bravery, competence, or skill of Ukrainian fighters, but a resource and strategy question. /13
To summarize. 1:Personnel sustainment and force employment are critical issues within Ukraine 2: Ukraine's partners must sharpen their support strategy given the current situation 3: the war cannot wait six months for DC to spin down/spin up during a presidential transition. /14
I met people in Ukraine who are practical, experienced, and focused. They continue with their battle tasks through weariness. Even in hard conditions, there is a quiet kindness and warmth too. I'm lucky i met them. I smile from a well-maintained American tank near the front. /15
Finally, and from the heart. I've held the hands of those fighting at the very edge of freedom. They're weary, focused, and good fighters, but they are bleeding out. They, despite all of it, are still kind and brave. Changes are needed, so they can defend what’s theirs. /16
I joined @KofmanMichael @RALee85 @HoansSolo and @konrad_muzyka on this trip. I'm glad I made this trip with you, guys. They are sharing their views also, which are well worth reading and considering. /end
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Today, Putin increased the military’s size for the 3rd time since 2022. Can they sustain 1.5M postwar, at a time when the budget will be under pressure to procure equipment? Not without tradeoffs. See my new report for more on this and other tradeoffs👇 carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/…
My report discusses why an increase to the standing army’s size by 30% to 1.5 million, simultaneous to a sweeping procurement program, would require a significant reordering of Russia’s economy and labor market beyond where it is now- the Kremlin has not wanted to do that so far.
1.5 million makes more sense as a temporary wartime number that can be readjusted down to the more financially manageable 1 million postwar via a new order /ukaz.
A brief 🧵about updates and observations about Russian forces' response in Kursk and Russian operations in Donetsk near Pokrovsk. I start by including guidance from Admiral Stockdale, as it's been meaningful to me in my analytic practice, perhaps others will find it helpful too.
Since this thread, Russia has set up a command structure for Kursk. It's been declared a "counter-terrorist operation) and Defmin Belousov set up a "coordination council" that meets every day and named Yunis-Bek Yevkurov as the deputy./2
On 20 August, Russia announced the creation of three operational groupings in Belgorod, Briansk, and Kursk to better manage the forces in the area. The idea makes sense but is somewhat undermined by the hodge- podge of units available for the area /3
Russia begins its response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk. Multiple ministries are involved and the command structure is still forming. Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2. A few important issues to watch: 🧵
Russia has declared its defense operation to be a "counter-terrorist operation" (KTO in Russian). This is a domestic operation and the FSB and Rosgvardia have roles along with the military. This is what the war in Chechnya was called from 1999 until it ended./2
Putin has instructed the FSB (+ its border troops) and Rosgvardia to defend the borders and assist this operation. He also told the military today that their main task is driving out Ukrainian forces from Russian territory and countering Ukrainian recon and sabotage groups /3
Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1
First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2
Belousov has no military experience at all or background in the military. He’s an economist. This will raise questions within the military who will fear a repeat of serdyukov. So I anticipate some unformed officer favorites appointed to leadership positions to balance this. /3
Ukrainian officials say attacks on border areas in Kharkiv Oblast have begun. Is this the beginnings of a new front, limited incursion ("sanitary zone"), or harassment? Where does this lead? Threat= capability x intent, so let's consider both below. 👇
Intent: Putin in March said he wanted a "sanitary zone" aka occupied buffer zone inside Kharkiv, in response to shelling or cross border raids from groups like RDK. /2 apnews.com/article/russia…
Intent: a few weeks ago, the MOD elevated the Russian group of forces from “Border Protection” to Operational Group North – making it equivalent to the other Operational Groups of Forces. /3
Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1
Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.
Here's what I see: 1 ATACM failed (dud), 1 ATACM missed a fixed command post (jamming, or coordinates slightly off?), 2 ATACMs hit a force grouping and probably another vehicle or CP/bivouac in the trees. /3