1. The report was written by a think tank, not technical experts from the 🇺🇦 gov't. 2. 🇺🇦 has ~7 tons of reactor Pu, enough for several hundred simple-fission weapons. 3. The Pu is sitting in spent fuel. To use it, 🇺🇦 would have to build a separation plant, which would take years and cost hundreds of billions. web.archive.org/web/2024111318…
First, some context. The document is just a report prepared by a think tank that will be presented at a conference. This very much stretches the definition of "news."👇
The paper claims that 🇺🇦 has about 7 tons of Pu that would be enough for an arsenal of several hundred simple fission weapons like Fat Man, with reduced yields. No argument here. That's all correct.
In 2023, Ukraine had about 7.4 tons of Pu-239 sitting in 1,350 tons of spent fuel from the reactors it still controls and operates. Each year, Ukraine unloads ~40 tons of spent fuel, which would contain an additional ~200 kg of Pu-239.
The initial "Fat Man" device used ~8 kg of Pu. It's an unclassified fact that a nuclear weapon can be made with as little as 4 kg of Pu. 7,400/8=925
FYI: Many years ago, Tom Cochrane and Chris Paine pointed out one could do better than that. ambienteparco.it/pdf/fissionwea…
Also, Ukraine *could* manufacture nuclear weapon with what's called "reactor Pu" -- although the yield would be uncertain. There are people who refuse to believe this, but the US did it in 1962 and declassified that fact in 1977.
Here is what @ENERGY said in 1997:
“[A] potential proliferating state could build a nuclear weapon from reactor grade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that.)” osti.gov/servlets/purl/…
So far, so good. Yes, Ukraine has a lot of reactor plutonium sitting in its spent fuel. That material could be used to make a lot of simple nuclear weapons. Now ... how to get at it?
That's the problem. Those 7 tons of Pu are mixed into 1,350 tons of highly radioactive spent fuel. To use any in a bomb, 🇺🇦 would need to reprocess some of that 1,350 tons of radioactive metal to chemically separate the Pu. Ukraine does not currently have such a facility.
🇺🇦 would have to build such a reprocessing plant. 🇨🇳 built a small plant to process about 50 tons of spent fuel a year. It took ten years to build (1993-2003) and cost 1.3 billion RMB -- over a billion dollars today.
Could 🇺🇦 do it faster & cheaper? In 1977, @ORNL claimed a proliferator could build a "simple and quick reprocessing facility" in 4-6 months. Others disagreed. @USGAO concluded the 4-6 months was "not highly probable", but credible "in some circumstances." gao.gov/assets/emd-78-…
The "others" included the Office of Technology Assessment and Congressional Research Service thought the number was about a 2-3 years and $25 million -- $130 million today. princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/197…
For @GAO, "some circumstances" meant "experienced personnel willing to risk radiation exposure, available materials, and full support of a nation willing to risk failure ..." Is Ukraine such a case? I don't doubt the will, but personnel and equipment are pretty limited.
Ukraine is hoping to construct a pair of new reactors in about 2.5 years with substantial technical assistance from Bulgaria. That's very fast -- and crucially it depends on foreign assistance. reuters.com/business/energ…
Ukraine is also constructing a spent fuel storage facility -- but again, with US assistance. Most of the equipment was manufactured in the US. The project also involves contractors in Estonia, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Ukrai…
That means this would probably take years. Russia would certainly attack the reprocessing plant during construction, unless Ukraine could keep the plant a secret. Ukraine might try to place the plant underground, but that would increase the time needed to construct the plant.
So while it isn't technically impossible for Ukraine to harvest the plutonium from its spent fuel, it wouldn't be something Ukraine could do quickly or cheaply. Building a reprocessing facility would probably take years -- years in which it would be exposed to Russian attack.
Note: Up above, I said Fat Man used 8 kg of Pu. Of course, it used 6 kg, not 8kg. The @iaeaorg "significant quantity" is 8 kg because it assumes one loses some Pu when making the 6 kg pit and I wanted a number of the divide with. That's a nuance that I should have explained.
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According to Kim Yo Jong, the explosive power or "yield" of the Hwasan-31, pictured below, is the same as 900 tons of TNT -- that's much smaller than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima (15,000 tons) or Nagasaki (21,000 tons).
The first indication will be a statement from @USGS_Quakes. Some time after that, the @CTBTO will also issue a statement. Here is what those looked like for the last test.
I am coming around to the idea that Israel's stocks of Arrow-2 and -3 interceptors are either depleted from April or are being saved for more sensitive targets. A little thread on cost effectiveness at the margins.
The US fired 12 interceptors during this engagement from the destroyers Bulkeley and Cole. Assuming they were SM-3 interceptors, that represents the production run for an entire year, at a cost of about $400 million total. (Each interceptor is about $30 million.)
Arrow-2 and -3 production rates are classified, but Arrow-3 is more expensive than SM-3 at about $50 million per interceptor. You can see lots of Israeli officials talking about the need to reduce the cost of interceptors and increase production rates. defensedaily.com/israeli-arrow-…
I think the three big takeaways are: 1. That's likely Kangson. It *is* an enrichment plant. 2. The centrifuges are more advanced than the ones Hecker described in 2010. 3. KCNA did not to show the plant staff or the control room. Someone read about STUXNET.
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As @ColinZwirko reported, the @JamesMartinCNS OSINT team concluded last night that this facility was most likely the presumed uranium enrichment plant at Kangson. I spent the morning quadruple-checking. I think they're right. nknews.org/pro/north-kore…
Here is the team's reasoning. North Korea released 5 images -- 4 inside the "big" hall and 1 inside the annex that @ColinZwirko first noticed under construction in March of this year. nknews.org/pro/north-kore…
Our friends at @planet have a really nice series of images of the "Typhon" missile launchers that the US has temporarily deployed in the Philippines. A couple of observations.
The Mid-Range Capability (MRC) or "Typhon" (named after a Greek giant just to please @tomkarako) is a @USArmy missile system capable of launching the ~500 km-range SM-6 and the ~2000 km-range Tomahawk missiles. There is a nice CRS report on the system. crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF…
@tomkarako @USArmy The deployment of the system to the Philippines is temporary and coincides with a series of US-RP military exercises. US officials, however, have avoided specifying how long "temporary" will be. usarpac.army.mil/Our-Story/Our-…
Russia conducted an exercise in which it practiced starting a nuclear war. A short thread. iz.ru/1699925/2024-0…
We get to see a convoy of Iskander vehicles -- a very rare security vehicle, some transloaders, some containerized missiles (ballistic and cruise) and some support vehicles.
We also get to see what seems to be a warhead convoy, although we don't have great reference imagery. Still, we see a different, also very rare security vehicle and some mundane looking trucks, which isn't much but its what we'd expect for the 12 GUMO.
After the US transmogrified Qasem Soleimani into his final form as a a parade float, Iran conducted a big missile strike against a US airbase in Iraq. Miraculously, no one else died.Did a whole pod ep on it.
Some implications for this morning. Season 2, Episode 5: The Worst Case Scenario (Almost) middlebury.edu/deal-podcast
Iran was prepared for a significant escalatory response by the US -- so much so that a jumpy Tor SAM crew shot down a civilian airliner (PS752) taking off from Tehran International Airport, killing all 176 people on board. cnn.com/2023/04/17/mid…
The US minimized the impact of the strike -- correctly stating that no one was killed in strike and incorrectly claiming that no significant injuries (Traumatic brain injuries are not "headaches".) However, by not responding, the situation was allowed to deescalate. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…