LTV:CAC has become a somewhat controversial metric in DTC. Commonly used in SaaS, LTV:CAC in consumer brands is hotly debated as to whether or not this SHOULD apply
So here's a dedicated thread DEBUNKING THE MYTHS and explaining EVERYTHING you need to know about LTV:CAC 👇👇
1/ Definition
Ok, the definition is the root of all problems. Often, people look at LTV as the lifetime REVENUE per customer
That's fine, its a worthwhile thing to track
BUT; LTV in the context of LTV:CAC is the LIFETIME CONTRIBUTION per customer, not revenue
2/ Contribution Margin
So lets just get this out of the way. Contribution Margin in ecommerce is DIFFERENT than CM in retail.
I am SICK of seeing 'CM1' & 'CM 2' etc for profit after product costs & then after shipping
CM is profit after ALL variable expenses incl logistics
1/ 1.0 LTV:CAC
If contribution per customer divided by CAC = 1.0, this means your unit economics are breakeven. Include any level of opex and you're burning cash. You can't grow without burning incremental cash, and you're flat
3/ 2.0x LTV:CAC
If Contribution per customer/CAC = 2.0, you pay back CAC and have enough left to acquire another customer. Great work - you now get to reinvest in getting 1 new customer for every 1 acquired, driving 1:1, or linear, growth:
4/ 3.0 LTV:CAC
This is where LTV:CAC becomes a clearly useful metric, and why 3.0x is the gold standard in venture capital.
When contribution dollars/CAC = 3.0x, you have acquired a customer, say for 1 dollar, and now you have TWO dollars left over generated by ONE customer
5/
Now, everyone ONE customer you acquire creates enough profit to acquire TWO more customers.
1 Customer = acquire +2 more
+2 more = acquire +4more
+4 more = acquire +8more
This compounds into exponential growth, and your curve looks like a hockey stick
6/ THE PROBLEM
The key to LTV:CAC is understanding the idea that you're creating enough PROFIT to acquire +2more customers for everyone customer acquired
If ur looking at LTV on a sales basis, and you have a 3.0, if your CM ratio per order is even 50%, you are actually a 2.0
7/ But here's the kicker
Time matters. If you have a beautiful 3.0 LTV:CAC but it takes 36 months to realize the CAC, you are actually WORSE OFF from an IRR perspective than someone with a 2.0 on first purchase
In other words, too long of a payback period negates this
8/ When you should use LTV:CAC
When you KNOW your unit economics. This is a data problem, not an intelligence or awareness problem. In other words, you don't know your unit economics on amazon without having built some tool to help you. You do know cohort analytics from shopify
9/ Common LTV:CAC pitfalls
1. Looking at revenue LTV exclusively 2. Using gross sales in LTV 3. Not having insights into amazon cohorts 4. Not including ALL VARIABLE EXPENSES (3PL) 5. Not performing accruals during cohort analysis (i.e., crediting returns to proper customers)
9/ In summary
LTV:CAC is a fine, maybe even good metric to track. Oftentimes mistakes around the calculations and thought processes are made, which make it a VERY dangerous north star
It works, but you have to know what you're doing and take it in context with every other KPI
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COVID subsidies, Ransomware, insider trading, Rocky Financials, SPACs, and of course - Crypto.
Breaking down why Lush is the next big Private Equity deal in consumer👇👇
1/ First a brief history on Lush
Lush Cosmetics, founded in 1995 by Mark Constantine & Liz Weir, is a british cosmetics retailer that sells hundreds of millions of dollars worth of beauty products like bath bombs, soaps, and skincare
2/
Lush never raised anything from investors. its a super ethics and sustainability focused brand - avoiding things like excessive packaging, animal testing, and other things that those dirty dirty capitalist investors force you to do
Allbirds stock trades below $1 per share, or ~$100m market cap
Most people just say 'DTC is hard' when telling the story of allbirds - but there's a deeper lesson in this story, and one that I think every DTC operator should hear
let's break down where Allbirds went wrong 👇👇
1/ A brief history of allbirds
Founded in 2015 by Tim Brown and Joey Zwillinger, Allbirds saw massive adoption quickly
2015 - Lerer Hippeau Seed Round
2016 - $1.1m Sales / $7.5M Maveron Series A
2017 - $27m sales / $17.5M Tiger Series B
2018 - Unicorn status
2/ IPO
In November of 2021, Allbirds IPOed on the NASDAQ under ticker: BIRD in an offering that raised $300m+. The stock closed that day at about $29, or +90% from IPO price.
All things considered, it was actually a pretty good initial run as a public company
Yesterday, Omsom - an Asian Food brand - was acquired in an asset sale by DayDayCook, a company with a market cap today of $20m, for $11.7m in total potential consideration
This deal structure was interesting and is beneficial for CPG founders to understand👇👇
First, I have seen some diagnoses of this acquisition as ‘Omsom sold for 3x sales’ - I find that misleading at best and dangerous at worst
Founder delirium around exit opportunities is a real problem. in general - subscale brands have not exited for a ‘revenue multiple.’
DayDay Cook (DDC) a $20M market cap company today, is public and disclosed a lot of details around the deal:
$HIMS stock is popping 10%+ after hours after the company announced it is increasing its revenue and profit expectations for the year.
let's break down the report👇👇
First, some juicy KPIs for the DTC nerds:
- MER: 2.13
- AOV: $109 (up from $90 a year ago, reflecting increased units per transaction (UPT))
- CAC*: $607
- Retention (2 years+): 85%
- CAC Payback Period: >1 year (*10 months)
- SG&A as a % of revenue: 21%
$HIMS now expects at least $120M in adjusted EBITDA for the full year 2024 on at least $1.2B in revenue, representing about a 10% adj. EBITDA margin for the year.
Remember, stocks trade on future expectations, so the report is to support the guidance