Thread by @Tatarigami_UA

The second part of Frontelligence Insight's investigation, based on leaked emails and documents provided by @CyberResUa, reveals new details about Russia's 2022 struggles to produce critical Su-57 components due to reliance on Western parts. 🧵Thread with investigation details:

2/ In the first part of our investigation, we examined the correspondence between Almaz-Antei's affiliate "Red Banner" and Joint Stock Company "Mikropribor" discussing how a critical component, the MPPU-50, put state contracts for Su-57 production at risk

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1839064115093942688

3/ As we discovered, the MPPU-50 module is used in the L-band antenna system (N036L-1-01) for the radar complex of the Sh-121 weapon control system on Su-57. The leaked documents reveal a decision to expand production to additional facilities to fulfill the contract.

4/ Frontelligence Insight found that the Research Institute "Mikropribor" agreed with two facilities, "Zavod Mikropribor" and "Krasnoye Znamya," to duplicate the production of the MPPU-50 module.

5/ The agreement between United Aircraft Corporation, Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute, and the Research Institute "Mikropribor" shows that the MPPU-50 is part of the "Megapolis" project (the 2nd phase of the Su-57 modernization)

6/ One of the emails between a Mikropribor employee and Alexandr Mishchenko - later identified as the Chief Engineer of the Mikropribor Research Institute, included an Excel document with detailed information about the MPPU-50, most notably the critical foreign components.

7/ The Excel document reveals that the MPPU-50 module relies heavily on various components, including microchips and circuit board elements. These parts are sourced from manufacturers in Japan, the United States, India, China, and Germany.

8/ Our team assesses that nearly all these components are used in civilian and dual-use electronics, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent Russia from acquiring them. These parts can be easily purchased online and delivered to Russia through third countries

9/ Sanctions are effective, forcing Russia to search for these parts, likely at higher costs. However, since these components are easily acquired and transported, the West must reassess its ability to use sanctions as a deterrent and evaluate what they can achieve during the war

10/ Another clear signal is that Russia has been unable to establish its own semiconductor or circuit board production. The war is unlikely to change this, as it not only requires production volumes that Russia's economy can't support but also needs experienced professionals

11/ Despite Russia's boastful claims of a self-sufficient military-industrial complex that can rely solely on Russian and Chinese parts, the reality is that modern weapons production in Russia is nearly impossible without Western components in its electronics.

12/ Maintaining sanctions against companies such as Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute, Almaz-Antei, Sukhoi, Plant Mikropribor, Guskov Research Institute, and RedBanner are mandatory to make it more difficult for Russia to quickly rebuild its modern military capabilities.

13/ Thank you for reading our report. Please don't forget to help us increase awareness and extend our reach: like, retweet, and comment on the first message of the thread to boost visibility.