THREAD: Today, Israel assassinated Muhammad Afif, Hizbullah’s media head, killing him along with other civilians in a Christian residential neighbourhood of Beirut. Beyond its clear violations of international humanitarian law, the timing of this assassination exposes Israel’s strategic failures and reflects a campaign fuelled by desperation and a desire for retribution. 1/
The fact that Israel waited this long to target Afif, a figure who moved openly and publicly, exposes the ineffectiveness of its earlier strikes. After targeting monumental figures like Nasrallah—who was not only the head of Hizbullah but also the leader of the entire Resistance Axis—and the entirety of Hizbullah’s senior military leadership, Israel’s failure to meaningfully weaken the organization only makes its desperation more apparent. Resorting to lower-ranking civilian officials like Afif underscores the brazen futility of its tactics. 2/
Earlier this week, Israel launched its expanded ground offensive, marking "Phase 2," intended to push toward Hizbullah's so-called "second line" of defense. This offensive now involves the 36th Division, Israel's largest armored formation. Yet, despite this escalation, Israel has failed to secure territorial gains beyond a few km into Lebanon, exposing the futility of its efforts and the exhaustion of its target bank. 3/
Operations like this are designed to have psychological impact, but they habitually fail even in that regard. Amid U.S.-mediated negotiations, the targeting of Afif reflects a misguided and ultimately futile attempt to pressure Hizbullah and the Lebanese state into acqueiscing to Israel’s demands. The choice to carry out the assassination in a Christian neighbourhood adds a secondary layer to this strategy, aiming to inflame sectarian tensions between Christians and Shia, thereby deepening Lebanon’s internal instability. 4/
Neither of these objectives will be achieved, yet Israel is clearly intent on escalating its campaign of intimidation—not just against Hizbullah but against Lebanon as a whole. This will likely involve further massacres of displaced Shia in host communities, the destruction of more towns and villages to render them uninhabitable, attacks on sacred sites such as mosques, churches, and burial grounds, and increased targeting of Hizbullah political officials and civilian institutions. This may even extend to democratically elected representatives of the Lebanese state—elections consistently overseen by international and Western observers. 5/
Setting aside all moral, ethical, and legal considerations, and judging Israel’s actions purely through the cold, pragmatic lens of realpolitik, this war is set to end not only without achieving a single one of its objectives but with Israel emerging significantly weaker. This is because the historically unparalleled scale of violence it has unleashed against Gaza and Lebanon has exhausted nearly all conceivable methods of force, leaving it with nothing further to escalate. Such overreach follows the law of diminishing returns, where greater violence yields increasingly limited results, ultimately undermining its strategic position. 6/
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THREAD: While A Trump victory will likely change little in U.S. policy toward Gaza and Lebanon, at least in the short term, it will signal a shift in approach—from a neocon liberal administration that uses deceit and diplomatic cover to distance itself from its support for Israel’s campaigns against Hizbullah and Hamas, to a far-right administration which will behave in a more unapologetically militaristic way. In other words, such a shift would sharpen the battle lines, replacing diplomatic pretense with more direct confrontation. 1/
While Nasrallah previously labeled Trump “among the worst, if not the worst” U.S. president following his 2020 defeat over the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, it was ultimately Biden who actively assisted Israel in targeting Nasrallah. With this and Harris’ genocidal record in mind, Hizbullah’s new Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, reiterated today that the outcome of the U.S. elections “holds no value” for the movement, emphasizing that Hizbullah relies on its battlefield strength rather than on U.S. political outcomes or ceasefire negotiations. 2/
This particularly the case considering Hizbullah's and Hamas' experience with the Biden-Harris administration, which engaged in over a year of calculated deception, using Gaza ceasefire talks as a front for Israel’s ethnic cleansing campaign. They also constructed a temporary pier, presented as a humanitarian aid project for Palestinians, but later used by Israel in a hostage rescue operation that resulted in the massacre of 270 Palestinian civilians. 3/
THREAD: Israel's campaign of extensive destruction across southern Lebanon - flattening over 37 towns and obliterating 40,000 homes - may appear decisive through the lens of linear, tactical thinking. Similarly, the targeting of Hizbullah's political and military leadership could be seen as markers of victory. Yet many in media and policy circles mistakenly assume this level of destruction and loss signifies Hizbullah's weakening, the Resistance Axis's disarray, and the imminent defeat of both. This misconception arises from two key issues: 1/
First, there is a fundamental disagreement over the appropriate metrics for assessing power, victory and defeat. Israel’s linear, tactical and destructive approach to progress focuses on quantifiable gains, while Hizbullah and the Resistance Axis follow a non-linear approach to progress, grounded in a cyclical, long-term strategy that prioritizes resilience and sustained impact. Secondly, even judged by the linear standards favoured by Hizbullah's critics, the evidence suggests it is Israel that is failing to achieve its objectives and facing major setbacks, not the other way around. 2/
While the massive losses Hizbullah incurred—from the pager strikes to the elimination of its entire military command and top political leadership—may seem devastating to outside observers, Hizbullah appears to have absorbed them, as indicated by its sustained military effectiveness. This resilience aligns with its cyclical approach to conflict, encapsulated in Nasrallah’s assertion in his last speech on September 19, ‘One day for us from our enemy, and one day for our enemy from us.’ Hizbullah views conflict as a long-term process of wearing down its adversary through attrition, where success is measured through sustainability and resilience. Progress is seen as cumulative—a strategy it calls ‘accumulating points’—with time itself wielded as a strategic weapon. 3/
THREAD: Israel’s sweeping evacuation orders and strikes across Baalbek today are yet more evidence of its systematic targeting of Lebanon’s Shia community, reinforcing concerns of an intentional ethnic cleansing campaign. This is not confined to Baalbek; it’s part of a broader strategy that combines direct ethnic cleansing with ethnic cleansing by proxy, as Israel reportedly employs right-wing Christian groups and militias to enforce Shia expulsion—and repeated secondary displacement—on its behalf. 1/
Israel’s actions go far beyond issuing evacuation orders or targeting overwhelmingly Shia areas in Lebanon, like the South and Beirut’s Dahyeh. Entire historic cities like Baalbek and Tyre have faced both evacuation orders and direct strikes, while entire villages along the border have been leveled through controlled demolitions to ensure they remain uninhabitable, preventing any chance of return—a core element of ethnic cleansing. Residential buildings housing displaced Shia communities across various regions of Lebanon are also under direct attack, underscoring the expansive and deliberate nature of this campaign. 2/
The scale and specificity of these actions point to intentions that surpass both military objectives and targeted displacement, indicating a calculated effort to alter Lebanon’s demographic landscape permanently. For Lebanon’s Shia community, this war has become existential—they are the direct targets of Israel’s campaign, facing Netanyahu's declared vision of a "New Middle East" in which they have no place. 3/
THREAD: Israel has committed a significant number of war crimes in Lebanon over the past 72 hours, facilitated by U.S. political cover. This was demonstrated through Amos Hochstein’s visit to Beirut yesterday and Antony Blinken’s trip to Israel today, once again showing how the U.S. wields diplomacy as a weapon of mass destruction. 1/
Hochstein’s proposal has been roundly condemned as a "surrender deal," offering Lebanon de facto Israeli occupation, by tightening the noose on Hizbullah and effectively placing the country under indirect Israeli control, in exchange for an ultimately unsustainable cease-fire. 2/
As revealed by al-Akhbar newspaper, Hochstein's plan would extend US and Israeli control over Lebanon by making significant revisions to UN Resolution 1701. The plan would broaden the authority of “international” forces — meaning allies of Israel—beyond the Litani River, granting them the power to inspect and patrol without Lebanese consent. It calls for more troops, increased foreign surveillance of Lebanon’s borders, ports, and airports, and allows these forces to enter private property with the Lebanese army. 3/
THREAD: Tomorrow, October 17, will mark one month since Israel launched its war on Lebanon, that was set off with the mass casualty terrorist attack on over 4000 pager users, and escalating to the carpet bombing of southern Lebanon, culminating in the assassination of Hezbollah's entire military leadership and Seyyid Hasan Nasrallah. Instead of causing the anticipated collapse of the movement, these very harsh blows which occurred in quick succession, only seem to have invigorated it, and demonstrated its anti-fragility. What was intended to weaken Hizbullah has spectacularly backfired, highlighting how Israel fundamentally misread the group and, even after 42 years of close surveillance, still clearly does not understand its enemy. 1/
Had any other state in the region, including Israel, been confronted with a similar scenario, it would have likely spiralled into chaos, civil war, and succumbed to invasion. Far from collapsing like many states would, Hizbullah’s asymmetric advantage enabled it not only to reconstitute itself organisationally and maintain its command, control, and operational continuity but also to inflict substantial losses on the Israeli military. 2/
These tactical victories include, among others, a strike on the elite Golani Brigade in Binyamina on Sunday, which killed 4 and injured 67, as well as today’s close combat clashes in the Ramia–Aita Al-Shaab–Qawzah triangle, where Hizbullah's ambush resulted in over 49 injuries so far. This is over and above dozens of similar incidents over the past few weeks which have resulted in dozens of Israeli casualties. All of this occurred while Hizbullah was still reeling from the impact of these monumental losses, and the displacement of most of its support base. 3/
THREAD: US and Israeli officials are already discussing plans for “the day after" or a “post-Hizbullah phase” in Lebanon, as if the outcome of Israel's campaign of state terrorism against the country is a foregone conclusion. Reports on the US’ “regime change” efforts effectively signal a push toward de-democratization—replacing one of the region’s most democratic state with another authoritarian US client regime. 1/
While this may seem like an effort to gain political capital by projecting false confidence in Hizbullah's weakness, the Resistance’s strong battlefield performance, preventing any Israeli incursions along 4 different axes for nearly two weeks, suggests it's more likely a US-Israeli attempt to compensate for the lack of military success on the ground. 2/
US officials are pushing to eliminate Hizbullah politically and reshape the country’s political landscape, framing the current crisis as a crucial opportunity for radical change. They seek to end Hizbullah’s alleged control over state institutions, encouraging its right wing Christian, and self-styled “independent” and “reformist” political rivals to prepare for a new phase without the movement. As part of this broader strategy, they are advocating for both new parliamentary elections and breaking the presidential deadlock, with a focus on installing the army chief as their preferred candidate to shift the political balance in their favour. 3/