Early reports suggest that Ukraine's use of ATACMS missiles may come with specific geographic limitations.
This nuance might significantly influence the outcomes of their use. Here’s a breakdown of what we can expect, given that the information about limitations is correct🧵:
2/ As reported before by our team Frontelligence Insight, Russian forces have moved many key air assets beyond ATACMS range, leaving mainly helicopters and close-support jets at the Kursk airfield within striking distance, reducing high-value targets
3/ Russia has a vast network of makeshift ammo depots, command posts, rail stations, and other tactical sites in Kursk oblast. However, their sheer number far outstrips the limited missiles available to Ukraine.
4/ Ukraine faces difficulties with limited salvo sizes and significant ATACMS interception rates, reducing the odds of consistently successful strikes. Our team has detailed these dynamics in a dedicated report before, and they should be factored into expectations.
5/ ATACMS variants differ in range and warhead type: some with unitary warheads, others with submunitions. Not all can reach 300 kilometers or target fortified structures, limiting the options further
6/ Quite serious doubts remain over whether Ukraine will be allowed to target Russian oil refineries or energy infrastructure, as the U.S. has opposed similar operations before. While this remains speculative, there is a good chance that critical infrastructure might be excluded
7/ ATACMS will aid Ukraine on the battlefield without a doubt, but expectations should be tempered. Their use is unlikely to dramatically impact Russian or North Korean-linked forces in Kursk, delivering incremental tactical gains rather than immediate and decisive outcomes.
8/ The goal is not to discourage public sentiment but to set realistic expectations, to avoid future speculation about why ATACMS didn’t shift the war’s tide or destroy the Russo-Korean forces in Kursk Oblast.
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The second part of Frontelligence Insight's investigation, based on leaked emails and documents provided by @CyberResUa, reveals new details about Russia's 2022 struggles to produce critical Su-57 components due to reliance on Western parts. 🧵Thread with investigation details:
2/ In the first part of our investigation, we examined the correspondence between Almaz-Antei's affiliate "Red Banner" and Joint Stock Company "Mikropribor" discussing how a critical component, the MPPU-50, put state contracts for Su-57 production at risk
3/ As we discovered, the MPPU-50 module is used in the L-band antenna system (N036L-1-01) for the radar complex of the Sh-121 weapon control system on Su-57. The leaked documents reveal a decision to expand production to additional facilities to fulfill the contract.
One point of tension between Zelensky and the Biden admins was the issue of allowing ATACMS strikes inside Russia. Frontelligence Insight conducted geospatial analysis and spoke with former U.S. officials and experts from leading US think tanks. Summary of our report🧵:
2/ When a Pentagon spokesperson suggested that Russia had moved assets capable of KAB strikes from airfields within ATACMS range, the statement was correct. Our research confirms that Russia relocated Su-34/35 jets from bases like Voronezh Air Base.
3/ At the same time, our analysis of satellite imagery from September 28 reveals that at least 14 combat and transport helicopters, along with eight Su-25 close-air-support jets, were stationed at the Kursk airport when the images were captured.
Ukraine is likely approaching the final stages of the active phase of the war. I suggest taking a look at my assessment, which draws on General Budanov’s overlooked speech at the Yalta Conference, along with insights from other reports and assessments
🧵Thread:
2/ Any war of attrition tests endurance, economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war continues, these issues intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point. Production and the capacity to replace losses are tangible factors that can be projected
3/ One notable point from Budanov’s speech was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024.
Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tank models from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is no longer in production.
After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
An alleged drone strike has targeted the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, according to early reports. The depot, closely monitored by Frontelligence Insight for its role in artillery ammo logistics, gained international attention in 2023 following the arrival of North Korean ammo.
🧵Thread
2/ Krasnodar Governor Veniamin Kondratyev reported that two UAVs targeting Tikhoretsk were "suppressed", with debris causing a fire and detonation of flammable materials. Videos on social media suggest a large denotation
Screenshot from the video posted by @war_monitor_ua
3/ The Tikhoretsk ammo depot was expanded in 2023 to store North Korean munitions. Most ammo arrived by train in containers, unloaded and stored in revetments - essentially pits in the ground under open sky. Civilian trucks then transported the munitions to frontlines
As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red